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Abstract
I begin from the intuitive requirement that a proper explanation of the possibility of 
empirical knowledge cannot assume any empirical knowledge in order to explain its 
possibility. But in conjunction with a radical scepticism I call ‘the Agrippan 
problematic’ this requirement leads to the ostensibly paradoxical observation that we 
require empirical knowledge to explain the possibility of empirical knowledge, and yet 
we cannot assume any empirical knowledge in order explain its possibility. This 
ostensibly paradoxical observation is at the heart of that problematic.
That observation is paradoxical, and not a straight contradiction, in virtue of 
how the Agrippan sceptic argues. But we should say that it is ostensibly paradoxical 
because the challenge to the epistemologist is to show why it is not paradoxical. To that 
end I delineate four applications of the general argumentative methodology of the 
Agrippan sceptic in regards to four epistemic loci I identify within the traditional notion 
of a justification or warrant for a belief. The most prominent of those epistemic loci is 
that of a justification itself, and in application to that locus the argumentative 
methodology of the Agrippan sceptic is commonly known as ‘the epistemic regress 
argument’. I suggest that a formally sufficient answer to that argument should also 
enable an answer to the other three applications of the Agrippan sceptic’s argumentative 
methodology.
There are various responses in the literature to the epistemic regress argument, 
however I focus on three. They are: ‘foundationalism’, ‘coherentism’, and finally the 
epistemology of Wilfrid Sellars. Each in a different way questions the premise of the 
epistemic regress argument. That premise is that all justification must be inferential. I 
indentify two assumptions which underlie that premise: firstly, that the only way in 
which a belief can justify another belief is inferentially; and secondly, that a justification 
for some proposition must always be epistemically distinct from a belief in that 
proposition.
The foundationalist questions that second assumption, essentially claiming that 
certain beliefs can justify themselves. However, I argue that we simply cannot make 
intelligible sense of the idea that a belief can justify itself except in certain specific 
cases. The coherentist questions neither assumption, instead suggesting that the 
Agrippan sceptic assumes that inferential justification is linear. However, I argue that 
the coherentist’s position is a holistic foundationalism, and suffers from the same 
defects as that other position. Sellars, however, questions that first assumption, arguing
that a belief can justify another belief without being inferentially connected to it. I argue 
that Sellars’s epistemology may be taken to have the resources to illustrate that 
ostensibly paradoxical observation to be just that—ostensibly paradoxical.
Table of Contents
Introduction P.l
Chapter One: Knowledge and Scepticism P.9
—Introduction P.9
—§ 1.1. Knowledge and Justification P.9
—§1.2. Scepticism and Radical Scepticism P.15
Chapter Two: The Agrippan Problematic P.22
—Introduction P.22
—§2.1. The Agrippan Problematic I: The Epistemic Regress Argument P.23 
—§2.2. The Agrippan Problematic II: The General Argumentative
Methodology of the Agrippan Sceptic P.27
—§2.3. Foundationalism and Coherentism P.36
—§2.4. The Agrippan Problematic III: The Problem of the Criterion P.42 
Chapter Three: Foundationalism and the Agrippan Problematic P.47
—Introduction P.47
—The Evidential Regress Argument and the Appearance Theory P.48
—The Appearance Theory and Fallibility P.53
—Bonjour’s Argument P.58
—The Sense-Datum Theory and Sellars’s Dilemma P.63
Chapter Four: From Logical Atomism to the
Coherence Theory of Concepts P.71
—Introduction P.71
—§4.1. Sellars’s Analysis o f ‘Looks-Talk’ P.71
—§4.2. Three Explanations P.79
Chapter Five: Coherentism and the Agrippan Problematic P.83
—-Introduction P.83
—§5.1. Coherentism and the Epistemic Regress Argument P.83
—§5.2. Coherentism as Foundationalism P.89
Chapter Six: Sellars and the Agrippan Problematic P.94
—Introduction P.94
—§6.1. The Theoretical Introduction of Thoughts P.95
—§6.2. The Two Criteria of Non-Inferential Knowledge and Reports P.103 
—§6.3. Sellars’s Two Hurdles P.109
—§6.4. Sellars and the Epistemic Regress Argument P.117
P.124—§6.5. Another Kind of ‘Ought’
—§6.6. Sellars and the Agrippan Problematic: A Solution
Conclusion
Bibliography
P.129
P.135
P.139
Introduction
Barry Stroud has written:
The philosophical interest in knowledge is general, and in at least two 
different ways. We are interested in all of our knowledge of the world taken 
together, or in some domain characterized in general terms. To ask only 
how we come to know some things in the domain, given that we already 
know certain other things in it, is not to ask about all knowledge of that kind 
in general. And we don’t just want a heterogeneous list of ways of coming 
to know. We want to find a single way, or a small number of very general 
‘ways of knowing’. To explain how they work will be to explain, in general, 
how knowledge of the kind in question is possible. 1 23
In this thesis I am interested in ‘all of our knowledge of the world taken together’, i.e., 
what is normally called ‘empirical knowledge’. That is, ‘We want to understand how 
any [empirical] knowledge at all is possible—how anything we currently accept 
amounts to [empirical] knowledge’. And to limit its purview from the off, in this thesis 
I am only concerned with the first aspect of the generality demanded by such an 
explanation as highlighted by Stroud—that aspect which concerns what such an 
explanation is disbarred from doing, i.e., assuming empirical knowledge in order to 
explain its possibility. This is to say: my investigation will operate under the 
methodological dictate that we will have failed to explain how empirical knowledge is 
possible if we have had to assume empirical knowledge in order to provide that 
explanation.
How does this limit its purview? I suggest that the two aspects of the generality 
demanded by what we might call ‘the traditional epistemological project’, are subject to 
two different, radically sceptical problematics/ Radical scepticism is ‘the claim that our 
beliefs, or our beliefs belonging to some broad category, are never so much as 
justifiable’ .4 Thus, if we make explicit the implicit connection between the notion of 
justification and explanation—‘To show that [re explain how] knowledge is possible is 
to give ourselves reasons to think [re to be justified in thinking] that we are in a position 
to know things’—then radical scepticism can be understood as the claim that we cannot 
explain how empirical knowledge is possible because we cannot be justified in believing
1 Barry Stroud, ‘Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge’, pp. 3—4, in Barry Stroud, Understanding 
Human Knowledge, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 1—8.
2 Barry Stroud, ‘Understanding Human Knowledge in General’, p. 101, in Stroud, Understanding Human 
Knowledge, pp. 99— 121.
3 Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 47, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). From hence, 
UD.
4 Ibid, p. 48.
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that we have any empirical knowledge.5 We may begin by naively asking how empirical 
knowledge is possible, and noting that only an explanation exhibiting those aspects of 
generality highlighted above will really be satisfactory in answering such a question, but 
that question only gets its bite when we encounter arguments to the effect that empirical 
knowledge is impossible, i.e., when we encounter radical scepticism.
The thought, therefore, that the two aspects of the generality demanded by the 
traditional epistemological project are subject to two different, radically sceptical 
problematics, is suggestive of the fact that there are multiple ways in which the radically 
sceptical claim that we cannot explain how empirical knowledge is possible because we 
cannot be justified in believing that we have any empirical knowledge can be brought to 
bear on that project. And, indeed, that is what we find. That aspect of the generality 
demanded by that project which 1 shall focus upon is ultimately concerned with the— 
ostensibly, it must be hoped—paradoxical observation that we require empirical 
knowledge to explain empirical knowledge, and yet we cannot assume any empirical 
knowledge to explain empirical knowledge. I shall call this ‘the Agrippan problematic’. 
On the other hand, that second aspect of the generality demanded by that project which I 
shall not focus upon is ultimately concerned with the—again, ostensibly, it must be 
hoped—paradoxical observation that what we get through the fundamental way or ways 
of knowing empirical propositions underdetermines any claims to empirical knowledge. 
This is ‘the Cartesian problematic’. In fact, it is perhaps better to say that the Cartesian 
problematic is concerned with both aspects of the generality demanded by that project, 
but the first one via the second one; this does not really alter what has been said above: 
the Cartesian problematic is still primarily concerned with the second aspect of that 
generality, and the Agrippan problematic—despite appearances and against 
epistemologico-historical tradition—really has nothing to do with that second aspect at 
all.6 Thus to say, as I have, that the purview of my investigation is limited is to say that
5 Ibid, p. 97.
6 That is, I do not think that the Agrippan problematic is centred around our fallibility, and specifically 
our fallibility in perceptual matters, as it is often taken to be. Even if we had infallible perceptual 
capacities that problematic would still be an issue. What it pushes us towards is not an epistemology in 
which experience has to play a justifying role, but an epistemology which is epistemic subject or agent 
centred, i.e., one in which justification is considered as an action. Of course, matters of experience come 
up when we turn to the much more difficult, Kantian problem of fitting the mind or agency into nature 
without giving up on the intuitively essential characteristics of either—spontaneity and independence, 
respectively. For a suggestion towards the idea that it is our fallibility which is at the heart of the 
Agrippan problematic, cf. Lawrence Bonjour, The Structure o f Empirical Knowledge, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 7 (from hence, SEK), where Bonjour claims that in an 
‘epistemically ideal situation’, where ‘truth were somehow immediately and unproblematically 
accessible’, ‘the concept of justification would be of little significance and would play no independent 
role in cognition’. On the contrary: I will attempt to suggest that it is exactly justification’s ‘independent
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it is only concerned with the first of the two different, radically sceptical problematics 
just roughly delimited. A successful undermining of the Agrippan problematic does not 
amount to an explanation of how empirical knowledge is possible, only a partial or
n
incomplete contribution to that project.
To focus on the Agrippan problematic is essentially to focus on the question of 
how our empirical knowledge is structured. That is, the Agrippan sceptic is want to 
suggest that we cannot have empirical knowledge because no workable structure of 
empirical justification can be identified and without such a structure we cannot explain 
how empirical knowledge is possible. For intuitively it is understandable that, if we are 
trying to explain how empirical knowledge is possible without assuming any empirical 
knowledge, there must be some originary point at which such a putative explanation 
takes us, metaphorically, from having no empirical knowledge to having some empirical 
knowledge, at which juncture it would appear that we have set out upon such a 
structuring of empirical justification.
Now to change tack somewhat, in regards to the question of how empirical 
knowledge is structured—essentially, then, the question of how empirical justification is 
structured—Wilfrid Sellars once wrote:
One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests 
on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great 
Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it 
begin?). Neither will do.* 78
We shall come to recognise ‘the picture of an elephant which rests on a tortoise’ as that 
epistemological position known as ‘foundationalism’, although in describing it so baldly 
Sellars at least fails to allude to the rich variety of foundationalisms in the
role in cognition’ qua emblematic o f agency, so to speak, that allows us to escape the Agrippan
problematic, and that goes for such an ‘epistemically ideal situation’ as well.
7 This may be thought to be somewhat problematic. I take it, although I cannot argue for this position 
here, that Sellars has an argument against the Cartesian problematic available to him, although he never 
explicitly employs it as such. That argument is to the effect that if we cannot test for something then we 
should regard it as only conceivable and not possible, thus making something like the dreaming 
possibility or Evil Demon hypothesis ruled out from the start. However, it does not resort to a crude 
verificationism to accomplish this, but rather something like an appeal to what John McDowell has 
termed an ‘anti-anti-realism’. Indeed, we might think of Sellars’s argument as an analogue at the level of 
the objectivity of truth of McDowell’s understanding of the objectivity of meaning. For Sellars’s 
argument cf. Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable Without Them’, Philosophy 
of Science, 15 (1948), pp. 287—315. For discussion of that paper cf. John Haugeland, ‘Truth and Rule- 
Following’, in John Haugeland, Having Thought, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1998), pp. 305—361. For McDowell’s talk of ‘anti-anti-realism’ cf. John McDowell ‘Preface’, p. viii, in 
John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 
pp. vii—ix, and his understanding of the objectivity of meaning cf. John McDowell, ‘Wittgenstein on 
Following a Rule’, in McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, pp. 221—262.
8 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy o f Mind, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), §38, pp. 78—79, original emphasis. From hence, EPM.
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epistemologico-historical record. (Which is not to say that all foundationalisms aren % 
effectively, pictures of elephants resting on tortoises.) The other epistemological 
position he alludes to—‘the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its 
tail in its mouth’—we shall come to recognise as referring to that epistemological 
position called ‘coherentism’. Furthermore, we shall come to recognise both of his 
pointed questions as being right on target: we must ask the foundationalist ‘What 
supports the tortoise?’, and we must ask the coherentist ‘Where does it begin?’ or better: 
where does your structure of empirical justification begin?
But what about Sellars’s own suggestion concerning the structure of empirical 
justification? This will be my quarry, although here due warning should be given that 
my elucidation of Sellars’s proposed structure of empirical justification will be, for the 
simple necessity of space, only partial and incomplete. That is, Sellars’s thought is 
incredibly systematic and to focus, effectively, solely on its epistemological dimension 
must necessarily do its scope a disservice. I shall not, then, focus on his philosophies of 
language, mind, perception, and science (even his metaphysics), although these topics 
will be brushed over. Unfortunately, this means that I leave certain elements of this 
thesis playing a merely descriptive role.
I will argue that Sellars’s own suggestion concerning the structure of empirical 
justification, one that is importantly based upon a ;?o«-traditional understanding of what 
it is for a belief to be justified, allows us to successfully undermine the Agrippan 
problematic, i.e., it allows us to illustrate why the ostensibly paradoxical observation 
that the first aspect of the generality demanded by the traditional epistemological project 
mandates that we require empirical knowledge to explain empirical knowledge, and yet 
we cannot assume any empirical knowledge to explain empirical knowledge is only 
ostensibly paradoxical—indeed, it is simply a false paradox. It is in the service of this 
goal that it is necessary to simply describe certain of Sellars’s positions on those topics 
already listed. This will leave it open for the Agrippan sceptic to question my 
conclusion—that Sellars’s epistemology provides the materials to undermine the 
Agrippan problematic, and so provides a workable structure of empirical knowledge— 
by questioning those positions of Sellars’s I have only been able to characterise and not 
defend, though they do not directly fall under the ambit of his problematic.
Before turning in greater detail to these matters, however, it will be useful to 
here delineate the contours of the extended, so to speak, understanding of empirical 
knowledge I shall employ in the proceeding. Put simply, as I shall employ it ‘empirical 
knowledge’ refers to knowledge dependent upon observation. As such its source is
4
experience—experience is the way of knowing empirical knowledge—although there 
are a variety of different sources often recognised within experience. But if we turn to 
matters of justification we might also say that experience is what provides the 
observational evidence for such knowledge, in that it purportedly allows us access to 
those contingent facts, constituted by the plethora of kinds of objects and their panoply 
of properties and relations, which it concerns. Note, then, that there are two suggestions 
here: there is the thought that empirical knowledge is knowledge derived from 
experience, and there is the thought that empirical justification is dependent upon 
observational evidence. One concerns the origin of all empirical knowledge, the other 
the particular justifications of instances of it. But we do not need to make this an 
invidious distinction. In regards to an explanation of how empirical knowledge is 
possible, both the consideration of its source as well as observational evidence will be 
essential ingredients of our being justified in believing that we have any empirical 
knowledge.
A distinction which might be invidious, however, is the aforementioned 
differentiation of sources within experience. For instance, as Stroud writes:
It is clear that the senses are at least very important for human knowledge. . 
Even restricting ourselves to the traditional five senses [re audition, sight, 
smell, taste, and touch] we can begin to appreciate their importance by 
reflecting on how little someone would ever come to know without them. A 
person blind and deaf from birth who also lacked taste buds and a sense of 
smell would know very little about anything, no matter how long he lived.
To imagine him also anaesthetized or without a sense of touch is perhaps to 
stretch altogether to far one’s conception of the human organism, or at least 
a human organism from whom we can hope to learn something about 
human knowledge. The importance of the senses as a source or channel of 
knowledge seems undeniable.9
Here Stroud is making the point that a person without functioning sense organs—who 
lacks what is called ‘outer’ sense—would at least appear to be denied access to mind- 
independent objects, and thus that we would or should object to ceding him knowledge 
of the facts of which they are constituents. That is perfectly sound, yet he goes on to 
claim that assessing the epistemic provenance, so to speak, of the senses, or ‘outer’ 
sense, ‘would then be assessing the credentials of what is often called our... ‘empirical’ 
knowledge’ . 10 But we should be careful with equating knowledge derived from the 
senses simply with empirical knowledge else we might fail to fully recognise a second
9 Barry Stroud, The Significance o f Philosophical Scepticism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
pp. 6— 7.
10 Ibid, p. 7.
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important dimension of the latter. A more inclusive conception of empirical knowledge 
would not restrict ‘the relevant notion of experience’, i.e., the source of empirical 
knowledge, ‘to sense experience in a narrow sense, but should rather be understood to 
include any sort of cognitive factor or element which, whatever its other characteristics 
may be, provides or constitutes information’ concerning matters of contingent fact.11 
That is, introspective and memory knowledge, etc., i.e., knowledge derived from ‘inner’ 
sense, is just as empirical as knowledge of mind-independent objects, say. This is the 
extended understanding of empirical knowledge. Nonetheless, when we enquire as to 
the structure of empirical justification we will find ourselves concerned, more often than 
not, with the epistemic provenance of empirical knowledge derived from the senses. 
This would appear to be a simple consequence of the empiricist proclivities of modem 
epistemology, something from which I shall not demure in general since it raises little 
trouble in the foregoing; I raise this issue now simply because it is of decided 
importance throughout my investigation.
I begin chapter one (§1.1) by introducing what is called ‘the standard analysis of 
knowledge’, moving on to how we should conceive of a reason to believe some 
proposition. I locate four epistemic loci within that notion at which the Agrippan 
problematic may attack the pursuit of empirical knowledge. In the next section (§1.2) I 
give an overview of scepticism.
In chapter two I move onto the Agrippan problematic. In the first section (§2.1) I 
introduce what is called ‘the epistemic regress argument’—the most important 
application of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic— 
highlighting its premise, and uncovering two assumptions which underlie it. In the next 
section (§2.2) I turn to that argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic, 
highlighting how the Agrippan sceptic thinks he can generate the ostensibly paradoxical 
statement at the heart of his problematic. I then suggest that he cannot do so, nor that he 
can argue for the assumptions underlying the premise of the epistemic regress argument. 
However, I also suggest that they are in any case hard to question. In the next section 
(§2.3) I turn to what I have called ‘foundationalism’ and ‘coherentism’, detailing the 
essentials of how those positions seek to respond to the epistemic regress argument. In 
the final section (§2.4) I turn to another application of the argumentative methodology 
of the Agrippan sceptic, that which I call ‘the problem of the criterion’. This leads to the 
most egregious instance of the ostensibly paradoxical observation at the heart of the 
Agrippan problematic.
11 Lawrence Bonjour, SEK, p. 192.
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In chapter three I move onto foundationalism. In the first section (§3.1) I 
describe another application of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan 
problematic which I call ‘the evidential regress argument’. I then detail the simplest way 
in which the foundationalist may respond to that argument—the foundationalist position 
I call ‘the appearance theory’. In the next section (§3.2) I argue that the appearance 
theory is to be objected to for failing to escape the evidential regress argument. In the 
next section (§3.3) I suggest that even if the appearance theory could escape the 
evidential regress argument it would in any case fail to escape the fourth and final 
application of the argumentative methodology of the Agrippan problematic that I 
investigate, the argument I call ‘Bonjour’s argument’. I then detail a foundationalist 
position—what I call ‘the sense-datum theory’—which may be able to escape all four of 
the applications of the argumentative methodology of the Agrippan problematic. 
However, in the final section (§3.4) I argue against the sense-datum theory being able to 
accomplish this feat.
In chapter four 1 turn to the semantic aspect of foundationalism. In the first 
section (§4.1) I turn to Sellars’s analysis of what I call ‘looks-talk’, a major semantic 
crutch of the foundationalist. Via that analysis I argue that the foundationalist’s 
semantic position is also to be questioned. That is, I argue that we should reject what I 
call ‘semantic’ or ‘logical atomism’ in favour of a more holistic semantic account. In 
the final section (§4.2), in looking at how Sellars thinks we might explain his analysis of 
looks-talk, I argue against the ontological claims of the sense-datum theorist and 
introduce one of Sellars’s conceptual innovations, i.e., the theoretical introduction of 
concepts.
In chapter five I turn to coherentism. In the first section (§5.1) I question the 
formal sufficiency of the coherentist’s position in regards to undermining the epistemic 
regress argument, pointing out that his appeal to the notion of coherence importantly 
ignores two of the elements I have previously identified within the notion of a reason to 
believe some proposition. In the final section (§5.2) I argue that the coherentist fails to 
escape the Agrippan problematic because of the formal insufficiency of his central 
appeal, i.e., because it fails to encapsulate those two elements of a reason to believe 
some proposition. I suggest that coherentism is essentially a more holistic 
foundationalism.
In chapter six I turn to Sellars’s epistemology and general philosophy of mind. 
In the first section (§6.1) I detail his account of the theoretical introduction of thoughts. 
In the next sections (§§6.2—6.4) I turn to his epistemology, identifying how he attempts
7
to escape both the epistemic regress argument and Bonjour’s argument. In the final two 
sections (§§6.5—6.6) I criticise and amend the structure of knowledge characterised in 
the previous two sections, going beyond Sellars’s own—flawed—statement of his 
position in important respects. Nonetheless, I make use of one final idea of Sellars’s, 
related to his theoretical introduction of thoughts, which enables that amended position 
to escape the Agrippan problematic.
In conclusion, I situate my amended version of Sellars’s proposed structure of 
knowledge in regards to the morals I have drawn in the preceding from the different 
applications of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic, making 
explicit how it deals with each one. However, I end on an ambivalent note, by 
suggesting that Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge, even amended, faces a 
certain difficulty, although, importantly, not one to be associated with the Agrippan 
problematic. Nonetheless, I conclude by suggesting that, even if Sellars’s proposed 
structure of knowledge is to be rejected because of this difficulty, since it is not 
engendered by the Agrippan problematic the fact that Sellars’s proposed structure of 
knowledge appears to escape the Agrippan problematic is enough to suggest that the 
manner in which it appears to escape that problematic is the manner in which the latter 
must be escaped.
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Chapter One: Knowledge and Scepticism
Introduction
In this chapter we examine certain general issues before beginning the investigation 
proper.
In the first section I present what is called ‘the standard analysis of knowledge’, 
or ‘the tripartite definition of knowledge’, i.e., that an instance of knowledge is an 
instance of a justified true belief. Furthermore, I make two important points concerning 
the notion of justification—one intuitive and one stemming from the first aspect of the 
generality demanded by the traditional epistemological project—as well as identifying 
four epistemic loci at which the Agrippan sceptic will attack the pursuit of empirical 
knowledge.
In the next section (§1.2) I give a short overview of scepticism, differentiating 
philosophical scepticisms from others, local from global, and finally philosophical 
scepticisms which attack knowledge directly or, more radically, via the notion of 
justification.
$1.1. Knowledge and Justification
It is best to start with the question of what an instance of knowledge, be it empirical or 
otherwise, amounts to. I will begin, therefore, by setting out what is called ‘the standard 
analysis of knowledge’, or ‘the tripartite definition of knowledge’, before turning to the 
issue of how we are to understand the notion of justification—or better: what a reason 
to believe amounts to. This will enable me to pinpoint four epistemic loci within the 
notion of justification where the Agrippan problematic may attack the pursuit of 
empirical knowledge.
The standard analysis of knowledge takes an instance of knowledge to amount 
to a justified true belief. That is, an epistemic subject s knows that p  if and only if (from 
hence, iff):
1. p,
2. s believes p,
3. s’s belief that p is justified.
9
To understand this account we should ask why the satisfaction of (1.) and (2.), i.e., s’s 
true belief that p , whilst necessary, is not sufficient for 5 to be in possession of 
knowledge. If I believe that ‘Martians exist’, and Martians do exist as a matter of 
contingent fact, why do these ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ factors, respectively, not 
amount to my being in possession of knowledge? For intuitively the purpose of 
knowledge is the belief o f truth, so why should we not just count true belief as 
knowledge?
A reason along the following lines is often given in defence of the conclusion
that the satisfaction of (1.) and (2.), whilst necessary, is not sufficient for an instance of
knowledge. I could believe that ‘Martians exist’, when Martians do exist as a matter of
contingent fact, without my having a reason to believe that proposition. In such a
scenario my belief that ‘Martians exist’ would only happen to be true—it would be
something like a mere opinion or a lucky guess. So imagine that, having such a true
belief, but without my having a reason to believe its propositional content, I come
across a journal article by a noted scientist which argues for the—ex hypothesi—false
conclusion that on our best, current understanding of the conditions required to originate
and sustain life, Mars, by all accounts, should be life/ess. As a rational being (let us
assume!) it would be reasonable of me to alter my belief in light of this evidence: in
fact, it transpires, I should believe that ‘Martians don’t exist’. It is normal to say that my
belief that ‘Martians exist’, though actually true, was only accidentally so. Knowledge,
• 12on the other hand, is to be understood as «0 /7-accidentally true belief.
Clearly explicit in the above scenario is the suggestion that my true belief that 
‘Martians exist’ would have been non-accidentally so if I had had a reason to believe its 
propositional content. That is, if my true belief that ‘Martians exist’ had been justified.
Now, I want to spend the remainder of this section going over some points 
concerning what a reason to believe amounts to as well as indicating the four epistemic 
loci I flagged above at which the Agrippan problematic may attack the pursuit of 
empirical knowledge.
12 It is now a commonplace that the tripartite definition of knowledge is, at least, necessary but not 
sufficient as a definition of knowledge. This is a consequence of Gettier-type counter-examples, i.e., 
examples of justified true belief which do not amount to knowledge. 1 have no desire to get into the game 
of actually trying to escape such counter-examples, merely to say that, as opposed to jettisoning the 
tripartite definition entirely, it must be my stance that all it requires is supplementation. Indeed, Sellars’s 
proposed structure of empirical knowledge has built into it a possible response to such counter-examples, 
in that it has built into it the idea ‘that a justifying inference cannot yield knowledge if it depends 
essentially on any false lemmas’. For such counter-examples, cf. Edmund Gettier, ‘Is Justified True 
Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis, 23 (1963), pp. 121—123. For quote, cf. M. Williams, UD, p. 94. Williams 
takes this proposal from Gilbert Harman, Thought, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). Also, 
see n. 164, below.
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Perhaps the most intuitive point to be made concerning a reason to believe is 
this: a reason to believe must be indicative of the truth of the proposition it concerns. 
This fits well with the aforementioned intuitive purpose of knowledge, i.e., the belief of 
truth. However, I also take it that attempting to explain how empirical knowledge is 
possible, an attempt that does not assume any empirical knowledge and so respects the 
first aspect of the generality demanded by the traditional epistemological project, entails 
a ‘retreat into subjectivity’: ‘If all knowledge of the world is up for assessment, I cannot 
take for granted anything having to do with my or anyone else’s worldly situation’. In 
other words, an explanation of how empirical knowledge is possible must make it 
intelligible how I myself qua epistemic subject can have a reason to believe the 
proposition that ‘Martians exist’ in my cognitive possession else that explanation will 
fail to respect the first aspect of the generality demanded by the traditional 
epistemological project. And to say that an explanation of how empirical knowledge is 
possible must make it intelligible how I myself qua epistemic subject can have a reason 
to believe that proposition in my cognitive possession entails that it must make it 
intelligible that I myself qua epistemic subject can recognise that a reason to believe 
that proposition is a reason to believe that proposition, i.e., that it is actually or 
unconditionally indicative of the truth of that proposition—that is what it means for me 
to have a reason to believe that proposition in my cognitive possession. An explanation 
of how empirical knowledge is possible would have failed to respect that first aspect of 
the generality demanded by the traditional epistemological project if it did not allow us 
to recognise a reason to believe as a reason to believe. (3.), therefore, is perhaps not 
ideally perspicuous in reflecting this point and should instead be formulated thus:
3*. s’s belief that p is justified for 5.14
The demand that I myself qua epistemic subject be able to recognise a reason to 
believe some proposition as a reason to believe that proposition is of a piece with the
13 M. Williams, UD, p. 99.
14 In putting the matter like this, I may be taken to be suggesting that I am more concerned with what is 
often called ‘doxastic’ justification than ‘propositional’ justification. The latter refers to ‘the propositional 
content of a belief state’, the former ‘the belief state itself. This distinction may be taken to allow that an 
epistemic subject may be propositionally justified in believing a proposition, even if he is not doxastically 
justified in believing that proposition, and, moreover, that he is both propositionally and doxastically 
justified in believing a proposition, but not for the same reason. Since I want to avoid that latter 
consequence, I am really to be understood as demanding that, at some point, an epistemic subject must be 
both propositionally and doxastically justified in believing a proposition for the same reason, if his belief 
in that proposition is to amount to an instance of knowledge for him. For the distinction, cf. Peter Klein, 
‘Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning’, Philosophical Studies, 134 (1; 2007), p. 6.
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thought that if I know that p then I know that I know that p. That is, it is an internalistic 
demand. 15 Effectively, then, I am suggesting that the traditional epistemological project 
is an internalistic enterprise because it mandates that any successful explanation of how 
empirical knowledge is possible must build from a subjective, reflective starting point. 
Knowing that I know that p is clearly something external to my knowing that p, yet for 
that to be possible the internal composition of a reason to believe that p  must be such 
that I can recognise that it is a reason to believe that p. Let us return to our example with 
these thoughts in mind and try to tease out the intuitive composition of a reason to 
believe the proposition that ‘Martians exist’ then.
Let us alter that example slightly: say that I believe that ‘Martians exist’, that 
Martians do exist as a matter of contingent fact, and that I come across a journal article 
which argues for the—ex hypothesi—true conclusion that on our best, current 
understanding of the conditions required to originate and sustain life, there should be 
life on Mars. That article, or the theses it contains, may be understood as acting as 
evidence in favour o f the proposition that ‘Martians exist’. That is, i f  I understand those 
theses, then I can also understand that the proposition ‘Martians exist’ is true, or likely 
to be true, i f  those theses themselves are true, or likely to be true; I can deduce that 
conditional conclusion from those theses (from my occurrent belief in those theses, 
say). So again, like a reason to believe that proposition, we should understand evidence 
in favour of it as being indicative of its truth, even if such indication is in that 
conditional sense. But such evidence does not as yet constitute a reason to believe that 
proposition.
What more is needed? It would appear that I also require some evidence to the 
effect that those theses themselves are true. Yet they themselves—their content—would 
not appear indicative of that fact; something about them external to their content must 
be indicative of that fact. Let us say, to stick with the example above, that they have the 
epistemic property of being formulated by a noted scientist. Now, their having such a 
property in itself has nothing directly to do with whether the proposition that ‘Martians 
exist’ is likely to be true, and so we cannot say that my being cognitively aware of the
15 Note that the appeal to intemalism—and, indeed, a very strong form o f that thesis—is not connected to 
the tripartite definition of knowledge in and of itself. It is a consequence of our basic assumption that the 
traditional epistemological project is so much as intelligible. The point being that, so long as it is assumed 
that that project is so much as intelligible, then the only satisfactory solution to its problems will be an 
internalist one that safeguards iterativity, i.e., a position which allows the recognition of a reason to 
believe some proposition as a reason to believe that proposition—as actually or unconditionally indicative 
of the truth of that proposition. Of course, if it can be proved that the traditional epistemological project 
and its dictates are unintelligible, then such a strong intemalism may not be required, but that is not 
something attempted in this thesis. For the implicit distinction between intemalism and extemalism 
employed here see n. 15, below, which is a more apt place to go into it.
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fact that they have this property, as well as my understanding those theses themselves, 
and so understanding that they are indicative of the truth of the proposition that 
‘Martians exist’ if they themselves are true, or likely to be true, gives me a reason to 
believe that proposition. Which is essentially to say that evidence alone, even when 
tiered, so to speak, as delineated above, is epistemically inert. For even with such 
secondary evidence my evidence in general in favour o f the proposition that ‘Martians 
exist’—both the theses, and the fact that they are formulated by a noted scientist—is 
still only putative evidence in favour of that proposition.
The final element of a reason to believe the proposition that ‘Martians exist’, 
over and above my evidence in general in favour of that proposition, is an inductively 
inferred epistemic principle that licences me to take my putative evidence in general in 
favour of that proposition as actual evidence in general in favour of that proposition, in 
that it suggests that statements which exhibit that epistemic property are likely to be 
true. Only if I have such a principle in addition to my evidence in general in favour of 
the proposition that ‘Martians exist’ will I have a reason to believe that proposition. In 
regards to our example such a principle would amount to something along the lines of 
the conditional statement. ‘I f  those theses have the epistemic property of being 
formulated by that noted scientist, then they are likely to be true’.
If I am in cognitive possession o f all these three elements then I can therefore 
reason like this:
a. In regards to their content the theses are indicative of the likely truth of the 
proposition that ‘Martians exist’ (belief).
b. If those theses themselves are likely to be true, then the proposition that 
‘Martian exist’ is likely to be true (by (a.)).
c. Those theses exhibit the epistemic property of being formulated by a noted 
scientist (belief).
d. If those theses exhibit the epistemic property of being formulated by that noted 
scientist, then those theses are likely to be true (belief).
e. Therefore, those theses are likely to be true (by (c.) and (d.)).
f. Therefore, the proposition that ‘Martians exist’ is likely to be true (by (b.) and
(e.)).
Then, given (f.) and my actual belief that ‘Martians exist’, it will be the case that I can 
know that I know that ‘Martians exist’—I will have a justified true belief that ‘Martians
13
exist’ as well as being aware of the fact that it is justified, i.e., (f.). So note, then, that 
without any of those three elements in my cognitive possession I could not have, and so 
not recognise that I have, a reason to believe that proposition.16
We are now in a position to pinpoint the four epistemic loci within the notion of 
justification where the Agrippan sceptic may attack the pursuit of empirical knowledge. 
Firstly, the Agrippan sceptic will attack the implicit thought of the foregoing that a 
reason to believe seems to be something epistemically distinct from belief in the 
proposition it concerns. That is:
I. The Agrippan sceptic will attack the epistemic distinctness of a reason to 
believe from belief in the proposition it concerns.
Secondly, the Agrippan sceptic will attack the evidence in favour of that proposition 
from the proposition it concerns. For the epistemic distinctness of a reason to believe 
from belief in the proposition it concerns also entails the epistemic distinctness of the 
evidence in favour of that proposition from the proposition it concerns. That is:
II. The Agrippan sceptic will attack the epistemic distinctness of the evidence in 
favour of a proposition from the proposition it concerns.
Thirdly, the Agrippan sceptic will attack the secondary evidence concerning the 
epistemic property exhibited by the evidence in favour of that proposition. For the 
epistemic distinctness of the evidence in favour of that proposition entails the epistemic 
distinctness of the secondary evidence concerning the epistemic property exhibited by 
the evidence in favour of that proposition from the evidence in favour of that 
proposition. That is:
16 If we assume, as we are, that the traditional epistemological project is so much as intelligible, then the 
distinction between intemalism and extemalism should be drawn along the following lines: an externalist 
position will be any position which does not require that an epistemic subject has all three elements of a 
reason to believe some proposition in their cognitive possession for their belief in that proposition to be 
justified for them, i.e., a position which does not require that he recognises that the reason to believe that 
proposition is actually or unconditionally indicative of its truth. This is not, of course, the only manner in 
which this distinction can be drawn; indeed, to repeat: this is all a consequence o f the assumption that the 
traditional epistemological project is so much as intelligible. For more on the problem with extemalism, 
as so defined, re the traditional epistemological project, cf. Stroud, ‘Understanding Human Knowledge in 
General’, pp. 109— 121. It should be noted that Stroud does not think that project is intelligible, although 
he does not therefore think that extemalism is a satisfactory epistemological position, for reasons related 
to Cartesian scepticism. Cf. Barry Stroud, ‘Scepticism and the Senses’, European Journal o f Philosophy,
17 (4; 2009), pp. 559—570.
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III. The Agrippan sceptic will attack the epistemic distinctness of the secondary 
evidence concerning the epistemic property exhibited by the evidence in favour 
of that proposition from the evidence in favour of that proposition.
Fourthly and finally, the Agrippan sceptic will attack the epistemic principle which 
licences an epistemic subject to take his putative evidence in general in favour of that 
proposition as actual evidence in general in favour of that proposition. For the epistemic 
distinctness of the putative evidence in general in favour of that proposition entails the 
epistemic distinctness of the epistemic principle licensing an epistemic subject to take 
his putative evidence in general in favour of that proposition as actual evidence in 
general in favour of that proposition from the evidence in general in favour of that 
proposition. That is:
IV. The Agrippan sceptic will attack the epistemic distinctness of the epistemic 
principle which licences an epistemic subject to take his putative evidence in 
general in favour of that proposition as actual evidence in general in favour of 
that proposition from the evidence in general in favour of that proposition.
§ 1.2. Scepticism and Radical Scepticism
Any position or point of view may be called ‘sceptical’ if it holds that knowledge is 
impossible, or that knowledge is impossible in a certain specified domain. But there are 
a variety of such positions, and not all of them amount to what may be called ‘a 
philosophical scepticism’. That is, any position which comes under the ambit of 
philosophical scepticism must involve an argument, however not every position which 
maybe called ‘sceptical’ need do so.
For instance, someone who dogmatically asks ‘How do you know?’ in response 
to every assertion or claim to knowledge that anyone ever makes in his vicinity would 
be a sceptic, but not necessarily exhibit a philosophical scepticism. As Jonathan Dancy 
comments: ‘This repeated question is very successful at reducing others to impotent 
silence, but there is very little that can be learnt from it until we know what lies behind 
it’.17 Now clearly something could lie behind that person’s constant reiteration of that 
question, e.g., Dancy suggests the following premises:
17 Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology\ (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
1985), p. 7. From hence, ICE.
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1 No one knows that p unless he can show that p.
2 The attempt to answer the question ‘How do you know that pT  by
1 o
simply restating that p cannot be successful. It begs the question.
Yet if he makes no allusion to some such premise as (1) or (2) then we should ignore 
him for ‘not presenting an interesting philosophical position’, and if he does make an 
allusion to some such premise then he has offered an argument for his scepticism after 
all—he is not as dogmatic as he first appears: his is a philosophical scepticism. The 
point being that by making such an allusion that person opens his scepticism up to the 
possibility of rebuttal. For instance, as Dancy writes:
the two propositions above are dubious. The second, for instance, amounts 
to an assertion that one cannot answer the question ‘How do you know you 
are in pain?’ by simply saying ‘Because I am in pain’. Someone who gives 
this answer clearly takes it that in some cases it works, and we must not beg 
the question against him.19
We could also recognise another kind of sceptic whose scepticism isn’t 
necessarily philosophical. Dancy writes: ‘This sceptic is a hard-nosed person who 
claims that most people allow themselves to be persuaded by what is really rather weak 
evidence, but that he needs more than that to convince him’. However, note that even 
then such a person only reaches scepticism proper, so to speak—only calls knowledge 
into doubt—‘when the standards [of evidence he purportedly adheres to] are set so high 
they cannot be fulfilled’. Like in our first example, this is philosophically 
uninteresting unless he offers an argument as to why our standards of evidence should 
be ‘set so high’, i.e., why his standards of evidence are correct, but if he does then 
again his is a philosophical scepticism. And to enter a caveat: if he does offer an 
argument as to why the standards of evidence should be set so high, and if that 
argument is to have any traction, then it must be ‘justified by appeal to our standards [of 
evidence] as well as his’, in order to guarantee that we are not simply talking past one 
another. Yet as Dancy comments: ‘There is then the danger of incoherence; is it 
consistent to provide an argument justified by normal standards of evidence, to the 
effect that those standards are inappropriate?’23 (In fact, we shall shortly meet an
18
19
20 
21 
22 
23
Ibid, p. 7.
Ibid, p. 7 .1 do not agree with this claim as it stands. 
Ibid, p. 8, original emphasis.
Ibid, p. 8.
Ibid, p. 8.
Ibid, p. 8.
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argument that such a sceptic might employ below, so it will be useful to keep these 
points in mind.)
So any position or point of view which can be labelled a ‘philosophical 
scepticism’ should be taken to hold that knowledge is impossible, or knowledge is 
impossible in a certain specified domain, in virtue of an argument to that effect. There is 
an obvious distinction to be drawn here between philosophical scepticisms that call into 
question the possibility of knowledge in general, and those which only call it into 
question in regards to a certain specified domain. Dancy writes:
this distinction is between local and global sceptical arguments. Local 
scepticism maintains that, even if knowledge is possible elsewhere, it is for 
special reasons not available in this or that selected area. Favourite areas for 
local scepticism are ethics, religion and the future. We can know how things 
are in front of our noses, maybe, but it is not possible to know that an 
altruistic act is morally good, nor that God exists, nor that you will have 
eggs for breakfast tomorrow. Obviously local scepticism hopes to feed on 
special features of the areas it is concerned with. But... it is very hard to 
keep one’s local scepticism local. A local ethical scepticism, for instance, 
tends very quickly to spread out and become a general scepticism about the 
unobserved or about the possibility of scientific knowledge. The problem is 
to find a convincing argument for local ethical scepticism which has no 
expansionist tendencies.24
This suggests a sliding scale concerning the scope attributed to philosophical 
scepticisms: a ‘local’ philosophical scepticism calls knowledge into doubt in a certain 
specified domain, a ‘global’ philosophical scepticism calls it into doubt, we might say, 
in more than one specified domain. Notice that ‘a general scepticism about the 
unobserved or about the possibility of scientific knowledge’ would appear to be 
Dancy’s examples of ‘global sceptical arguments’, but those domains are surely less 
global than empirical knowledge. The Agrippan problematic, as I have characterised it, 
concerns all our knowledge of the world taken together and thus must be a truly global 
philosophical scepticism. If we cannot explain the possibility of empirical knowledge 
then we cannot have knowledge of the unobserved, or again scientific knowledge, in 
any case.
Given the subject-matter of my investigation, then, the local/global distinction 
between philosophical scepticisms is of little import (indeed, as Dancy makes clear ‘it is 
very hard to keep one’s local scepticism local’ anyway). A more important distinction 
can be made between philosophical scepticisms however. Philosophical scepticisms, 
whether local or global, may be understood to apply at two separate epistemological
24 Ibid, p. 8.
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levels. For the philosophical sceptic can pose an argument which ‘can attack the notion 
of knowledge directly, but leave other related notions, crucially that of justified belief, 
untouched’. In regards to this point, Michael Williams writes:
it has been argued by Peter Unger that “know”, like “flat” is an “absolute 
term.” Strictly speaking, a surface is flat if and only if it has no bumps 
whatsoever, which means that no physical surface is ever really flat. 
Similarly, knowledge requires absolute certainty: I know something if and 
only if there is no possibility, however remote, that I am wrong. On this 
view, there is a kind of incoherence in combining a claim to know that P 
with an admission that one might nevertheless be in error. Of course, some 
error possibilities are so remote that, for ordinary practical purposes, we 
rightly disregard them.... But something very similar can be said about 
bumps: for practical purposes, such as playing billiards, a surface’s minute 
irregularities do not matter. Still, all this means is that the table is flat 
enough for playing billiards, not that it is really flat. So by the same token, 
our “knowledge” may be knowledge for all practical purposes; but... it will
9 Snot really be knowledge.
This kind or type of philosophical scepticism we shall call ‘knowledge-specific’. It is a 
philosophical scepticism, moreover, that the second sceptic introduced above might 
employ to justify his ultra-high standards of evidence—what could be a higher standard 
of evidence than ‘absolute certainty’, i.e., ‘if and only if there is no possibility, however 
remote, that I am wrong’ about p i  That would guarantee the truth of p. Indeed, this 
argument might be taken to side-step the ‘danger of incoherence’ which we have seen 
Dancy associate with whether it is ‘consistent to provide an argument justified by 
normal standards of evidence, to the effect that those standards are inappropriate’. It 
could be said to do this by highlighting that any such incoherence must in fact accrue to 
our defence of those standards of evidence, given that such terms as ‘know’ and ‘flat’ 
are—‘Strictly speaking’—‘absolute terms’. That is, since our everyday use of such 
terms already implicitly appeal to that sceptic’s ultra-high standards of evidence it is we 
who are being incoherent in denying that in using those terms we are in error when we 
are anything less that absolutely certain, or in referring to anything less than absolute 
flatness, respectively. In that case it would be we who beg the question.
But as Williams goes on to say:
Clearly, the discovery that nothing is absolutely flat is not disturbing. This is 
because, when we claim that a billiard table is flat, we mean that the surface 
has no irregularities that could disturb the path of a billiard ball; and if we 
claim that it is really flat, we mean flat enough to satisfy the standards of the
25 M. Williams, UD, pp. 48—49, original emphasis. Williams refers to Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case 
fo r Scepticism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
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most exacting player. But even if we mean more than this—even if, in our 
thoughtless way, we mean that it is free of even the most microscopic 
bump—showing us the error of our ways will not place us in conflict with 
anything we ordinarily need to claim, which means that we can accept 
correction without strain. Accordingly, if scepticism rested on no more than 
the analogy between “know” and “flat,” scepticism would not point to a 
deep and unsettling truth about the human condition. To preserve the 
analogy, ordinary knowledge claims would have to stand to justification as 
ordinary flatness claims stand to flatness, demanding whatever measure is 
appropriate to the purpose in hand. Absolute certainty, like absolute flatness, 
would be an idealized condition that we do not expect to find realized in the 
actual world.26
This passage offers both a suggestion of a rejoinder to the sceptic who argues in such a 
manner, as well as signs of something more worrying. In the first case, we might simply 
respond to the sceptic who argues for his ultra-high standards of evidence by objecting 
that ‘know’ and ‘flat’ are not—strictly speaking—absolute terms. If that is the case then 
he will require another argument to underlie his position—at least if he does in fact wish 
to be a philosophical sceptic, and the danger of incoherence my yet reappear, only this 
time in regards to his own side of the debate. However, we are not really interested in 
responding to that argument anyway. More importantly for our purposes, how might a 
sceptical argument ‘place us in conflict with’ something ‘we ordinarily need to claim’, 
such that it points ‘to a deep and unsettling truth about the human condition’?
Dancy writes:
It has... been suggested that epistemology could survive the loss of the 
concept knowledge, because all the important epistemological questions can 
equally profitably be rephrased using the concept of justified belief. Thus 
instead of asking whether we can ever know what will happen in the future, 
we ask in which if any circumstances our beliefs about the future are 
justified.27
Compare Crispin Wright:
odd as it might first seem to say so... knowledge is not really the proper 
central concern of epistemologico-sceptical enquiry. There is not necessarily 
any lasting discomfort in the claim that, contrary to our preconceptions, we 
have no genuine knowledge in some broad area of thought—say in the area 
of theoretical science. We can live with the concession that we do not, 
strictly, know some of the things we believed ourselves to know, provided 
we can retain the thought that we are fully justified in accepting them. That 
concession is what we might call the Russellian Retreat. For Russell... 
proposed that such is exactly the message that philosophical epistemology 
generally has for us: we must content ourselves with probability,
26 Ibid, p. 49, original emphasis.
27 Dancy, ICE, p. 21.
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defeasibility and inconclusive justification where standardly we had wanted 
to claim more. What, however, is not tolerable is the thesis that, among 
propositions about, for instance, the material world, other minds, or the past, 
we never actually attain to genuinely justified opinion; that no real 
distinction corresponds to that which we are accustomed to draw between 
grounded and ungrounded beliefs, earned information and mere prejudice or 
dogma. But just this claim is what the best—radical—sceptical arguments 
purport to deliver....
So consider Dancy’s example of the domain of our knowledge of the future. If we do 
associate knowledge with absolute certainty for what ever reason, as the sceptic who 
demands ultra-high standards of evidence would have us do, then, given the 
astronomical (literally!) amount of evidence we would require to exactly predict what 
will happen in an hour’s or even a second’s time, we cannot have knowledge of the 
course of future events—basically, we cannot satisfy the implicit demands of (3*.) in 
application to an instance o f knowledge in that domain. This is because, if knowledge 
demands absolute certainty, then we cannot rest satisfied with a reason to believe being 
merely indicative of the truth of the proposition it concerns, it must be absolutely 
certainly indicative of the truth of that proposition. Therefore, we cannot ever take 
putative evidence in favour of some proposition concerning the course of future events 
as actual evidence in favour of that proposition because the epistemic principle we 
should utilise to do so only licences us to take putative evidence in favour of that 
proposition as actual evidence in favour of that proposition if it is absolutely certainly 
indicative of the truth of that proposition, and we simply cannot have evidence that is so 
indicative.
But we may accept all that and still have justified belief in the course of future 
events. Since absolute certainty in empirical matters is normally taken to be ‘an 
idealized condition that we do not expect to find realized in the actual world’ in any 
case, i.e., by natural scientific investigation, it does not appear too problematic if we just 
fall back to only requiring that our beliefs about the course of future events are justified, 
in the sense that a reason to believe is merely indicative of the truth of the proposition it 
concerns and that such reasons are available concerning propositions concerning the 
course of future events. That is, knowledge of the course of future events may be denied 
us but that does not mean that we cannot be justified in believing in how that course 
might pan out. Yet if we could not even take ourselves to be able to predict the course 
of future events to any degree whatsoever—if no such reasons to believe concerning
28 Crispin Wright, ‘Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon’, Mind, 100 (397; 1991), p. 88, 
original emphasis.
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propositions concerning the course of future events were available—we might feel that 
we are placed in conflict with something which we ordinarily need to claim. Should I 
take an umbrella with me or wear shorts today? Or is it going to snow?
A philosophical scepticism which suggests that we never ‘attain to genuinely 
justified opinion; that no real distinction corresponds to that which we are accustomed 
to draw between grounded and ungrounded beliefs, earned information and mere 
prejudice or dogma’ we shall call a ‘radical’ philosophical scepticism. The Agrippan 
problematic, as we shall see, is a truly global and radical philosophical scepticism. (In 
fact, from hence we shall return to the parlance I employed in the introduction in which 
‘a radical philosophical scepticism’ was termed ‘a radical scepticism’—or, indeed, 
simply ‘radical scepticism’.)
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Chapter Two: The Agrippan Problematic
Introduction
In this chapter I set out what I have called ‘the Agrippan problematic’. In the first 
section I present what is commonly called ‘the epistemic regress argument’. This is the 
first, and most well known, application of the general argumentative methodology at the 
heart of the Agrippan problematic. In it the Agrippan sceptic applies that argumentative 
methodology to the first of the epistemic loci I identified in §1.1., i.e., (I.). Not only will 
I highlight the argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic in application to that 
epistemic locus in this section, but importantly I uncover two assumptions which 
underlie the premise of the epistemic regress argument, and suggest that they are the 
point at which its conclusion can be challenged.
Those two assumptions, however, are not meant to be mere assumptions. The 
Agrippan sceptic thinks he can argue for them. In the next section (§2.2) I turn to the 
general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic which underlies each and 
every one of its applications. It is that general argumentative methodology—indeed, a 
specific claim at its centre—which the Agrippan sceptic takes to ensure the validity of 
those assumptions. However, I suggest that, in fact, in virtue of that claim he can argue 
for neither, and I end this section by suggesting that the epistemologist may therefore 
question either of the two assumptions underlying the premise of the epistemic regress 
argument, and roughly delimit the story, so to speak, to be told throughout the rest of 
my investigation.
In the next section (§2.3) I turn to the most traditional responses to the epistemic 
regress argument, i.e., those positions which I designated in the introduction 
‘foundationalism’ and ‘coherentism’. The former, I suggest, questions the second 
assumption underlying the premise of that argument; the latter, on the other hand, 
questions neither that nor the first assumption. Coherentism, I claim, represents an 
insufficient reaction against foundationalism—it is between two worlds, so to speak.
In the final section of this chapter (§2.4) I illustrate the application of the 
Agrippan sceptic’s general argumentative methodology to the fourth of the epistemic 
loci I identified in §1.1., i.e., (IV.). We shall call this argument ‘the problem of the 
criterion’ and it can be understood as formulating the most clear cut case of the 
ostensibly paradoxical observation at the heart of the Agrippan problematic. Moreover, 
in this section I highlight the methodological priority of the epistemologist first
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responding to the epistemic regress argument before turning to respond to any of the 
other applications of the argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic.
Thus in this chapter I bookend, so to speak, the four epistemic loci within the 
notion of justification where the Agrippan problematic may attack the pursuit of 
empirical knowledge. In doing this I do not mean to suggest that the applications of that 
argumentative methodology to those other two loci—(II.) and (III.)—are less important 
applications of that methodology; in fact, I think that none of those applications can be 
undermined without the others also being undermined. However, the two arguments we 
shall focus on are nonetheless the most prevalent in the literature.
$2.1. The Agrippan Problematic I: The Epistemic Regress Argument
The epistemic regress argument has been said to be ‘the most crucial in the entire theory 
of knowledge’ and, moreover, that ‘The stand which a philosopher takes here will 
decisively shape the whole structure of his epistemological account’. This argument is 
often invoked as an argument for foundationalism, in that, as we shall see, 
foundationalism appears to be the most obvious or intuitive, non-capitulatory response 
to it. But I shall instead characterise it without reference to that position in an effort to 
expose its underlying argumentative methodology and assumptions, i.e., the general 
argumentative methodology of the Agrippan problematic, which takes the form of a 
trilemma.
As has been illustrated in the foregoing, it is an obvious thought that many of 
our empirical beliefs are inferentially justified. As Bonjour writes:
it seems highly plausible to suppose that many of a person’s contingent or 
empirical beliefs are interrelated in such a way that if a particular belief of 
[sic should be ‘or’] conjunction of beliefs were somehow known or assumed 
to be true, this would provide a good reason for supposing that some further 
belief was true. An explicit statement of such a reason would take the form 
of an argument or inference from the former belief or conjunction of beliefs 
as premise to the latter belief as conclusion. Such a putatively justifying 
reason may appropriately be referred to as a conditional reason. But it is 
obvious that the existence of a conditional reason of this sort can yield a 
reason or justification simpliciter for its nonconditional conclusion only if 
there is some further reason or justification, which must seemingly be
"5 A
epistemically prior, for accepting the truth of its premises.
29 Bonjour, SEK, p. 18.
30 Lawrence Bonjour, ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’, p. 118, original emphasis, in 
John Greco and Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology’, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
1999), pp. 117— 142.
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In §1.1 I offered a schematic of how a ‘conjunction of beliefs’ could ‘provide a good 
reason for supposing that some further belief was true’. In regards to my belief that 
‘Martians exist’ I suggested that the following conjunction of beliefs might act as an— 
inferential, we might now say—reason to believe that proposition:
a. In regards to their content the theses are indicative of the likely truth of the 
proposition that ‘Martians exist’ (belief).
b. If those theses themselves are likely to be true, then the proposition that 
‘Martian exist’ is likely to be true (by (a.)).
c. Those theses exhibit the epistemic property of being formulated by a noted 
scientist (belief).
d. If those theses exhibit the epistemic property of being formulated by that noted 
scientist, then those theses are likely to be true (belief).
e. Therefore, those theses are likely to be true (by (c.) and (d.)).
f. Therefore, the proposition that ‘Martians exist’ is likely to be true (by (b.) and
(e.)).
But the conclusion of some such reasoning process, i.e., (f), will, Bonjour is suggesting, 
only be conditional, and so my belief that ‘Martians exist’ only conditionally justified 
by it, unless those beliefs constitutive of that conjunction of beliefs which leads to (f.) 
are themselves justified.
Let us consider this at an abstract level: say an epistemic subject a (not 5 for the 
moment to avoid any terminological confusion) believes that /?, and that a ’s belief that p 
is justified by his belief that q, in that, for some reason, q is ‘epistemically prior’ to p—
• • 3 1tf’s belief that q is a ‘premise-belief in this inferential sense for his belief that p. The 
justification of a ’s belief that p  will only be conditional or putative unless his belief that 
q is also justified. But the justification of a's belief that q will itself only be conditional 
unless his belief that r is justified, and so on. How, then, does a break out of this regress 
of conditional justification to the ‘nonconditional conclusion’ that all these inferentially 
justified beliefs of his are actually justified! Note, however, the implicit and important 
assumption of this abstraction: the only way that a belief can justify another belief is 
inferentially. For we can imagine, however this is to be actually characterised, a ’s belief
31 Ibid, p. 119.
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that p justifying, and being justified in turn, by his belief that q, without either being 
inferentially connected to the other, merely by their presence in his belief system.
The premise of the epistemic regress argument is that all justification must be 
inferential. This premise, I submit, is built upon two assumptions', the first is that the 
only way a belief can justify another belief is inferentially; the second is that it is not 
just that a reason to believe always seems to be something epistemically distinct from 
belief in the proposition it concerns, but that a reason to believe always is something 
epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns. They interact in such a 
manner: the first assumption does not entail that a belief cannot justify itself, although 
the second does; the second assumption does not entail that there is only one way in 
which a belief can justify another belief, although the first does. Ergo, all justification 
must be inferential. And given that premise the Agrippan sceptic argues for the truly 
global, radically sceptical conclusion that justified belief is impossible.
Let us say that we accept those two assumptions. To approach this conclusion 
from the non-sceptical side of the dialectic, clearly for the epistemologist ‘The obvious 
problem is to say how this regress of levels or stages of justification, each dependent on 
the next [re a's beliefs that p, q, r, etc.], finally ends’. There would appear to be three 
options, each of which, and in their own way, the Agrippan sceptic points out to be 
unsatisfactory in providing for justified belief.
The first option would be that:
The final stage of any particular branch on the regress may invoke premise- 
beliefs for which no further reason or justification of any sort is available. In 
this case, it seems to follow that the epistemological tree structure, no matter 
how complicated and ramified it may be, offers no reason or justification for 
thinking that any of the component beliefs that are essentially dependent on 
those unjustified beliefs are true.... It tells us, in effect, only that some 
things would be true i f  other things were true, and that those other things 
would be true i f  still further things were true, and so on, ending with things 
that there is no reason to believe to be true.
That is, (a), the regress of conditional justification finally terminates in a 's dogmatic 
belief that 5, say, which itself bears no inferential connection to any epistemically prior 
belief that t that might serve to conditionally justify it. Therefore, all of a 's beliefs p, q, 
r, etc. are themselves unjustified, their conditional justification stemming from a belief 
which is itself unjustified.
The second option would be that:
32 Ibid, p. 119.
33 Ibid. p. 119.
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The final stage of the regress may invoke premise-beliefs that have occurred 
earlier in the structure, so that the justificational structure in effect loops 
back upon itself in some fashion. In this case, assuming again that all 
relevant justificatory relations are captured by the structure, the justification 
for all of the components of the structure is apparently either directly 
circular or else dependent on premise-beliefs that are justified only in a 
circular and apparently questionbegging manner. Thus such a justificational 
structure again seems to present no reason for thinking that any of the 
component beliefs are true.34
That is, (b), the regress of conditional justification is paradoxical, in that the 
justification of a's belief that p  ‘logically presupposes its own epistemically prior 
justification’ .35
The third and final option is (c), the regress of conditional justification continues 
on infinitely. At each stage the matter of the conditionality of the premise-beliefs 
constitutive of the structure is answered by invoking another set of premise-beliefs, and 
the matter of their conditionality is answered by invoking a further set of premise- 
beliefs, ad infinitum, (c), then, doesn’t even attempt to arrest the regress of conditional 
justification. As opposed to (a) and (b), however, it is more difficult to pinpoint the 
exact problem with (c). The question is whether the infinite regress of conditional 
justification is vicious or virtuous, for unlike (a) where there is not even conditional 
justification afforded a ’s beliefs that p, q, r, etc., and (b) where the conditional 
justification of a’s beliefs is undone by the paradoxical nature of the loop, at least in (c) 
a 's beliefs, all the infinite array of them, are conditionally justified. Often the 
epistemologist inclines toward the former: conditional justification just isn’t non­
conditional justification, which is what we need for instances of knowledge; therefore, 
the infinite regress of conditional justification is vicious. Conditional justification is just 
a placeholder for non-conditional justification. Nonetheless, again, a ’s beliefs are 
conditionally justified in virtue of being a member of such an infinite regress, so we 
cannot say that a doesn’t know those beliefs, although we cannot, in parallel, say that he 
does. But whilst the fact that a 's beliefs are not non-conditionally justified in virtue of 
their membership of such an infinite regress is not decisive, this dilemma is certainly 
enough to make us look elsewhere than (c) for a way to elude the regress of conditional 
justification, thus treating (c) as something like the option of last resort.
34 Ibid, p. 119.
35 Bonjour, SEK, p. 24, original emphasis.
36 Cf. Dancy, ICE, p. 56.
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And the way to begin to do that is to challenge the premise of the epistemic 
regress argument. As it stands its conclusion is that, if all justification must be 
inferential then justified belief is impossible. But I have suggested that that premise 
itself is built from two assumptions: firstly, the assumption that the only way a belief 
can justify another belief is inferentially; and secondly, that a reason to believe is 
always something epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns. So 
what is to be challenged is either—or both—of those two assumptions. But before 
turning to such challenges let us clarify the trilemma that underlies this argument, 
indeed, that is common to all arguments that come under the banner of the Agrippan 
problematic. For as we shall see the Agrippan sceptic in fact argues for the second of 
those assumptions, although that argument begs the question, and given his originary 
resources simply cannot argue for the first.
§2.2 The Agrippan Problematic II: The General Argumentative Methodology of the 
Agrippan Sceptic
Clarifying what exactly lies behind the trilemma is very important. I have suggested that 
the premise of the epistemic regress argument, i.e., that all justification must be 
inferential, appears to be founded upon two assumptions. The first assumption is that 
the only way in which a belief can justify another belief is inferentially, and the second 
assumption is that a reason to believe is always something epistemically distinct from 
belief in the proposition it concerns. Now, I suggest that the Agrippan sceptic argues for 
that second assumption but that his relationship to the first is rather ambivalent. Indeed, 
I take it that he cannot argue for it given the resources that he begins with. However, I 
also take it that his argument for the second assumption is question-begging and that, if 
he attempts to shore it up, then he may be able to argue for the first assumption. I shall 
comment on this thought below.
At first blush we might think the epistemic regress argument to be operating as a 
reductio ad absurdum of the premise that all justification must be inferential—an 
assumption for the sake of proving it false. Indeed, those who employ that argument as 
an argument for foundationalism, instead of situating it within the context of the 
Agrippan problematic, may be taken to understand it in this way. Yet I take it that the 
Agrippan sceptic really thinks that all justification must be inferential, even if he cannot 
necessarily support this conclusion. Williams writes:
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The idea behind [the Agrippan problematic]... is devastatingly simple. When 
any proposition, advanced as a claim to knowledge, is challenged, there are 
only three ways of responding:
1 Refuse to respond, i.e. make an undefended assumption [re (a.)].
2 Repeat a claim earlier in the argument, i.e. reason in a circle [re (b.)].
3 Keep trying to think of something new to say, i.e. embark on an infinite
regress [re (c.)].
Since there is no fourth option, any attempt to justify a given belief will fail, 
either by being interminable or by terminating in an evidently unsatisfactory 
way. It is hard to imagine a sceptical argument starting with more minimal 
presuppositions than this. All that appears to be taken for granted is that any 
claim can always be challenged: a request for justification can always be 
entered, even though it normally might not be.
Understood in this light, no assumption of the epistemic distinctness of a reason to 
believe some proposition, nor therefore of the three elements I have identified as 
constitutive of such a reason, need be made by the Agrippan sceptic. Their epistemic 
distinctness is entailed by the fact ‘that any claim to knowledge can always be 
challenged’. For if any claim to knowledge can always be challenged then that 
challenge can only be met by making another claim to knowledge that in someway 
justifies that first, challenged claim, i.e., by the provision of an epistemically distinct 
reason to believe the propositional content of that first, challenged claim. Thus, if we 
accept his claim that any claim to knowledge always can be challenged then the 
Agrippan sceptic has an argument for the second assumption underlying the premise of 
the epistemic regress argument. I now want to make two essential points concerning the 
Agrippan sceptic’s claim that any claim to knowledge can always be challenged: (a), 
that it is that claim which leads to the ostensibly paradoxical observation at the heart of 
the Agrippan problematic; and, most importantly, (b), that that claim cannot be used to 
argue for the first assumption on its own, and that that claim is question-begging.
(a) The generation o f the ostensibly paradoxical observation. The ostensibly 
paradoxical observation at the heart of the Agrippan problematic is that we require 
empirical knowledge to explain empirical knowledge, and yet we cannot assume any 
empirical knowledge to explain empirical knowledge. The second clause, i.e., that we 
cannot assume any empirical knowledge in order to explain empirical knowledge, is an 
explicit statement of the first aspect of the generality demanded by the traditional 
epistemological project in any suitable explanation of the possibility of empirical
37 Williams, UD, p. 60.
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knowledge. Therefore, I take that clause as given. The first clause, however, i.e., that we 
require empirical knowledge to explain empirical knowledge, must be rejected or 
explained away if we are to escape the ostensibly paradoxical observation—if we are to 
show that it is only an ostensibly paradoxical observation or, indeed, no paradox at all. 
Having introduced the central claim of the Agrippan sceptic, i.e., that any claim to 
knowledge can always be challenged, we now have, I submit, the tools to generate that 
first clause.
How? For now, let us accept the claim of the Agrippan sceptic that any claim to 
knowledge can always be challenged. It is that claim, coupled with those two points 
concerning a reason to believe some proposition I made in §1.1, which enables the 
generation of that first clause. Those two points were: (i), given that the intuitive 
purpose of knowledge is the belief of truth a reason to believe must be unconditionally 
indicative of the truth of the proposition it concerns; and (ii), that an explanation of how 
empirical knowledge is possible would have failed to respect the first aspect of the 
generality demanded by the traditional epistemological project—so would be no 
explanation at all—if it did not allow us to recognise a reason to believe some 
proposition as a reason to believe that proposition.
Those two points interact in such a manner: to recognise a reason to believe 
some proposition as a reason to believe that proposition it must be possible to recognise 
that that reason is indicative of the truth of that proposition. But to recognise a reason to 
believe as being indicative of the truth of some proposition it must be the case that that 
reason to believe that proposition itself is recognisable as true, or likely to be true—that 
reason to believe that proposition must itself be an instance of knowledge. But note that 
their conjunction implies nothing about whether a reason to believe must always be 
epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns, i.e., that believing some 
proposition might be a reason to believe that proposition in itself. It is the Agrippan 
sceptic’s claim, then, that any claim to knowledge can always be challenged, which 
entails that a reason to believe some proposition must always be something 
epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns. The point being that 
that challenge is a bare challenge, so to speak, which does not imply that a claim to 
knowledge isn’t actually correct in any way, just that it can be challenged because it is a 
claim to knowledge. And if that thought is intelligible—if it is intelligible that a claim to 
knowledge can always be challenged because it is a claim to knowledge—then a reason 
to believe some proposition must always be something epistemically distinct from belief 
in the proposition it concerns.
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The first clause of the ostensibly paradoxical observation at the heart of the 
Agrippan problematic is therefore generated like this: if it is intelligible that a claim to 
knowledge can always be challenged because it is a claim to knowledge, then a reason 
to believe some proposition must always be something epistemically distinct from belief 
in the proposition it concerns; a reason to believe some proposition must itself be an 
instance of knowledge; if a reason to believe some proposition must always be 
something epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns, and a reason 
to believe that proposition must itself be an instance of knowledge, then a claim to 
knowledge can only be justified by another claim to knowledge. Therefore, knowledge 
is required to explain knowledge. Of course, however, that is not the first clause of the 
ostensibly paradoxical observation, for that clause specifically concerns empirical 
knowledge. What we have generated here is the first clause of the even more 
encompassing paradox that we require knowledge to explain knowledge, yet we cannot 
assume any knowledge to explain knowledge. Now, we shall turn to the specifically 
empirical understanding of that ostensibly paradoxical observation in §2.4, where I will 
introduce the problem of the criterion; however, before that we must turn to the question 
of whether it is really paradoxical in any case.
(b) The Agrippan sceptic ’s claim that any claim to knowledge can always be challenged 
cannot be used as is to argue for the first assumption and is, moreover, question­
begging. How is the trilemma related to the ostensibly paradoxical observation? One 
way to understand their relationship is to take the trilemma as a parallel of the 
ostensibly paradoxical observation and not a consequence of it nor contribution to it. 
How so? The trilemma may be understood as accruing to particular instances of claims 
to empirical knowledge, the ostensibly paradoxical observation to a general explanation 
of it possibility. On this understanding of their relationship the connection between the 
two is (c), i.e., the infinite regress of reasons to believe. For (c) can be understood as 
what makes the ostensibly paradoxical observation a paradox and not a contradiction: 
whilst we may not be able to explain how empirical knowledge is possible, we may 
nonetheless have it—and without assuming any empirical knowledge.
But I suggest that there is another way to understand that relationship, one which 
begins from the idea that the ostensibly paradoxical observation is in fact a necessary 
description. This is, essentially, to historicise the ostensibly paradoxical statement: we 
wouldn’t be wondering about the possibility of empirical knowledge if we didn’t think 
we had it, therefore, if it turns out that we do have it—if we explain its possibility—we
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will have in fact used empirical knowledge to explain empirical knowledge and, 
moreover, required empirical knowledge to explain its possibility. This does not entail, 
however, that the explanation we provide will have assumed any empirical knowledge 
to explain its possibility: we will have used such knowledge, the explanation shall not 
have. The point being that explaining things, including empirical knowledge, is 
something that we do—a practical activity in which the epistemologist participates. 
And a very important corollary of this thought is that justifying might also be something 
that we do (recall the connection intimated between explaining and justifying in the 
introduction). It is perhaps not just that a belief justifies another belief, but that we 
justify that other belief by making the connection between it and that former belief—in 
matters of justification what is at issue may also be the epistemic conduct of the 
epistemic subject and not only the epistemic relation between beliefs. This is, 
essentially, the extended, so to speak, non-traditional understanding of what it means for 
a belief to be justified which I have alluded to on various occasions.
These thoughts complicate the relationship between the trilemma and the 
ostensibly paradoxical observation. I suggest that, in fact, the Agrippan sceptic must 
take it that the trilemma contributes to the ostensibly paradoxical observation, such that 
it is not to be understood as a parallel of it at the level of particular instances of claims 
to empirical knowledge, although it is pitched at that level. The thought here is that we 
set out to justify some particular claim to empirical knowledge and come up against the 
three options of the regress, and then the ostensibly paradoxical observation is a 
corollary of the fact that (c) cannot actually or properly be rejected. For it may just be 
the case that the ostensibly paradoxical statement is simply a necessary description of 
how we both are able and must go about explaining the possibility of empirical 
knowledge, and then there is no need for the Agrippan sceptic’s claim that any claim to 
knowledge can always be challenged to generate it. That is, perhaps a reason to believe 
some proposition just is always epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it 
concerns, but that this is not epistemically problematic at all. This is suggestive of the 
fact that, for the Agrippan sceptic’s claim that any claim to knowledge can always be 
challenged to be considered as generative of the first clause of the ostensibly 
paradoxical statement, then it must be something about that claim which mandates that 
the options we face when attempting to set out to justify some particular claim to 
empirical knowledge are (a)—(c), i.e., that the only way a belief can justify another 
belief is inferentially.
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For, if we accept that that claim mandates that a reason to believe some 
proposition must always be something epistemically distinct from belief in the 
proposition it concerns, it is only if we in addition accept that the justification of one 
belief by another belief must be inferential that the trilemma looms and, moreover, we 
have seen no reason to suppose that, because a reason to believe some proposition must 
be epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns, and because that 
reason to belief that proposition must itself be an instance of knowledge, the only way 
that that reason to believe that proposition can be epistemically related to that 
proposition is inferentially. If that first assumption is to be defended, then, it must be 
something about the Agrippan sceptic’s claim that any claim to knowledge can always 
be challenged which must therefore mandate that the justification of one belief by 
another belief must always be inferential. Yet nothing about that claim, as it is, does 
mandate this because it does not set down any constraints concerning how a claim to 
knowledge is to be defended. For instance, perhaps what is to be defended is sometimes 
the epistemic conduct of an epistemic subject and not the epistemic relation between 
beliefs. I think this reflects what we might call ‘a blind spot’ in the Agrippan 
problematic.
As it goes I think this argument is fine, but the waters surrounding this issue, 
i.e., whether the Agrippan sceptic’s claim that any claim to knowledge can always be 
challenged can itself be challenged, are even muddier. For we have effectively already 
rejected the Agrippan sceptic’s claim that any claim to knowledge can always be 
challenged. In §1.2 it was suggested that such a claim ‘amounts to an assertion that one 
cannot answer the question ‘How do you know you are in pain?’ by simply saying 
‘Because I am in pain” , which we described as begging the question. And again—and 
an example we shall focus on—can my claim to know—my assertion—that ‘I think’ be 
challenged in a similar manner? That is, can that claim to knowledge be challenged 
without recourse to more philosophical baggage than the radically sceptical 
argumentative methodology of the Agrippan problematic? For the Agrippan sceptic 
takes it that he is licensed to challenge any claim to knowledge for no other reason than 
that it is simply a claim to knowledge.
At this juncture it is surely important to highlight the fact that such a putative 
instance of empirical knowledge as my claim to know that ‘I think’—for as I indicated 
in the introduction I do regard it as an instance of empirical knowledge—concerns a 
deliverance of ‘inner’ and not ‘outer’ sense. As such, and as also indicated there, it 
normally falls outside the ambit of the subject-matter in regards to which the traditional
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epistemological project, at least as most commonly attempted, has been conducted. That 
is, the fact that it does not concern a deliverance of ‘outer’ sense is normally taken to 
disbar it from making a contribution to that project. Here, then, the invidious distinction 
between ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ sense I further mooted in the introduction is making itself 
felt.
It has been philosophico-hxstoncdWy common to take it that the deliverances of 
‘outer’ and ‘inner’ sense concern two fundamentally different domains of objects—the 
mind-independent and the mind-dependent. And in parallel to this distinction the claim 
that we have unfettered access to the latter, but problematic access to the former, has 
often been tendered. That is, when I experience myself as having the occurrent belief 
that ‘There is a Martian in front of my eyes’ I am directly experiencing the object which 
is that belief of mine, but when I experience myself as looking at the Martian in front of 
my eyes which prompted that belief it is often thought that I am not directly 
experiencing that Martian. Indeed, the thought goes that if I am directly experiencing 
anything in that latter case it is a visual appearance of there being a Martian in front of 
my eyes.
And so for the epistemological case as well. Say that I claim knowledge of the 
fact that there is a Martian in front of my eyes. In such a case it is not question-begging 
for the Agrippan sceptic to ask me to justify my claim. This is because my belief that 
‘There is a Martian in front of my eyes’ may very well be false for whatever reason: my 
perceptual capacities are fallible. But say that I claim knowledge of the fact that I 
believe that ‘There is a Martian in front of my eyes’. The thought has often been 
broached, the Cartesian problematic aside, that my belief that T believe that ‘There is a 
Martian in front of my eyes” cannot be false, i.e., that my introspective capacities are 
in fallible. If that is the case then it is question-begging for the Agrippan sceptic to ask 
me to justify my claim. Which is to say: in certain cases it is apparently unintelligible 
for the Agrippan sceptic to challenge a claim to knowledge simply because it is a claim 
to knowledge.
We might ask how we can have such infallible introspective access to the mind- 
dependent, and on examination that claim is to be disputed as we shall see, but 
certainly—and specifically—in the case of my claiming to know that T think’ it seems 
question-begging for the Agrippan sceptic to ask me to justify that claim, as I can only
38 For the qualification ‘the Cartesian problematic aside’ cf. Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project o f  
Pure Enquiry, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1978), pp. 184— 213.
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make that claim by thinking. The point being that if I understand what the proposition 
T think’ means, in claiming that I know that T think’ I make that proposition true. Let 
us say, then, in regards to my claim to know that T think’, that since the Agrippan 
sceptic is not questioning my very understanding of the propositions I claim to know we 
have identified an instance of empirical knowledge which he cannot challenge.
Now certainly my claim to know that T think’ is a claim of introspective 
knowledge on my part, though empirical for all that. We should ask two questions at 
this point: what does this entail for the Agrippan problematic? and how has this helped 
with the traditional epistemological project, i.e., the attempt to explain how empirical 
knowledge is possible without assuming any empirical knowledge? To take the latter 
first: it must still be explained how I can understand the proposition that T think’, and 
this may very well involve other empirical knowledge, so clearly we cannot rest 
satisfied with having identified an instance of empirical knowledge which cannot be 
challenged by the Agrippan sceptic in an attempt to explain how empirical knowledge is 
possible. On the other hand, this would nonetheless seem to have ramifications for the 
Agrippan problematic. It suggests that the Agrippan sceptic’s claim that any claim to 
knowledge can always be challenged is question-begging—we need not accept it 
without argument—at least when that challenge is as bare as he makes it out to be, i.e., 
simply because a claim to knowledge has been made.
Does this not just lead to the dissolution of the Agrippan problematic? Not 
exactly. Whilst much of the epistemological force of the Agrippan problematic would 
seem to be accrued from the fact that it masquerades as being as intuitive as is 
possible—the Agrippan sceptic purports to only make the claim that any claim to 
knowledge can always be challenged—there is nothing to stop him from making certain 
further assumptions to defend that claim against the thought that there are some claims 
to knowledge which he cannot challenge just because they are claims to knowledge. 
One such might be to amend his own problematic to that of the Cartesian sceptic. 
Another would be to assume a certain semantics, one which makes it intelligible how he 
can challenge my claim to know that T think’, i.e., one which does allow him to 
question my understanding of that proposition. And it might conceivably be the case 
that the amendment of the Agrippan problematic to the Cartesian problematic, or the 
assumption of a certain semantics, enables both the defence of the second and the first 
assumptions which underlie the premise of the epistemic regress argument. However, I 
propose to ignore this thought, and I take my professed ignorance here to be principled:
39 Cf. ibid, pp. 73—74.
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although there is nothing to stop the Agrippan sceptic doing this it does defeat the 
purpose of his claim to the intuitiveness of his problematic.
I have now suggested that the Agrippan sceptic’s claim that any claim to 
knowledge can always be challenged can be used to generate neither of the two 
assumptions underlying the epistemic regress argument. This means that the trilemma 
might not be exhaustive of the options because either: (i), there is more than one way in 
which a belief can justify another belief, i.e., inferential connection between beliefs is 
not the only epistemic relation which may obtain between them; or (ii), a reason to 
believe some proposition is not always something epistemically distinct from belief in 
the proposition it concerns. Moreover, because the Agrippan sceptic cannot now 
generate the second assumption, i.e., that a reason to believe some proposition must 
always be something epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns, he 
further cannot now generate the first clause of the ostensibly paradoxical observation. 
But does the rejection of one or other—perhaps both—of those assumptions offer up 
any other options concerning how empirical knowledge might be structured?
At this point it seems apt to turn to what epistemologists have actually done in 
regards to these two assumptions in attempting to undermine the Agrippan problematic. 
Foundationalism explicitly challenges the second assumption; orthodox coherentism 
effectively neither, simply modifying the first. On the other hand, I have made 
intimations towards a non-traditional understanding of how a belief is justified above. 
The story 1 shall tell for the remainder of the thesis is one in which the epistemologist’s 
reaction to the Agrippan problematic is connected to his theory of concept-acquisition 
and accompanying semantics. The story, in its essentials, goes like this: the 
foundationalist challenges the second assumption underlying the premise of the 
epistemic regress argument, however both his fundamental understanding of the notion 
of non-inferential justification, as well as his abstractionist theory of concept-acquisition 
and atomistic semantics, are to be objected to (see §§3.1—4.2). The coherentist accepts 
the most obvious alternative semantics, i.e., a holistic semantics, yet he tells no story 
concerning how we come by our concepts, and so fails to see that he can challenge the 
second assumption via such a theory. He thus finds himself in the no man’s land of 
challenging neither of the assumptions underlying the premise of the epistemic regress 
argument (see §§5.1—5.2). Finally I turn to Sellars, who explicitly questions that first 
assumption and tells a story of sufficient depth concerning how we come by our 
concepts which backs this challenge up (see §§6.1—6.6).
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The dialectical movement, then, is from challenging that second assumption 
underlying the epistemic regress argument to challenging that first assumption 
underlying the premise of the epistemic regress argument. In the midst of this I take it 
that each of the applications of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan 
problematic has a moral which a workable picture of empirical justification must 
satisfy. And note that if we are not challenging the second assumption, i.e., that a reason 
to believe some proposition is always something epistemically distinct from a belief in 
the proposition it concerns, then the first clause of the ostensibly paradoxical 
observation can be generated; however, I have already intimated above how we might 
understand that observation—as being a necessary description of the way in which the 
traditional epistemological project has to be carried out.
Given that we need not accept either of the two assumptions which underlie the 
premise of the epistemic regress argument based on a simple consideration of the 
resources available to the Agrippan sceptic, we might ask why—epistemologico- 
historically—it has caused such problems? Without getting into the philosophico- 
historical details of the matter I think we might just simply say that those assumptions 
are hard to illustrate to be /«valid, whether argued for by the Agrippan sceptic or not. 
For instance, the foundationalist as we shall deal with him is not concerned with 
empirical knowledge in general (as I delineated it in the introduction), but with 
empirical knowledge of the mind-independent, and given our fallibility in perceptual 
matters it is intuitively the case that empirical knowledge of the mind-independent can 
always be challenged. Therefore, if the foundationalist accepts the first assumption, i.e., 
that the only way in which a belief can justify another belief is inferentially, as he does, 
then he will face the Agrippan trilemma in any case: for both the assumptions 
underlying the premise of the epistemic regress argument are now in place. Indeed, just 
because, given his argumentative resources, those assumptions cannot be argued for by 
the Agrippan sceptic, this fact does not in any way mean they are not hard to dislodge. 
Given this fact I will simply assume that to be the case in general, i.e., that those two 
assumptions are valid unless otherwise shown, and so the Agrippan trilemma to be in 
effect in regards to all its applications, for the remainder of this thesis.
§2.3. Foundationalism and Coherentism
The most obvious and epistemologico-historically prevalent way to question the 
premise of the epistemic regress argument is by arguing that not all justification is or
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must be inferential, although the only way in which a belief can justify another belief is 
inferentially. Which is, essentially, to question the second assumption underlying that 
premise, i.e., that a reason to believe is always something epistemically distinct from 
belief in the proposition it concerns. The foundationalist’s central claim, then, is that a 
reason to believe some proposition is not always epistemically distinct from belief in the 
proposition it concerns, with certain specific permutations dependent upon the 
foundationalism under consideration, as we shall see (§§3.3—3.4). This has often been 
taken as or proposed to be the lone way to escape the regress of conditional 
justification, a thought which Bonjour highlights:
The only apparently remaining alternative is that though there is some sort 
of reason or justification for thinking that premise-beliefs of the final stage 
are true, this reason is not of the conditional or inferential sort we have been 
discussing and hence avoids invoking new premise-beliefs that would 
themselves be in need of justification.... Thus such beliefs, if they exist, 
might be said to be unconditionally justified .40
Or, as is more conventional, the ‘premise-beliefs of the final stage’ of the regress of 
conditional justification are non-inf er entially justified. The foundationalist thus attempts 
to transform (a): instead of that regress terminating in the dogmatic assumption that a’s 
belief that s is justified, without that belief bearing an inferential connection to any 
epistemically prior belief that t which might serve to justify it, it terminates in a’s belief 
that 5 which is non-conditionally or non-inferentially justified—actually justified— 
without needing to be inferentially connected to any epistemically prior belief that t. 
Bonjour summarises this strategy thus:
the central thesis of epistemological foundationalism... is the twofold thesis:
(a) that some empirical beliefs possess a measure of epistemic justification 
which is somehow immediate or intrinsic to them, at least in the sense of not 
being dependent, inferentially or otherwise, on the... justification of other 
empirical beliefs; and (b) that it is these “basic beliefs,” as they are 
sometimes called, which are the ultimate source of justification for all 
empirical knowledge.41
This is a good synopsis of ‘the central thesis’ of foundationalism in that it is suitably 
non-committal concerning what kind of empirical beliefs can play the role of ‘basic 
beliefs’ and why.
I suggested in the introduction that the most common understanding of empirical 
knowledge was that one in which it is taken to concern the deliverances of ‘outer’ sense,
40 Bonjour, ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’, p. 119, original emphasis.
41 Bonjour, SEK, pp. 16— 17, original emphasis.
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i.e., as concerning the mind-independent. I shall not defend this understanding—I have 
already suggested that it leads to an invidious distinction between knowledge putatively 
gleaned from the deliverances of ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ sense—however since that is the 
manner in which the foundationalisms we shall discuss understand empirical knowledge 
that is what we shall cleave to in the proceeding. Such foundationalisms begin, then, by 
first specifying that the propositional contents of basic beliefs must directly concern 
mind-independent objects. Which is understandable: the observational evidence for 
empirical knowledge of the mind-independent must itself be of the mind-independent. 
Nonetheless, this has important consequences for what kinds of empirical belief can 
play the role of basic beliefs. There are two ways in which this can be done.
Consider again my belief that ‘There is a Martian in front of my eyes’. Its 
propositional content directly concerns the Martian apparently in front of my eyes, i.e., 
directly concerns a mind-independent object. If there is a Martian in front of my eyes, 
and let us assume that there is, then that proposition will be true and so possibly amount 
to an instance of knowledge. Moreover, it is an intuitive thought that in such a case the 
justification of that belief does not itself involve another belief or beliefs—it is at least 
part constituted by the Martian in front of me. That belief is to be considered non- 
inferentially justified because it is not justified via inference from another belief but via 
its interaction with that which it concerns.
But, then, as suggested above, it often thought that I am not directly 
experiencing that Martian—that in such a case if I am directly experiencing anything it 
is a visual appearance of there being a Martian in front of my eyes. This thought is 
encouraged by the observation, again suggested above, that my perceptual capacities are 
fallible. For instance, that I can be mistaken in believing that ‘There is a Martian in front 
of my eyes’ because I am subject to an illusion—say that there is in fact a suitably 
Martian-like Moon-man in front of my eyes—or a hallucination—that I have ingested 
some hallucinatory drugs which have provided me with the visual appearance of a 
Martian in front of my eyes, when there is in fact nothing there at all (or nothing 
Martian-like there at all). Yet the case is often made that there must be something in 
common between those cases and that of a veridical experience of there being a Martian 
in front of my eyes: even if I am subject to some such illusion or hallucination of there 
being a Martian in front of my eyes when there in fact isn’t, and also in the veridical
38
case of their actually being a Martian in front of my eyes, in all three I am nonetheless 
having a visual appearance o f a Martian in front of my eyes.42
This is suggestive of another way in which a basic beliefs propositional content 
can concern a mind-independent object: it can do so mdirectly via directly concerning 
an appearance of such an object. This is normally codified by qualifying the 
propositional content of my belief that ‘There is a Martian in front of my eyes’ with a 
‘looks to be/looks as if...’, ‘appears to be/appears as if...’, ‘seems to be/seems as if...’, 
etc., locution. If I believe that ‘There looks to be a Martian in front of my eyes’ its 
propositional content does not directly concern the mind-independent, but instead ‘is 
restricted to the deliverances of sense-experience alone and implies nothing about an 
independent world’ .43 Let us call such a belief an experiential belief, i.e., a belief whose 
propositional content directly concerns an appearance. But before it appears as if the 
foundationalist has retreated into empirical knowledge of the mind-dependent the claim 
is made that at least in some cases that visual appearance is directly caused by that 
which it concerns. This is to return us to Stroud’s point that a person without 
functioning sense organs would at least appear to be denied access to the mind- 
independent and correspondingly, we might now infer, appearances concerning the 
mind-independent. Thus the connection between appearances and the mind-independent 
is maintained. That being the case, the foundationalist may also suggest that he can 
utilise experiential beliefs as basic beliefs. And in their case, those beliefs are to be 
considered non-inferentially justified because they are not justified via inference from 
another belief, but due to their interaction with their subject-matter, i.e., appearances.
It must be noted, however, that the epistemic regress argument in itself does not 
force the foundationalist to make a choice between these two proposed kinds of basic 
beliefs in his attempt at carrying through the traditional epistemological project in 
regards to empirical knowledge of the mind-independent. For it makes no claim 
concerning how justified a basic belief must be. And such an issue is not within its 
ambit because the Agrippan sceptic obviously thinks that there can be no such thing as a 
non-inferentially justified, basic belief.
But having introduced foundationalism let us leave the substantive issue of 
which of those two proposed kinds of basic belief the foundationalist should choose to
42 This need not be accepted, committing the foundationalist as it does to a questionable position in the 
philosophy of perception, i.e., what might be called an ‘indirect realism’. However, since nothing 
effectively hangs on the issue of how the foundationalist conceives of perception I shall not question the 
assumption of such a theory.
43 Barry Stroud, ‘Epistemological Reflection on Knowledge of the External World’, p. 130, in Stroud, 
Understanding Human Knowledge, pp. 122— 138.
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the side for the moment. I now wish to make some clarifications concerning the scope 
of my investigation, and specifically clarifications in regards to the scope of our 
involvement with foundationalism.
It is often noted that there are two problems with foundationalism. The first is 
the one we are interested in: how or whether it escapes the Agrippan problematic. The 
second is more of a pragmatic problem, so to speak. It concerns the transition that must 
necessarily be made from the foundationalist’s basic beliefs to the superstructure of 
inferentially justified empirical beliefs—empirical knowledge of the mind- 
independent—which they are ‘the ultimate justification for’. As Bonjour writes:
The main issue [concerning the transition between the foundation and the 
superstructure]... is whether it is possible on the basis of the foundation 
specified by such a position to provide an adequate justification for the other 
beliefs that we ordinarily regard as justified, or at least for a reasonably high 
proportion of such beliefs. A foundationalist view that falls seriously short 
in this area will itself amount to a fairly severe version of scepticism. 44
For instance, say for whatever reason that the foundationalist must take his basic beliefs 
to be of the latter of the two proposed kinds specified above, i.e., to have as their 
subject-matter appearances. If the foundationalist cannot illustrate a suitable 
justificatory inference from such beliefs to beliefs which directly concern the mind- 
independent then that threatens to forever cut us off from the mind-independent in the 
radically sceptical sense that we cannot even have justified belief concerning it. 
Successfully specifying a foundation of basic beliefs at that level may therefore be 
something of a pyrrhic victory. But this is not our topic: we are interested in the 
explanation of how empirical knowledge is possible as compounded by the applications 
of the trilemma at the heart of the Agrippan problematic, like the epistemic regress 
argument, which dictate that there can be no structure of empirical justification, and so 
no structure of empirical knowledge, and not whether, having identified some things we 
do know, and so having structured some aspect of or domain within our empirical 
knowledge, we can get to other things which we take ourselves to know. In a sense, the 
former is sufficient for us: to be able to define a structure of empirical knowledge, even 
one of slight extension, would effectively amount to our explaining the possibility of 
empirical knowledge. In regards to foundationalism, then, we are only concerned with 
whether we can identify actual basic beliefs and nothing more.
44 Bonjour, ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’, p. 120.
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But whilst foundationalism is the most epistemologico-historically common way 
to attempt to escape the regress of conditional justification highlighted by the epistemic 
regress argument, we must also recognise another response. This response attempts to 
transform (b). Adherents to this position do not dispute the first assumption which 
underlies the premise of the epistemic regress argument, i.e., that the only way in which 
a belief can justify another belief is inferentially. Nor do they dispute, as the 
foundationalist does, the second assumption underlying that premise, i.e., that a reason 
to believe is always something epistemically distinct from a belief in the proposition it 
concerns. In fact, in a sense, they do not dispute the premise of that argument at all. 
Instead, they dispute the implicit claim of that premise which seems to entail that we 
must conceive of inferential justification as linear. They argue that, whilst it is the case 
that all justification is inferential, ‘inferential justification, despite its linear appearance, 
is essentially systematic or holistic in character: beliefs are justified by being 
inferentially related to other beliefs in the overall context of a coherent system’ .45 Thus 
epistemologists who hold such a position are called ‘coherentists’. Their thought is that, 
if we take inferential justification as ‘systematic or holistic in character’ we can avoid 
the paradoxical nature of (b): a's belief that p does contribute to its own justification, 
but that is only ‘in the overall context of a coherent system’, and this somehow eludes 
the charge of circularity levelled at (b). It is because the coherentist does not object to 
either of the two assumptions which underlie the premise of the epistemic regress 
argument that I said in the introduction to this chapter that he was ‘between two 
worlds’. For we should really understand him as moving towards questioning that first 
assumption, just not going far enough, as we shall see below.
Perhaps the most apt way of characterising this position in general terms is to 
say that the coherentist takes the Agrippan sceptic, in pushing the epistemic regress 
argument, to have m/ss-located the true locus of inferential justification: it is not 
primarily at the level of particular empirical beliefs but at the level of a system of 
empirical beliefs—the latter is the fundamental unit of justification. Inference occurs 
between belief systems and not beliefs; in fact, beliefs are only derivatively justified by 
their membership within such a system. A belief is justified iff it increases the 
coherence o f a system o f beliefs, otherwise it should be rejected; the more coherent such 
a system the greater the degree of justification devolved upon its constituent beliefs. 
The fundamental notion of coherentism, then, is that of coherence itself, i.e., the
4:1 Bonjour, SEK, p. 90.
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epistemically salient characterisation of how the properties of a belief system as a whole 
devolve justification on its constituent beliefs.
Simply put, there are a great many problems with even getting this position off 
the ground. As Bonjour writes:
At first glance, however, [coherentism] seems to be subject to a number of 
crushing objections, even if the quite problematic holistic and nonlinear 
conception of justification is tentatively allowed. The most standard of these 
objections are the following three (which are obviously closely related):
First, no matter how high the standard of coherence is set, it seems clear that 
there will be many, probably infinitely many, systems of beliefs which will 
satisfy it and between which such a coherence theory will be unable to 
choose in any epistemically nonarbitrary way. (And any consistent 
empirical belief which is not internally coherent will be a member of some 
of those systems.) Second, such a view seems to deprive empirical 
knowledge of any input from or contact with the nonconceptual world, 
making it extremely unlikely that it will accurately describe that world. If 
justification depends only on the internal relations between the components 
of the system, then any agreement with the external world would be purely 
coincidental.... Third, such a coherence theory will seemingly be unable to 
establish an appropriate connection between justification and truth unless it 
interprets truth as long-run coherence.... This is precisely what the idealist 
proponents of the coherence theory tended to do, but such a view is 
nonetheless extremely implausible.46
Nonetheless, like with the issue concerning the transition between the foundation and 
the superstructure in regards to foundationalism, I will ignore these three problems. 
That might seem odd since we are concerned with the possibility of empirical 
knowledge. For instance, how can we explain the possibility of empirical knowledge if 
we are denying ‘any input from or contact with the nonconceptual world’? But to make 
the point now in order to forestall any objections: I shall argue that the very notion of 
coherence is question-begging. That is, I shall argue that coherence is actually 
foundationalism in disguise. In regards to an attempt to carry through the traditional 
epistemological project no epistemically salient account of the notion of coherence can 
be given without the importation of a foundationalist element and thus the breakdown of 
any claim to holistic inferential justification. Therefore, if foundationalism is to be 
rejected, then so is coherentism.
§2.4. The Agrippan Problematic III: The Problem of the Criterion
46 Ibid, p. 25, original emphasis.
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In §2.2 I illustrated how the first clause of the all encompassing, ostensibly paradoxical 
observation that we require knowledge to explain knowledge, and yet we cannot assume 
any knowledge to explain knowledge, was to be generated by the Agrippan problematic. 
Now, whilst I there questioned that generation in the sense that the Agrippan sceptic 
cannot argue for it without begging the question, I also stated that we would accept the 
assumptions underlying the Agrippan trilemma as valid unless shown to be otherwise. 
That being the case then the ostensibly paradoxical observation can be considered a 
product of that latter fact (again as specified in §2.2), so let us assume that it is in effect. 
Here I wish to turn to the specifically empirical understanding of that ostensibly 
paradoxical observation which we are most concerned with (recall the end of (■a) in 
§2.2). And I shall do this by illustrating the most egregious case of the requirement that 
we need empirical knowledge to explain empirical knowledge, and yet we cannot 
assume any empirical knowledge to explain empirical knowledge. This is that 
application of the Agrippan sceptic’s general argumentative methodology which I have 
called ‘the problem of the criterion’.
Now, as reiterated above, in §1.1 I offered a schematic of both the composition 
of a reason to believe qua indicative of the truth of the proposition it concerns, as well 
as isolating the elements of it which enabled its recognition as a reason to believe qua 
indicative of the truth of the proposition it concerns. In regards to my belief that 
‘Martians exist’ I suggested that the following conjunction of beliefs might act as a 
reason to believe that proposition believed:
a. In regards to their content the theses are indicative of the likely truth of the 
proposition that ‘Martians exist’ (belief).
b. If those theses themselves are likely to be true, then the proposition that 
‘Martian exist’ is likely to be true (by (a.)).
c. Those theses exhibit the epistemic property of being formulated by a noted 
scientist (belief).
d. If those theses exhibit the epistemic property of being formulated by that noted 
scientist, then those theses are likely to be true (belief).
e. Therefore, those theses are likely to be true (by (c.) and (d.)).
f. Therefore, the proposition that ‘Martians exist’ is likely to be true (by (b.) and
(e.)).
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That aspect of such reasoning we are concerned with here is (d.), i.e., the epistemic 
principle ‘If those theses exhibit the epistemic property of being formulated by a noted 
scientist, then those theses are likely to be true’ which licenses me to take my putative 
evidence in general in favour of the proposition that ‘Martians exist’ as actual evidence 
in general in favour of that proposition. That is, as suggested above, the problem of the 
criterion is concerned with the epistemic locus (IV.): the epistemic distinctness of the 
epistemic principle which licences an epistemic subject to take his putative evidence in 
general in favour of some proposition as actual evidence in general in favour of that 
proposition from the evidence in general in favour of that proposition.
Note that in §1.1 I stated without fanfare that (d.) was an inductively inferred 
epistemic principle. However, clearly that cannot always be the case in regards to such 
principles because surely at least one such principle is needed prior to my ever being 
able to take any putative evidence in general in favour of a proposition as actual 
evidence in general in favour of a proposition, i.e., for me to even be able to make such 
an inductive inference. Williams writes:
Suppose that, instead of offering some particular piece of evidence, I back 
up a given belief by citing its supposedly authoritative source (“the senses,” 
“reason,” etc.) or by claiming it meets some condition that distinguishes 
justified beliefs from unjustified [sic should say ‘beliefs’ again] (e.g. 
increasing the overall coherence of one’s belief-system): surely I can be 
challenged to explain why beliefs issuing from that source, or meeting that 
condition, are likely to be true. Again, we face three options: we can refuse 
to explain; we can justify our reliance on a given source or standard by 
appeal to the same source or standard (“I know by observation that 
observation is reliable,” “A coherence theory of justification maximises 
coherence”): or we can try to cite a different source (“I can show a priori 
that observation is reliable/that coherence is truth-conducive”). I suppose, 
however, that given our limited epistemological ingenuity, there is not much 
chance of our embarking on an infinite regress: circularity and mere 
assumption are the chief dangers here.47
Note his claim at the end: ‘there is not much chance of our embarking on an infinite 
regress: circularity and mere assumption are the chief dangers here’. This is indicative 
of the difference between the epistemic regress argument, i.e., the Agrippan sceptic’s 
general argumentative methodology as applied to the epistemic locus (I.), and that 
argumentative methodology as applied to the epistemic loci (II.)—(IV.). The former is a 
much more formal, abstract application of that argumentative methodology, one which 
is not subject-matter specific. It is only once some kind of workable solution to that
47 Williams, UD, p. 61—62, original emphasis.
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argument has been tendered that we can properly turn to the subject-matter we are 
concerned with, i.e., empirical knowledge. And it is then that we come face-to-face with 
the other three applications of that methodology, culminating with the problem of the 
criterion. So note, then, that I am suggesting that the epistemic regress argument has 
methodological priority over the other applications of the argumentative methodology 
of the Agrippan sceptic—the epistemologist attempts to answer that argument first. In 
any case, Williams’s claim is to be understood in light of the fact that some such 
substantive relativisation has now been made to that subject-matter—given that 
relativisation there is not much chance of embarking on an infinite regress in regards to 
the problem of the criterion.
The problem expressed in the passage above is indicative of the fact that we 
simply have to, at some point, make an assumption in regards to the explanation of 
empirical knowledge—that is the moral, I take it, of the problem of the criterion. And 
what the Agrippan sceptic enjoins us to think is that that assumption must be of an 
instance of empirical knowledge. Given that he cannot inductively infer his ultimate 
empirical epistemic principle— his criterion—the epistemologist is faced with either 
justifying that ultimate empirical epistemic principle by circular appeal to itself, or 
justifying it by appeal to some other, non-empirical or a priori source or standard, but 
how does he then justify that, for obviously it is no use appealing to the ultimate 
empirical epistemic principle which the latter has been invoked to justify. In fact, I think 
we should actually reject this second option. As Stroud writes:
As a way of explaining how we know the things we do, this [re the appeal to 
the a priori] merely postpones or expands the problem. It avoids the 
sceptical regress in sensory knowledge of the world by insisting that the 
basic ‘principles’ or presuppositions needed for such empirical knowledge 
do not themselves depend on empirical, sensory support. But that says only 
that those ‘principles’ are not known by experience; it does not explain how 
they are known. Merely being presupposed by our empirical knowledge 
confers no independent support. It has to be explained how we know 
anything at all a priori, and how in particular we know those very things we 
need for empirical knowledge. And then the old dilemma presents itself 
again. If our a priori knowledge of those ‘principles’ is derived from 
something prior to them which serves as their evidential base [re are 
themselves inferred, whether deductively or inductively], it must be shown 
how the further ‘principles’ needed to take us from that base to the 
‘principles’ in question could themselves be supported. If we assume from 
the outset that we do know some ‘principles’ a priori, not all of our a priori 
knowledge in general will have been explained. It would seem that a priori 
knowledge in general could be explained only in terms of something that is 
not itself a priori knowledge. But empirical knowledge cannot explain a 
priori knowledge—and it would be no help even if it could—so either we
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must simply accept the unexplained fact that we know things a priori or we 
must try to explain it without appealing to any other knowledge at all.
And note that if we do reject this second option then we have finally reached the 
ostensibly paradoxical observation as specifically concerning empirical knowledge: we 
require empirical knowledge, i.e., an ultimate empirical epistemic principle, to explain 
empirical knowledge, yet we cannot assume any empirical knowledge in order to 
explain empirical knowledge, and we cannot assume any other knowledge either. The 
derivation of the specifically empirical ostensibly paradoxical observation is thus to be 
understood as a product of the fact that an appeal to other knowledge is really of no help 
at all.
48 Stroud, ‘Understanding Human Knowledge in General’, pp. 108— 109.
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Chapter Three: Foundationalism and the Agrippan Problematic
Introduction
In this chapter I introduce the last two applications of the Agrippan trilemma, as well as 
two kinds of foundationalism, one in regards to each of those two applications. Those 
two applications obviously concern the remaining two epistemic loci I identified in 
§1.1, i.e., (II.) and (III.). We shall call these arguments ‘the evidential regress argument’ 
and ‘Bonjour’s argument’ respectively. In regards to the evidential regress argument I 
shall introduce the foundationalism termed ‘the appearance theory’, although, as we 
shall see, it fails to elude that argument. And even if it did, it shall be argued, it would in 
any case fail to elude Bonjour’s argument. The other foundationalism I introduce may 
be called ‘the sense-datum theory’. This appears to offer the best prospect for the 
foundationalist attempting to elude either of those two applications of the Agrippan 
trilemma (as well as the problem of the criterion it might be added), although once again 
it shall be suggested that it fails.
In the first section I present what I have called ‘the evidential regress argument’. 
This forces the foundationalist to opt for experiential beliefs as basic in that it demands 
that the evidence in favour of the propositional content of a basic belief must be 
absolutely certain, which simply cannot be the case in terms of beliefs whose 
propositional contents directly concern the mind-independent. I then present the 
appearance theory, which we should understand as the simplest possible response 
available for the foundationalist to that argument. Invoking certain pieces of linguistic 
evidence, the appearance theory argues that we cannot be wrong about how things 
appear to us.
In the next section (§3.2) I argue that our fallibility in perceptual matters also 
extends to cognitive matters—our capacities in general are fallible. That being the case 
we should not accept the appearance theorist’s argument. However, this leaves the job 
of explaining away those pieces of evidence the appearance theorist has invoked in 
defence of his position (a matter I turn to in §§4.1—4.2).
In the next section (§3.3) I present what I have called Bonjour’s argument. This 
suggests that the search for absolute certainty in regards to evidence in favour of some 
proposition is in any case not enough to escape the Agrippan problematic, for a reason 
to believe that such evidence is absolutely certain will still be required for a belief in the 
proposition that evidence concerns to be acceptable as basic. The appearance theorist
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cannot reply to this argument. On the other hand, the sense-datum theorist may be able 
to: he argues that what in fact constitute the foundation of our empirical knowledge are, 
effectively, appearances themselves. That which is believed about at the second level, 
so to speak, itself constitutes the first level of our empirical knowledge and does not 
require justification.
In the final section of this chapter (§3.4) I argue that the sense-datum theorist 
may be understood as implying that there is in fact a third assumption underlying the 
premise of the epistemic regress argument, i.e., that only beliefs have a justificational 
role to play in an epistemic economy, so to speak. But I also argue that the 
foundationalist who proffers such a theory finds himself faced with an inescapable 
dilemma, which is indicative of the fact that that supposed third assumption is in any 
case encompassed by the second assumption, i.e., that a reason to believe some 
proposition must always be something epistemically distinct from belief in the 
proposition it concerns. I finish this chapter by bringing up Sellars’s own thoughts on 
the confusions of the sense-datum theory.
$3.1. The Evidential Regress Argument and the Appearance Theory
To dive straight in, the evidential regress argument is well expressed by Dancy:
This [argument]... can best be understood by approaching it from a (very 
slight) knowledge of the probability calculus. In this calculus, probability is 
always assessed relative to evidence. We do not ask what the absolute 
probability of a hypothesis h (written P(/?)) would be. Instead we ask what 
the absolute probability of a hypothesis /z’s conditional probability given 
evidence e (written P(h/e)). The probability of h given e is expressed as 
correlations generally are, on a scale of 0 to 1. If P (h/e) = 0, then given eh is 
certainly false. If P(h/e) = 1, then given e, h is certainly true. If P(h/e) = 0.5, 
then it is as probable that h is true, given e, as that it is false, since P(h/e) + 
P(~h/e) = 1 in the calculus.
The main point is that in assessing the probability of h given e we do not 
question e; we assume temporarily that e is certain, and we ignore the 
chance of e not being true. But e itself has a probability relative to further 
evidence e \  and so on indefinitely. And unless we can find in the end a 
proposition or set of evidence en which has somehow in its own right the 
probability of 1, all these probabilities will have nothing to rest on. We need 
to find something certain which can function as the unquestioned evidence 
by appeal to which the probabilities of other things are to be assessed.49
4<) Dancy, ICE, p. 54— 55, original emphasis.
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This argument suggests that the evidence in favour of some proposition must ultimately 
be traced back to an item or items of evidence which are themselves certain, items 
which have in their own ‘right the probability of 1’, else all the items of evidence 
constitutive of that chain (regress) of conditional evidence will have ‘nothing to rest 
on’—they will not even be /wprobable: their actual probability simply cannot be 
calculated. Now here Dancy is obviously treating the evidential regress argument as an 
argument for foundationalism, however his acknowledged inspiration for this argument, 
C. I. Lewis, implicitly treats it as an instance of the Agrippan trilemma.50 The latter 
writes:
Again; if the statement of objective fact, in whatever degree it may have 
become already assured, is further significant—if it implies what could be 
further and empirically determined but is not strictly deducible from past 
and present findings—then always it signifies something verifiable but as 
yet unverified, and is, in corresponding measure, itself subject to theoretical 
uncertainty. We have concluded that all statements of objective fact do have 
this character. That conclusion being premised, it becomes essential to 
distinguish statements of the given and presently certain, as well as 
statements of terminating judgments which later experience may render 
certain, from such statements of objective fact. Otherwise it becomes 
impossible to assure objective truth as even probable. If what is to confirm 
the objective belief and thus show it probable, were itself an objective belief 
and hence no more than probable, then the objective belief to be confirmed 
would only be probably rendered probable. Thus unless we distinguish the 
objective truths belief in which experience may render probable, from those 
presentations and passages of experience which provide this warrant, any 
citation of evidence for a statement about objective reality, and any 
mentionable corroboration of it, will become involved in an indefinite 
regress of the merely probable—or else it will go around in a circle—and 
the probability will fail to be genuine. If anything is to be probable, then 
something must be certain. The data which eventually support a genuine 
probability, must themselves be certainties.51
Here Lewis clearly sets out options (b) and (c) of the Agrippan trilemma: ‘Thus unless 
we distinguish the objective truths belief in which experience may render probable, 
from the presentations and passages of experience which provide this warrant, any 
citation of evidence for a statement about objective reality, and any mentionable 
corroboration of it, will become involved in an infinite regress of the merely probable— 
or else it will go around in a circle—and the probability will fail to be genuine’ (I have 
italicised the mention of (b)). All that is needed to make explicit the trilemma at the 
heart of the evidential regress argument would be to add that there is of course the other
50 Ibid, p. 54.
51 C. I. Lewis, An Analysis o f Knowledge and Valuation, (La Salle: The Open Court Publishing Company, 
1946) p. 186.
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option (a), which in this case would amount to refusing to calculate the probability of 
some item of evidence in a regress of conditional evidence such that we cannot take 
anything which it is putatively conditional evidence in favour of as even improbable. 
This, then, is the Agrippan problematic in application to the second epistemic locus I 
identified in §1.1, i.e., (II.): the epistemic distinctness of the evidence in favour of that 
proposition from the proposition it concerns.
Let us bracket the suggestion of Lewis’s own response to the evidential regress 
argument implied in phrases such as, e.g., ‘those presentations and passages of 
experience which provide this warrant’ or ‘statements of the given and presently 
certain’; Lewis is a sense-datum theorist as we shall see in §3.3. Clearly Dancy and 
Lewis are here concerned with what we have called ‘absolute certainty’ (§1.2). For an 
item of evidence to have a probability of being true of 1 is for there to be no possible 
evidence against its being true. And since we are here considering foundationalism, the 
present response to this argument is already decided for us (as implied above): the 
foundationalist shall attempt to transform (a.)—he will suggest that he can identify basic 
beliefs the evidence in favour of which is absolutely certain. And note that the 
evidential regress argument is not simply suggesting that some of the items of evidence 
at the terminating points of a regress of conditional evidence must be absolutely certain. 
It is saying that all such items must be, since at a minimum a regress of conditional 
justification will consist of only one item of evidence.
Now, one thing we can note from the passage of Lewis’s is his contention that 
‘objective belief or ‘statements of objective fact’—empirical beliefs whose 
propositional contents directly concern mind-independent objects and expressions 
thereof—are ‘no more than probable’. Consider again my empirical belief that ‘There is 
a Martian in front of my eyes’. If true, its propositional content directly concerns a 
mind-independent object, i.e., the Martian in front of my eyes. But given my fallibility 
in perceptual matters I cannot tell from my experience of there being a Martian in front 
of my eyes alone whether it is veridical—it could be veridical, yet it might also be an 
illusion or an hallucination. This dictates that simply because it is a belief about a mind- 
independent object it cannot have evidence in favour of its propositional content which 
is absolutely certain. The evidence in favour of the proposition that ‘There is a Martian 
in front of my eyes’ can only be indicative of the likely truth of that proposition.
The conclusion we should draw from these considerations is that empirical 
beliefs whose propositional contents directly concern mind-independent objects cannot 
play the role of basic beliefs if the evidence in favour of the propositions constitutive of
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basic beliefs must be indicative of their certain truth. But the foundationalist only has 
two choices in regards to such basic beliefs, so by a process of elimination it must be 
the case that what I have called ‘experiential beliefs’, i.e., empirical beliefs whose 
propositional contents directly concern appearances of mind-independent objects play 
the role of basic beliefs. Empirical beliefs whose propositional contents are restricted to 
the deliverances of sense-experience alone and imply nothing about an independent 
world, i.e., experiential beliefs, must play the role of basic beliefs—they are 
epistemically prior to all other empirical beliefs.
But why should we regard the evidence in favour of the propositional contents 
of such experiential beliefs as absolutely certain? That evidence is to be considered an 
appearance itself, and the thought goes that we simply cannot be wrong about how 
things look or seem or appear to us. Unlike in the case of my belief that ‘There is a 
Martian in front of my eyes’, in regards to which there may or may not be a Martian in 
front of my eyes in virtue of which it is true, in the case of my belief that ‘There looks 
to be a Martian in front of my eyes’ what could I have mistaken for the visual 
appearance of their being a Martian in front of my eyes?
This thought becomes complicated, however, when the idea that an item of 
evidence must exhibit propositional structure is brought up, something which we have 
simply ignored up until now. The point being that only something which admits of truth 
or falsity can play the role of evidence and only something with propositional structure 
can admit of truth or falsity. So the simplest response for the foundationalist in regards 
to the evidential regress argument, without his attempting any ontological claims 
concerning the nature of appearances, is to posit that appearances are not in fact the 
evidence in favour of the propositional contents of experiential beliefs concerning them, 
but that those beliefs simply cannot be wrong—their propositional contents are that 
which is absolutely certain.
This, I take it, is the central claim of the appearance theorist. And he defends this 
claim initially by invoking a linguistic fact: what we shall call ‘the non-iterative nature 
of looks-talk’. This can be inferred from statements—expressions—of empirical belief. 
Statements of objective fact, i.e., expressions of empirical belief in the mind- 
independent, which thus involve what we shall call ‘is-talk’—an existence claim—can 
always be subjectively qualified. Consider my assertion that ‘There is a Martian in front 
of my eyes’. To this assertion I can always add the subjective qualification ‘... or, at 
least, it looks (<appears, seems, etc.) that way to me’. On the other hand, appearance 
statements, i.e., expressions of experiential belief, which thus involve looks-talk—an
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appearance claim—cannot be qualified in such a manner. I cannot intelligibly assert 
that ‘It looks as though there looks to be a Martian in front of my eyes’. The appearance 
theorist takes this as indicative of the fact that we cannot be wrong concerning 
appearances. And as Williams comments:
There seems to be something right in the claim that we cannot be wrong 
about how things appear to us.... I can say ‘This tie looks green to me, but 
the light is a bit funny in here so perhaps it is really blue’. But I can’t say 
‘This tie looks as if it looks green to me, but perhaps it really looks blue’.
What would such a claim even mean?52
(And note, to avoid any confusion, that the statement ‘This tie looks green to me, but 
the light is a bit funny so perhaps it is really blue’ does not involve the subjective 
qualification of the assertion of the experiential belief ‘This tie looks green to me’. It 
instead involves something like its objective qualification, so to speak, i.e., questioning 
what colour the tie really is, as opposed to how it looks.)
Let us accept this claim for now. How does the appearance theorist get from it to 
the thought that experiential beliefs are non-inferentially justified, i.e., to the thought 
that they are fit to play the role of basic beliefs and thus halt the regress of conditional 
justification codified in the epistemic regress argument? Recall that the foundationalist 
objects to the second assumption underlying the premise of that argument, i.e., that a 
reason to believe some proposition is always something epistemically distinct from 
belief in the proposition it concerns. The appearance theorist suggests that, in regards to 
experiential belief, a reason to believe some proposition directly concerning an 
appearance is not epistemically distinct from belief in that proposition. And that is 
because that propositional content will be absolutely certain. Moreover, this devolves a 
corresponding epistemic property upon a belief in such a proposition: infallibility. That 
is, ‘If a proposition, being certain, has a probability of 1, then there is no chance that a 
belief in that proposition will be false; so the belief will be infallible’. And it is a short 
step from a beliefs being infallible to the claim that it is therefore non-inferentially 
justified, i.e., basic. As Dancy writes:
An infallible belief would be justified but would not derive its justification 
from any relation in which it stood to other beliefs; it would not need any 
support from elsewhere. For surely a belief whose chances of being false are 
nil is unimpeachable. Nothing could reduce its probability, and hence there 
could be no reasons for supposing it false. So if there are any infallible 
beliefs we have no need to worry about the threatened regress of
52 M. Williams, Problems o f Knowledge, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 96. From hence, PK.
53 Dancy, ICE, p. 55.
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justification [re the epistemic regress argument]. Infallibility in the base will 
stop the regress.54
So the appearance theorist takes himself to have an answer to both the epistemic and 
evidential regress arguments—indeed, some kind of explanation of how empirical 
knowledge is possible. It is from a foundation of experiential beliefs that he proposes 
our empirical justification is structured, and the explanation for this is that their 
propositional contents are absolutely certain. But let us note straight away in regards to 
such a putative claim: what about Bonjour’s argument? And, moreover, what about the 
problem of the criterion? Considering that what I have suggested as the composition of 
a reason to believe some proposition is only partially fulfilled by arguing that the 
evidence in favour of some proposition is not to be conceived of as epistemically 
distinct from that proposition itself, what has the appearance theorist to say about the 
fact that it would appear that an epistemic subject must in any case be able to recognise 
an experiential belief as infallible, i.e., have secondary evidence concerning the 
evidence in favour of it, and, indeed, have an epistemic principle which, in regards to 
such secondary evidence, licenses his acceptance of that belief as non-inferentially 
justified and so basicl
$3.2. The Appearance Theory and Fallibility
Indeed, there are a variety of problems with the appearance theory which would suggest 
that any claim to have explained the possibility of empirical knowledge, at least in 
regards to the first aspect of the generality demanded by the traditional epistemological 
project, would be premature, not least of which are those presented by Bonjour’s 
argument and the problem of the criterion. Yet since we have specified its central claim 
which is, in an extended form, that empirical beliefs whose propositional contents 
directly concern appearances are infallible because their contents are absolutely certain, 
it is most obvious to begin its critique by asking whether it even escapes the evidential 
regress argument.
Now, we might say that the appearance theorist denies that all our capacities are 
fallible. The question is, is such a denial plausible? For instance, imagine a situation in 
which I assert that ‘There looks to be a red Martian in front of my eyes’ in the standard 
conditions of visual perception, e.g., broad daylight, my not being on drugs or visually 
impaired in any manner, etc. That would be to give expression to an experiential belief
54 Ibid, p. 57.
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of mine. Moreover, say that there really is a Martian in front of my eyes, you can see it 
too, but that it is in fact green. What are we to say about this disparity in colour between 
my expression of my experiential belief and the actual facts of the case? Have I or have 
I not in some sense made a mistake? And if I have, might that mean that that 
experiential belief is actually false?
The point of the invocation of standard conditions is that it should rule out, or at 
least limit, malfunctions of my perceptual capacities. So let us say that the appearance 
that I am expressing belief in the qualitative character of actually has the qualitative 
character of green and thus matches with objective reality. So what has gone wrong? 
Have I, via the fallibility of the cognitive capacities of mine involved in the process by 
which I have acquired the experiential belief that ‘There looks to be a... Martian in 
front of my eyes’ (where ‘a ...’ is to signify the fact that we are not sure whether I 
believe that the Martian looks red or green), acquired a false experiential belief? The 
appearance theorist cannot allow that: in all cases like this my cognitive capacities must 
be infallible. But what can he say instead, since clearly a mistake has been made 
somewhere on my part. Dancy writes:
Champions of infallibility tend to concede that there is room for a mistake in 
the description of one’s sensory states.... I might mistakenly describe my 
sensory state as being an experience of pink (things look pink to me there) 
when in fact it is an experience of orange. But this is dismissed as a merely 
verbal error. Of course I can be mistaken about the meanings of the words I 
use, but this will not show that I have any mistaken beliefs about my present 
sensory states. On the contrary, I must know how things look to me: my 
only error lies in choosing the wrong words to describe it. The description I 
use may be false, but I, the describer, am in this case infallible. My beliefs— 
the things I use words to express, with more or less success—must be true.55
That is, the appearance theorist argues that any suggestion of fallibility in regards to my 
empirical belief that ‘There looks to be a... Martian over there’ is to be attributed to my 
expression of that experiential belief. I can make a false assertion concerning the 
qualitative character of an appearance, but it cannot be the case that I falsely believe in 
what that qualitative character is—‘On the contrary, I must know how things look to 
me’.
The appearance theorist defends this claim by shifting into the semantic register: 
he argues that it has to be the case that ‘I must know how things look to me’ if it is even 
to be possible that an assertion of mine concerning the qualitative character of an 
appearance can be false to begin with—if such an assertion can even be meaningful. So
55 Ibid, p. 58, original emphasis.
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note the juncture we have now reached: we are turning to the semantics behind 
foundationalism. Moreover, note the implicit thought at work here: if experiential 
beliefs must play the role of basic beliefs in regards to empirical knowledge, then it 
cannot be the case that their propositional contents could be false else empirical 
discourse would be meaningless. It is possible to take this thought as relativised to that 
certain theory of concept-acquisition which I have claimed that the foundationalist is 
wedded to, but I actually think there is a kernel of truth to it which takes us beyond the 
borders of just that theory. The thought is that we must be able to illustrate that our 
empirical concepts actually hook onto the mind-independent in some way. Indeed, I 
take this to be the fundamental moral behind the evidential regress argument.
In any case, Dancy reconstructs such an argument like this:
[Firstly,]... we may say that merely verbal errors can be corrected in 
standard ways. You can show me or remind me of the difference between 
orange and pink, perhaps by showing me a colour chart. When I have 
grasped this [difference]..., I can apply it to my present experience in order 
to see whether the experience is one of pink or of orange. But in order to do 
this I must be aware of the nature of the experience already, before I 
compare it with others in order to get the right words to describe it. I don’t 
change my beliefs about how things look, only about how to describe them.
[Secondly,]... although some comparison between my present experience 
and others is necessary for me to know what words to use in description, 
and although such comparison, especially in the case where the objects 
compared are a past and a present experience, is fallible (since memory is 
fallible), still the comparison is not what I am trying to express when I 
express my beliefs about my present experience alone. For my experience 
would have been this way no matter how other experiences might or might 
not have been. So the fallibility of the comparison does not extend to show 
the fallibility of the belief expressed; it only shows the fallibility of the 
expression of belief.
Finally, if a comparison is possible at all, this can only be because 
ultimately we have non-comparative knowledge of the two things 
compared. We compare them in order to see not what each is like but in 
what respects they are like each other. 56
These three points are intertwined. The first suggests that we are to equate my very 
awareness of the qualitative character of an appearance with my experiential belief 
whose propositional content directly concerns that qualitative character. Otherwise, the 
appearance theorist continues, how could I even correct my assertion that There looks 
to be a red Martian in front of my eyes’ when prompted, e.g., by your provision of a 
colour chart. The second then introduces the parallel claim that when I express an 
experiential belief whose propositional content directly concerns the qualitative
56 Ibid, pp. 58—59.
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character of an appearance a process of comparison is involved in which I compare the 
qualitative character of that appearance with the qualitative character of other 
appearances either current or remembered such that I can choose the correct words for 
that assertion concerning its qualitative character. Nonetheless, it is an experiential 
belief whose propositional content directly concerns that qualitative character of that 
appearance which I am trying to express, so again it cannot be that I am unaware—do 
not believe in—that qualitative character already. Moreover, the process of comparison 
allows us to pinpoint a locus of fallibility between my experiential belief whose 
propositional content directly concerns that qualitative character of that appearance and 
my expression of that belief. The final point then clarifies how we are to understand the 
propositional content of my experiential belief whose propositional content directly 
concerns that qualitative character of that appearance—it is constituted by non­
comparative concepts necessarily specific or particular to the propositional content of 
that experiential belief in that qualitative character of that appearance.
What seems correct here is that it certainly is the case that when I express an 
experiential belief I am attempting to express belief in that qualitative character of that 
appearance, and this will, in a sense, involve non-comparative concepts (see §4.1). 
However, the appearance theorist confuses this thought. The question we must ask is 
what evidence the appearance theorist can provide for the existence of this non­
comparative propositional content as he conceives of it, i.e., as never expressed. For he 
seems to take it that locutions such as ‘looks red’ and ‘looks green’, locutions 
constitutive of the assertion of an experiential belief, acquire their meaning via that 
process of comparison. Indeed, he must do this to maintain that it is that process which 
is the locus of fallibility between such an experiential belief and its expression. But if 
such non-comparative propositional contents are never directly expressed, so to speak, 
but always only after some such process of comparison, what semantic contribution, so 
to speak, do they make to those locutions?
Now, clearly there are two meanings to such locutions. There is the comparative 
one employed in such a statement as ‘X looks as red things normally look’, which may 
be false, and there is the non-comparative one employed in the statement ‘Red things 
normally look red’, which is a contingent a priori truth. Now, if the ‘looks red’ at work 
in this latter statement is the ‘looks red’ at work in the former it would be a tautology: 
‘Red things normally look as red things normally look’. But the latter is not a tautology, 
and this fact needs to be explained away. This leads to the second linguistic fact which 
the appearance theorist invokes in defence of his position.
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This can be seen by noting that the proper way to expand that second statement 
is to put it in the form of a biconditional: ‘X  is red iff x would look red to standard 
observers in standard conditions’. Again, that is a contingent a priori truth, but it would 
be vacuous—tautologous—as a definition of physical redness if it was the case that 
‘red’ on its right-hand side simply was the ‘is red’ of its left-hand side. That would 
amount to defining physical redness in terms of physical redness which is obviously 
unilluminating. What we want is a genuine way of expressing how physical redness 
normally looks such that we can pick out all and only physically red things. The 
appearance theorist takes it that the non-comparative meaning of the locution ‘looks 
red’ can help here. That is, if we understand the ‘looks red’ of the right-hand side in 
terms of the non-comparative meaning of that locution, then we can understand that 
biconditional as an exceptionless definition, i.e., a definition, of how redness normally 
looks. This is because that non-comparative meaning of the locution ‘looks red’ is 
supposed to encompass all the occasions in which something looks red to someone, and 
so a fortiori those occasions when something looks red to someone because it is red. So 
whilst this non-comparative meaning of the locution ‘looks red’ never occurs in an 
assertion of an experiential belief, otherwise the appearance theorist looses his right to 
identify the process of comparison as the locus of fallibility, there is nonetheless 
evidence for its existence in the sense that if the propositional contents of experiential 
beliefs are not constituted by such non-comparative concepts then how else are we to 
explain the non-vacuous nature of that biconditional? This he invokes to dispel the ad 
hoc aura of his appeal to non-comparative concepts as constitutive of the propositional 
contents of such experiential beliefs. And it should be noted as a consequence of this 
explanation of the non-vacuous nature of that biconditional that the appearance theorist 
thinks that we can know how things look without ever necessarily knowing how they 
are.
Does this defence of the infallibility of experiential belief add up? Not really: the 
problem is, the use of the appearance theorist’s understanding of how the conceptual 
analogue of the non-comparative meaning of the locution ‘looks red’ in an explanation 
of how that biconditional can be considered non-vacuous aside, there seems to be 
evidence against its playing any role—again as the appearance theorist understands it— 
in regards to the cases that matter, i.e., when I express an experiential belief and that 
assertion turns out to be false in regards to the actual facts of the case at hand (in
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Standard conditions obviously). In regards to such cases the appearance theorist ‘seems
cn
to misuse the notion of an error which is merely verbal’. Dancy writes:
There are several sorts of such errors.... But the case where, choosing my 
words carefully with full consciousness of what I am doing, I deliberately 
pronounce on the nature of my present sensory state is not one of them.
Here if I am wrong, my error is substantial, for in being wrong about 
whether ‘pink’ is the word to describe my present experience I am wrong 
about what pink is and hence about whether my experience is of pink rather 
than of orange. Here then the error is both verbal and substantial.58
The import of this point is that a case like the one we have described, which is exactly 
where the two meanings of the locution ‘looks red’ should coincide if the non­
comparative one supposedly at work in the propositional content of an experiential 
belief is to make any semantic contribution to the comparative one that must be at work 
in the expression of that belief, does not give credence to the presence of the former in 
that propositional content because I can still get it wrong—still make a false assertion— 
even after I choose ‘my words carefully with full consciousness of what 1 am doing’ in 
attempting to express that empirical belief. It would appear more likely that I do not 
understand what the locution ‘looks red’ means at all in such a situation.
Ultimately, if we are to really give credence to the idea that we can have an 
infallible experiential belief in terms of its having a propositional content constituted by 
non-comparative concepts necessarily specific or particular to the propositional content 
of that experiential belief in that qualitative character of that appearance we would do 
better to assimilate the non-comparative ‘looks red’ to the purely demonstrative ‘looks 
this’, a concept ‘devoid of all implications for [its] further application’.59 Indeed, ‘What 
is... plausibly infallible is a belief that things look that way now to me’, but to imagine a 
foundation of experiential beliefs—basic beliefs—with such content is to imagine a 
foundation devoid of empirical content.60 Even without considering the other two 
applications of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan problematic the 
appearance theory cannot escape it. Nonetheless, this still leaves the matters of the 
explanation of the non-iterative nature of looks-talk, and how we can understand that 
biconditional to be non-vacuous, to be dealt with (for which see §4.1).
§3.3. Bonjour’s Argument
57 Ibid, p. 59.
58 Ibid, pp. 59—60.
59 M. Williams, PK, p. 101.
60 Dancy, ICE, p. 59, original emphasis.
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I suggested above that the appearance theory was the simplest way for the 
foundationalist to attempt to answer or elude the evidential regress argument, obviously 
implying that it is not the only way such an attempt can be made. However, given that 
our fallibility encompasses our cognitive capacities as well as our perceptual capacities, 
indeed, perhaps ‘that we are nowhere entirely immune from the possibility of error’, it 
is not surprising that many modem foundationalists do not feel the force, or bother to 
respond, to that argument.61 As Dancy remarks:
One of the main reasons for wanting one’s own basic beliefs to be infallible 
is that it would guarantee that they are all true. But is there really any 
purpose in seeking this guarantee? The principles of inference by which we 
are to move from basic to non-basic beliefs are fallible, in the sense that 
they take us sometimes from true belief to false ones.... If there is this 
source of contamination necessarily present in the procedure, why should 
we insist that the input to the procedure be completely sterile, i.e. devoid of 
any taint of falsehood?
On the other hand, I take it that the moral of the evidential regress argument is that we 
must be able to illustrate how our conceptual capacities hook onto the mind- 
independent in some way, so I think that simply ignoring that argument is un-principled. 
In fact, this passage from Dancy highlights another problem related to that same issue: 
how can we be sure that inference even works as a method of epistemically relating 
beliefs if there is no separable instance of an inference that works infallibly? 
Nonetheless, what I have called ‘Bonjour’s argument’—after Lawrence Bonjour, we 
might now add—would appear to undermine any foundationalism which seeks to posit 
its foundations at the level of beliefs. In other words, it undermines the whole notion of 
a basic belief.
I have suggested that Bonjour’s argument is to be understood as the application 
of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan problematic to the third of 
the epistemic loci I identified in §1.1, i.e., (Ill): the epistemic distinctness of the 
secondary evidence concerning the epistemic property exhibited by the evidence in 
favour of that proposition from the evidence in favour of that proposition. However, he 
himself does not treat it in that way, instead blending the problem of the criterion into it. 
Why I will leave it as is, bar some qualifications, is that it enables the easy derivation of 
the central thesis of the sense-datum theory, as we shall see.
In the first instance, Bonjour formulates his argument thus:
61 Ibid, p. 58.
62 Ibid, p. 58.
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if basic beliefs are to provide a secure foundation for empirical knowledge, 
if inference from them is to be the sole basis upon which other empirical 
beliefs are justified, then that feature, whatever it may be, by virtue of which 
a particular belief qualifies as basic must also constitute a good reason for 
thinking that belief true....
This crucial point may be formulated a bit more precisely, as follows. If 
we let f represent the basic feature or characteristic, whatever it may be 
[e.g. infallibility], which distinguishes basic empirical beliefs from other 
empirical beliefs, then in an acceptable foundationalist account a particular 
empirical belief B would qualify as basic only if the premises of the 
following justificatory argument were adequately justified:
(1) B has feature f .
(2) Beliefs which have feature f  are highly likely to be true.
Therefore, B is highly likely to be true.63
He then argues that at least one of those premises—‘(1)’ or ‘(2)’—must itself be 
empirical and concludes that an empirical belief qua basic belief is always dependent 
for its acceptance as basic on at least one other empirical belief; therefore, it cannot be 
basic.
We can see straight away what (1) and (2) correspond with: those two elements 
of a reason to believe some proposition above and beyond evidence in its favour, i.e., 
what I have called ‘secondary evidence’ and an ‘epistemic principle’ (§1.1). In regards 
to the appearance theory ‘f ’—the ‘feature’ or epistemic property, we should say, of a 
belief which is indicative of an empirical belief qua basic belief—will be infallibility, 
and we can imagine that the matching epistemic principle will be something like 
‘Beliefs which are infallible will be true’, allowing an epistemic subject to reason to the 
conclusion that his empirical beliefs which exhibit that feature are acceptable as basic. 
And whilst the appearance theory allows the easy illustration of these points we must 
keep in mind that the main thrust of Bonjour’s argument is that any empirical belief 
posited as basic must be understood as being basic in virtue of some epistemic property 
f , and so Bonjour’s argument applies to any foundationalism that takes the foundation 
of his structure of empirical knowledge as composed of empirical beliefs.
Now, Bonjour thinks that either of (1) or (2) could be a priori, but that at least 
one of them must be empirical. In regards to that first claim, i.e., that either of (1) or (2) 
could be a priori, the obvious suggestion is that it is (2)—the epistemic principle—that 
is a priori64 We have met this thought before in §2.4 where it was observed that taking 
an epistemic principle to be an instance of a priori knowledge in an effort to escape the
63 Bonjour, SEK, pp. 30—31.
64 Cf. ibid, p. 31.
60
problem of the criterion simply postponed the inevitable fact that at some point an 
assumption o f knowledge—whether empirical or not—must be made. That is the moral 
of the problem of the criterion, at least as the Agrippan sceptic understands it. I 
suggested that, since there was no way to elude that fact, we need not consider the turn 
to the a priori as in anyway helping the epistemologist’s cause. In regards to Bonjour’s 
thought that either of (1) or (2) could be a priori, but that at least one of them must be 
empirical, then, we might object that both (1) and (2) must be empirical. But what I 
have called ‘Bonjour’s argument’ only depends upon the idea that at least one of them 
must be empirical, and so we need not make too much of the fact that an appeal to the a 
priori is essentially redundant.
Before turning to the way Bonjour characterises the argument in the second 
instance, it will be useful to make two further points. Firstly, its relationship to the 
general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan problematic must be characterised. 
Bonjour employs the argument to illustrate how an empirical belief qua basic belief will 
always be dependent for its acceptance as basic upon another empirical belief. I have 
suggested that we might in fact take that as its dependence on two other empirical 
beliefs, but no matter. Moreover, I have suggested that it is most obvious that (2), i.e., 
the epistemic principle, will be a priori if either of the two premises are. Thus, we shall 
simply assume that (1), i.e., the secondary evidence, is an empirical belief. And now the 
implication of regress, and so the Agrippan trilemma, in regards to the third of the 
epistemic loci I identified in §1.1 is clearly deducible from Bonjour’s conclusion, i.e., 
that an empirical belief qua basic belief will always be dependent for its acceptance as 
basic upon another empirical belief. For the extended question, so to speak, is how we 
can know that that other empirical belief is itself justified? And whilst we may 
implausibly assume for whatever reason that its propositional content is absolutely 
certain such that it is itself infallible, we will then need a further empirical belief to the 
effect that it exhibits that epistemic property, etc. (I take it that there is no need to go 
into the characterisation of the three options (a)—(c) again.) This just underscores 
Bonjour’s conclusion by bringing out the implied regress contained within it.
The second point that should be made is that the secondary evidence qua 
empirical belief is an empirical belief only in that extended sense I have identified. It is 
empirical in that its propositional content concerns a deliverance of ‘inner’ sense, i.e., 
the introspective experience o f having an empirical belief that is putatively basic. It is 
from such an experience that the further belief in the fact that that original belief has the 
epistemic property posited as indicative of a basic belief is derived. Therefore, the moral
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of this application of the Agrippan trilemma, I submit, is that we cannot separate the 
two supposed domains of empirical knowledge—the mind-independent and the mind- 
dependent—as with a knife. Empirical knowledge comes as a package: introspective 
and memory knowledge, say, is just as empirical as, e.g., knowledge of mind- 
independent objects, and must necessarily be included in an account of the possibility of 
empirical knowledge from the beginning.
Bonjour formulates his argument more perspicuously thus:
(1) Suppose that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, empirical beliefs 
(a) which are... justified, and (b) whose justification does not depend 
on that of any further empirical beliefs.
(2) For a belief to be epistemically justified requires that there be a reason 
why it is likely to be true.
(3) For a belief to be epistemically justified for a particular person requires 
that this person be himself in cognitive possession of such a reason.
(4) The only way to be in cognitive possession of such a reason is to 
believe with justification the premises from which it follows that the 
belief is likely to be true.
(5) The premises of such a justifying argument for an empirical belief 
cannot be entirely a priori; at least one such premise must be 
empirical.
Therefore, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief must depend
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting (1); if
follows that there can be no basic empirical beliefs.65
How could the foundationalist respond to this argument? The foundationalist can argue, 
as Bonjour writes:
That the believer’s cognitive grasp of the premises required for [the 
justifying argument for B to be accepted as basic]... does not involve 
further empirical beliefs, which would themselves require justification.
What is involved is rather... states of a more rudimentary type which do not 
themselves require justification, despite having the capacity to confer 
justification on beliefs. It is these more rudimentary states which are thus, 
according to this position, the ultimate source of epistemic justification; 
although such basic beliefs are indeed the most basic beliefs, they are not 
the most basic [epistemic]... states.66
That is, I do not require another belief to the effect that my belief that ‘There looks to be 
a Martian in front of my eyes’ has the epistemic property indicative of non-inferential 
justification. Instead, that belief is non-inferentially justified in virtue of its 
interaction—however this is to be characterised—with an epistemically prior item 
which is not a belief and which does not itself require a justification.
65 Ibid, p. 32, original emphasis. In regards to ‘(5)’ see remarks above.
66 Ibid, p. 33, original emphasis.
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This is the thought codified by the sense-datum theory which we now turn to: it 
is an appearance itself, as distinct from an experiential belief whose propositional 
contents directly concerns it, which in some manner plays the role of the foundation of 
empirical knowledge. We have seen that Lewis talks of ‘those presentations and 
passages of experience which provide’ the warrant for ‘objective truths’. The former he 
also calls ‘the given’—‘the immediately presented or directly presentable contents of 
experience’.67 And it is ‘the given’ which he takes to be the ultimate foundation of 
empirical knowledge.
We must note the implications of the claim that the given do not require 
justification, although they are epistemically efficacious, so to speak. Not only will they 
stop the regress of conditional justification codified in the epistemic regress argument, 
but they will: (i), be absolutely certain in that they simply are what the second-level 
empirical beliefs of the sense-datum theorist’s structure of empirical knowledge will 
concern and not other beliefs about those things; (ii), not require that an epistemic 
subject know that they have the epistemic property indicative of their being basic or 
foundational; and (iii), be empirical knowledge arrived at without the requirement that 
an epistemic subject apply a criterion of empirical knowledge. That is, they will elude 
all four of the applications of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan 
problematic. An appeal to the given seems to present an overwhelmingly attractive 
prospect for the foundationalist.
§3.4. The Sense-Datum Theory and Sellars’s Dilemma
What is going on in an appeal to the given? How does it enable the foundationalist to 
question the second assumption underlying the premise of the epistemic regress 
argument? That assumption is that a reason to believe some proposition must always be 
something epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns. For the 
sense-datum theorist that assumption is apparently acceptable—contra the appearance 
theorist—however the Agrippan sceptic mistakenly thinks that beliefs are the only items 
which can play a justificational role in an epistemic economy. There are other items— 
instances of the given—which do not require a reason to believe them because they are 
simply not beliefs. And these can play the role of reasons to believe empirical beliefs at 
the second-, non-inferential level of the sense-datum theorist’s structure of empirical
67 Lewis, An Analysis o f Knowledge and Valuation, p. 176.
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knowledge. Effectively, we just have empirical knowledge in that we just have instances 
of the given. But can the given really play such a universal epistemic role?
What is important for our purposes here is the manner in which the appeal to the 
given is made. That is, in consideration of Lewis’s position Bonjour writes:
our immediate concern is to understand the precise epistemological role 
which the given content in question is supposed to play. In order to do this, 
we need again to consider in detail the elements and structure of an actual 
justificatory situation: First, there is the particular foundational or basic 
belief [re the second-level empirical belief] which is supposed to be non- 
inferentially justified. We will assume that such a basic belief is always the 
belief, linguistically formulable only in expressive language, that a certain 
specific given content is present, for example, that I seem to see something 
red. If this belief is true, as we may also assume, then it must be the case, 
second, that a red element is actually present in my experience. But it seems 
clear on reflection that these two elements are not enough. It is not enough 
for the appropriate experiential content merely to exist; rather it must be 
grasped or apprehended by me if I am to have a reason for accepting the 
basic belief. And thus we have a third element which seemingly must be 
present in the situation: the immediate apprehension or direct experience of
the experiential content in question, the apprehension that a red element is
. 68present.
Now, it is the ‘immediate apprehension or direct experience’ we are interested in the 
character of—is it epistemic or not? And which ever way the sense-datum theorist 
decides to fall on this matter will be dictated by how he conceives of the character of the 
‘red element’ actually present in an experience, i.e., the instance of the given.
After Sellars, we should recognise that the sense-datum theorist has two choices. 
He can either:
(1) Treat the red element as a particular, i.e., a non-epistemic item, in which 
case the immediate apprehension or direct experience of it cannot itself 
amount to a knowing, i.e., be epistemic—the existence of a red element 
‘does not logically imply the existence of knowledge’.69
(2) Treat the red element as a fact, i.e., an epistemic item, in which case the 
immediate apprehension or direct experience of it can amount to a knowing, 
i.e., be epistemic—the existence of a red element does logically imply the 
existence of knowledge.
68 Bonjour, SEK, p. 74, original emphasis and with suitable elisions and substitutions for ease of 
understanding.
69 Sellars, EPM, §3, p. 16, original emphasis.
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In the case of (1) we should not take it that s ’s immediate apprehension or direct 
experience of the red element can justify his second-level empirical belief whose 
propositional content directly concerns it. That is, that empirical belief qua basic belief 
is simply not non-inferentially justified by that red element, i.e., is not basic. A 
particular is not propositionally structured, and so does not admit of truth or falsity— 
how, then, can it be a reason to believe the propositional content of that second-level 
empirical belief? In the case of (2) we may take it that s 's immediate apprehension or 
direct experience of the red element can justify his second-level empirical belief qua 
basic belief, but then it is ‘difficult or impossible to see why it does not itself require 
justification in order to be thus acceptable’. This is the dilemma the sense-datum 
theorist faces which I flagged in the introduction to this chapter.
Which is to say: whilst the sense-datum theorist may understand himself as 
having located a third assumption underlying the premise of the epistemic regress 
argument, i.e., that only beliefs can play a justificational role in an epistemic economy, 
he has in fact done no such thing. If he conceives of the red element in non-epistemic 
terms then it can simply play no justifying role in regards to a second-level empirical 
belief. On the other hand, if he conceives of it in epistemic terms then it can play such a 
role, however he can provide no good reason for why we should not simply require that 
it be justified just as it justifies that second-level empirical belief. Indeed, why not 
simply treat it as another belief? Yet even if we do allow that items other than beliefs 
can play a justificational role in an epistemic economy the second assumption can be 
expanded to encompass this in any case. We just expand it to read: a justification for 
anything which can be thought of as playing a justificational role in an epistemic 
economy must always be something epistemically distinct from that which it concerns. I 
submit that the sense-datum theorist has discovered no third assumption underlying the 
epistemic regress argument.
However, there are two possible routes out of the dilemma which suggest 
themselves, one attempting to combine the horns corresponding to (1) and (2), the other 
to pass safely through the middle. The first is to deny the strict differentiation between 
the red element, understood as a particular, and s’s immediate apprehension or direct 
experience of it, understood as a fact. To introduce some further terminology: let us call 
the red element in my experience in complex with s 's immediate apprehension or direct 
experience of it a ‘sense datum’, but that red element alone, a ‘sense content’. (Thus
70 Bonjour, SEK, p. 75.
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why I have called this theory ‘the sense-datum theory’.) The sense-datum theorist can 
now say the following:
The non-inferential knowing on which our world picture rests is the 
knowing that certain items, e.g. red sense contents, are of a certain 
character, e.g. red. When such a fact is non-inferentially known about a 
sense-content, I will say that the sense content is sensed as being, e.g., red. I 
will then say that a sense content is sensed (full stop) if it is sensed as being 
of a certain character, e.g. red. Finally, I will say of a sense content that it is 
known if it is sensed (full stop), to emphasize that sensing is a cognitive or 
epistemic fact.71
This is to say that there is a dual aspect to s ’s immediate apprehension or direct 
experience of that red element: 5 both senses (non-inferentially knows) a fact about it, 
e.g. that it is red, i.e., as a sens e-datum, and also senses (knows) it in its particularity, so 
to speak, i.e., as a sens e-content. The two come together. But note that for 5 to sense 
(know) it in its particularity—as a sense-content—entails that ‘it is logically 
necessary... it be sensed as being o f a certain character, and that if it be sensed as 
being o f a certain character, the fact that it is o f that character be non-inferentially 
known', i.e., that he also knows it as a sense-datum. The claim then, is that whilst the 
red sense-content is a particular, it is, in a sense, a self-presenting particular, so to 
speak. Yet as Bonjour writes:
the same dilemma as was formulated above may be applied to this response: 
is that non-inferential knowledge allegedly built in to the red element 
cognitive or noncognitive, judgemental or nonjudgemental? If the former, 
then it seems impossible to deny that it is at least logically distinct from the 
given content of which it is non-inferential knowledge of. How after all can 
a red element fail to be logically distinct from the non-inferential knowledge 
that such a red element is present? The latter, unlike the former, is 
propositionally formed, capable of being true or false, and capable of 
serving as the premise of an inference; whereas the former, unlike the latter, 
is literally red (in the appropriate sense). How can two things as different as 
this fail to be distinct? If, on the other hand, the non- inferential knowledge 
is held to be nonjudgmental, noncognitive, there seems to be no clear reason 
for distinguishing it from the red element of which it is non-inferential 
knowledge of. But as already argued, a nonjudgemental, noncognitive 
understanding of non-inferential knowledge can provide no justification for 
a basic belief.
71 Sellars, EPM, §4, p. 17, original emphasis.
72 Ibid, §4, p. 17, original emphasis.
77 Bonjour, SEK, p. 76, original emphasis and with suitable elisions and substitutions for ease of 
understanding.
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We should take it, then, that the first proposed way in which the sense-datum theorist 
may escape the dilemma, i.e., the attempted combination of the horns corresponding to 
(1) and (2), is an epistemological bust.
The second route out of the dilemma attempts to go between the horns 
corresponding to (1) and (2). Instead of s’s immediate apprehension or direct experience 
of that red element being either epistemic or non-epistemic it is neither one nor the other 
but an adtnixture of them both; it is semi-epistemic, so to speak. Let us call this ‘the 
direct apprehension route’. S directly apprehends a fact (the epistemic part), but that 
apprehension is unmediated by concepts (the non-epistemic part). Yet again this route is 
open to objection. Sellars writes:
How is ‘direct apprehension’ to be understood? If the apprehending is 
distinguishable from the apprehended, is it not also ‘separable’? Might not 
apprehending occur without any fact being apprehended? If so, an 
‘apprehending that-p’ might not be an apprehending of the fact that-p. 
Hitting, in baseball, implies that something is hit. ‘Swinging’ does not. To 
hit is to swing successfully. Of course, ‘apprehend’, like ‘see’, is, in its 
ordinary sense, an achievement word. But does this not mean that, as in the 
case of ‘see’, there is a place for ‘ostensibly apprehending’, i.e., seeming to 
apprehend, a concept which does not imply achievement?74
He continues:
Many who use the metaphor ‘to see’ in intellectual contexts overlook the 
fact that in its literal sense ‘seeing’ is a term for a successful conceptual 
activity which contrasts with ‘seeming to see’. No piling on of additional 
metaphors (e.g., ‘grasping’, which implies an object grasped) can blunt this 
fact. Now the distinction between seeing and merely seeming to see implies 
a criterion. To rely on the metaphors of ‘apprehending’ or ‘presence of the 
object’ is to obscure the need for criteria for distinguishing between 
‘knowing’ and ‘seeming to know’, which ultimately define what it means to 
speak of knowledge as a correct or well-founded thinking that something is 
the case.
If so, to know that we apprehend a fact, we would have to know that the 
criteria which distinguish apprehending from seeming to apprehend were 
satisfied. In short, I suspect that the notion of a non-conceptual ‘direct 
apprehension’ of a ‘fact’ provides a merely verbal solution to our problem 
[re the regress of conditional justification]. The regress is stopped by an ad 
hoc regress-stopper.75
Or, as Bonjour remarks, ‘to say simply that acts of immediate apprehension, unlike
ordinary beliefs, somehow cannot by their very nature be mistaken is to stipulate that
74 Sellars, ‘The Structure of Knowledge’, III, §23, p. 339, original emphasis, in Hector-Neri Castaneda 
(ed.), Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Critical Studies in Honour o f Wilfrid Sellars, (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1975), pp. 295—347.
75 Ibid, III, §§24— 25, p. 339, original emphasis.
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this problem [re the non-inferential justification of empirical beliefs at the second-level 
of the sense-datum theorist’s structure of empirical knowledge whose propositional 
contents concern that which is directly apprehended, i.e., the red element] does not exist
76without offering any clear explanation of how and why this is so’.
Indeed, I think we should regard this second attempt to escape the dilemma 
formulated above as effectively unintelligible. It is akin to positing ‘semi-events, which 
could cause but need to be caused; semiexplanantia, which could explain but need to be 
explained’ .77 However, I think we can learn a little more from the first of those attempts 
to escape that dilemma. For the sense-datum theorist takes s ’s sensing (knowing) of the 
red element in its particularity, i.e., as a sense-content, ‘to be a fact which presupposes 
no learning, no forming of associations, no setting up of stimulus-response 
connections’, but s’s sensing (non-inferentially knowing) a fact about it, e.g., that it is 
red, i.e., as a sense-datum, as involving all those things. As Sellars continues:
In short, [the sense-datum theorist has tended]... to equate seeing sense 
contents with being conscious, as a person who has been hit on the head is 
not conscious whereas a new bom babe, alive and kicking, is conscious. 
[He]... would admit, of course, that the ability to know that a person, 
namely oneself, is now, at a certain time, feeling a pain, is acquired and does 
presuppose a (complicated) process of concept formation. But, [he]... would 
insist, to suppose that the simple ability to feel a pain or see a color, in 
short, to sense sense contents, is acquired and involves a process of concept 
formation, would be very odd indeed.
But if a sense-datum philosopher takes the ability to sense sense contents 
to be unacquired, he is clearly precluded from offering an analysis of x 
senses a sense content which presupposes acquired abilities. It follows that 
he could analyze x senses red sense content s as x non-inferentially knows 
that s is red only if he is prepared to admit that the ability to have such non- 
inferential knowledge as that, for example, a red sense content is red, is 
itself unacquired. And this brings us face to face with the fact that most 
empirically minded philosophers are strongly inclined to think that all 
classificatory consciousness, all knowledge that something is thus-and-so, 
or, in logicians’ jargon, all subsumption of particulars under universals, 
involves learning, concept formation, even the use of symbols.79
The point being that the sense-datum theorist who pushes the first attempt to escape the 
dilemma is committed to a picture in which 5 is required to have concepts before we 
would wish to say that he has acquired concepts. And Sellars agues that this is 
indicative of the fact that the sense-datum theorist has confused two ideas:
76 Lawrence Bonjour, ‘Foundationalism and the External World’, p. 231, Philosophical Perspectives, 13 
(si3; 1999), pp. 229—248.
77 Bonjour, SEK, p. 77.
78 Sellars, EPM, §6, p. 20.
79 Ibid, §6, p. 20, original emphasis.
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(1) The idea that there are certain inner episodes—e.g. sensations of red or 
of C# which can occur to human beings (and brutes) without any prior 
process of learning or concept formation; and without which it would 
in some sense be impossible to see, for example, that the facing surface 
of a physical object is red and triangular, or hear that a certain physical 
sound of C#.
(2) The idea that there are certain inner episodes which are non-inferential 
knowings that certain items are, for example, red or C#; and that these 
episodes are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as 
providing the evidence for all other empirical propositions.80
Where ‘(1)’ ‘clearly arises in the attempt to explain the facts of sense perception in 
scientific style’, but unfortunately gets rolled up with ‘(2)’ when the epistemologist 
realises that it seems ‘to fit the requirements of another, and less fortunate, line of 
thought so well that it has almost invariably been distorted to give the latter [re (2)] a
o  1
reinforcement without which it would long ago have collapsed’. Let us finish this 
chapter, then, by looking at how Sellars describes this ‘less fortunate’ Tine of thought’:
The seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular 
is a veridical member of a class of experiences—let us call them ‘ostensible 
seeings’—some of the members of which are non-veridical; and there is no 
inspectible hallmark which guarantees that any such experience is veridical.
To suppose that the non-inferential knowledge on which our world picture 
rests consists of such ostensible seeings, hearings, etc., as happen to be 
veridical is to place empirical knowledge on too precarious a footing— 
indeed, to open the door to skepticism by making a mockery of the word 
knowledge in the phrase “empirical knowledge.”
Now it is, of course, possible to delimit subclasses of ostensible seeings, 
hearings, etc., which are progressively less precarious, i.e., more reliable, by 
specifying the circumstances in which they occur, and the vigilance of the 
perceiver. But the possibility that any given ostensible seeing, hearing, etc., 
is non-veridical can never be entirely eliminated. Therefore, given that the 
foundation of empirical knowledge cannot consist of the veridical members 
of a class not all the members if which are veridical, and from which the 
non-veridical members cannot be weeded out by ‘inspection,’ this 
foundation cannot consist of such items as seeing that the facing surface o f 
a physical object is red and triangular,82
Clearly this Tine of thought’ corresponds with the effect upon foundationalism of the 
evidential regress argument, for that is what we have taken the foundationalist to be 
responding to when setting his foundations at the level of experiential belief or, indeed, 
sense-contents. So it is important to note Sellars own response to this line of thought:
80 Ibid, §7, pp. 21—22, original emphasis.
81 Ibid, §7, pp. 22—23,
82 Ibid, §7, pp. 23—24, original emphasis.
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Thus baldly put, scarcely anyone would accept this conclusion. Rather they 
would take the contrapositive of the argument and reason that since the 
foundation of empirical knowledge is the non-inferential knowledge of such 
facts, it does consist of members of a class which contains non-veridical 
members.
But then I have taken the moral of the evidential regress argument to be the requirement 
that our empirical concepts intelligibly hook onto the mind-independent, for which I 
take it that absolute certainty is required somewhere, so it would appear that here Sellars 
and I are fundamentally out of step. Nonetheless, I take it that, whilst Sellars never 
explicitly considers the evidential regress argument, and so is content to argue for a 
‘foundation of empirical knowledge’ which ‘does consist of members of a class which 
contains non-veridical members’, his arguments actually allow for at least a singular 
case in which we simply cannot be wrong concerning the mind-independent (see §6.6). 
And an important step in that argument is disabusing us of the thought that the 
experience of the mind-independent and the mind-dependent can be separated as with a 
knife.
83 Ibid, §7, p. 24, original emphasis.
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Chapter Four: From Logical Atomism to the Coherence Theory of Concepts
Introduction
In the previous chapter (§§3.1—3.2) we noted two linguistic facts invoked by the 
appearance theorist in favour of his position. Whilst I argued that that position was to be 
rejected, this still left those facts to be explained away. In this chapter I endeavour to do 
that. That is, in explaining away those facts I argue that not only is the foundationalist’s 
epistemological position problematic, but so—in certain respects—is his semantics.
In the first section I present Sellars’s analysis of looks-talk. This is suggestive of 
the fact that we could not know how things look without also being able to know how 
they are. It explains away the non-iterative nature of looks-talk, not in terms of the 
certain truth of appearance statements attributed to them by the appearance theorist, but 
because in making such statements an epistemic subject is denying endorsement to, i.e., 
the truth of, the propositional content of, an experience. Moreover, the contingent a 
priori truth ‘X  is red iff x would look red to standard observers in standard conditions’ 
Sellars shows to be non-vacuous, not because the use of ‘looks red’ on the right-hand 
side is non-comparative, but because of the phrase ‘standards observers in standard 
conditions’. Perhaps the most important consequence of Sellars’s analysis of looks-talk, 
however, is the suggestion that we should cleave to a coherence theory of concepts, and 
so a holistic semantics. That is, we should not subscribe to the semantic or logical 
atomism of foundationalism.
In the second and final section (§4.2) I quickly cover how Sellars thinks that we 
might go about explaining his analysis of looks-talk, i.e., the possibility of non-veridical 
perceptual experiences. And whilst we are really only interested in the first, perfectly 
useful kind of explanation he proffers, it will be helpful to at least allude to how he 
thinks a more thoroughgoing explanation might be given. This will finally allow us to 
dispose with the sense-datum theorist, as well as being of import when we turn to 
Sellars’s epistemology (§§6.1—6.6), and specifially in relation to how he wants us to 
conceive of our acquisition of mentalistic discourse, i.e., our acquisition of concepts 
pertaining to thought.
§4.1. Sellars’s Analysis o f ‘Looks-Talk’
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The appearance theorist, as we have understood him, takes experiential beliefs to have 
propositional contents that directly concern appearances, in that they are restricted to 
characterising the subjective character of a sense-experience and make no claim 
concerning how it is with the mind-independent. Such experiential beliefs are to be 
expressed by statements which involve the comparative use of ‘looks red’, although 
their propositional contents themselves involve the non-comparative conceptual 
analogue of the use of ‘looks red’ at work in the statement ‘Red things normally look 
red’. Although I made no allusion to it (§3.4) the sense-datum theorist makes a similar 
move: the second-level empirical beliefs of his structure of empirical knowledge have 
propositional contents again characterised in terms of the ‘looks red’ locution and, we 
might now infer, in terms of the conceptual analogue of its non-comparative use. 
(Recall Bonjour: ‘We will assume that such a basic belief is always the belief, 
linguistically formulable only in expressive language, that a certain specific given 
content is present, for example, that I seem to see something red’—my italics.) And 
certainly it is the case that if any use of that locution is at work in the propositional 
contents of experiential beliefs it will be the conceptual analogue of its non-comparative 
use; the appearance theorist is correct about that. For surely an epistemic subject really 
is trying to express the qualitative character of that appearance—how things looks to 
him—when expressing such a belief. Nonetheless, the appearance theorist confuses this 
thought in attempting to defend the infallibility of his experiential, basic beliefs.
Indeed, whilst we have seen that both the appearance and sense-datum theories 
are to be objected to for epistemological reasons, we have not as yet turned to consider
O A
their semantic claims. The very notion of a basic belief, or an epistemic item which 
doesn’t itself require justification although it nonetheless can justify, i.e., s’s immediate 
experience or direct apprehension of a red element in his experience understood along 
any of the lines in which that immediate experience or direct apprehension is to be 
considered epistemic and so conceptual, are explicit expressions of the foundationalist’s 
epistemic atomism. And in companion to his epistemic atomism the foundationalist 
must also espouse a semantic or logical atomism: ‘If a belief can be justifiably held in 
the absence of any further beliefs, a fortiori it can be held (justifiably or not) in such
o r
conditions’. That is, the propositional content of a belief or other epistemic state can
84 I take it that the argument to the effect that an infallible empirical basic belief would have literally no 
content, and so not be empirical at all (§3.2), is an epistemological result.
85 Williams, PK, p. 94. As stated in §2.2 I will make no claims as to which comes first— the 
epistemological position or the theory of concept-acquisition/semantics.
72
be understood without an epistemic subject being able to understand the propositional 
content of any other belief or epistemic item. As Williams writes:
Behind this account of basic knowledge lies a certain picture of meaning 
and understanding. In this picture, two sorts of rules or ‘definitions’ 
determine the conceptual abilities that go with understanding a language.
Some words get their meanings by discursive definitions: definitions that 
link words with other words. Such definitions state analytic truths, such as 
‘A bachelor is an unmarried male’. But not all words can get their meanings 
this way. Some meanings must be established by ostensive definitions, 
which set up rules or conventions linking words with extra-linguistic reality. 
Ostensive definitions apply first and foremost to objects and qualities that 
we can grasp directly in experience: we learn what things are properly
Of .
called ‘red’ by being presented with examples.
This ‘picture of meaning and understanding’ has been trenchantly criticised in recent 
times, however we have noted that the appearance theorist’s appeal to the conceptual 
analogue of the non-comparative use of ‘looks red’ is not without apparent linguistic 
evidence in its favour, i.e., the non-iterative nature of looks-talk, as well as the question 
of how we are to make the contingent a priori truth expressed in the biconditional ‘X  is 
red iff x would look red to standard observers in standard conditions’ «tw-vacuous. Can 
we explain away such linguistic evidence?
This would be to argue against foundationalism from the semantic aspect of the 
dialectic. The question we should ask, then, given that both the appearance theorist and 
sense-datum theorist take it that they can have experiential beliefs or second-level 
empirical beliefs whose propositional contents are properly expressed by statements 
involving ‘looks red’ is how an epistemic subject can come by that locution without 
being able to tell whether a mind-independent object actually is, e.g., red? And it must 
be noted that things are a little more complicated in the case of the sense-datum theorist, 
for the fundamental conceptual resource of his theory is not in fact looks-talk, but 
instead ‘senses-talk’, the third-personal expression of s’s second-level empirical belief 
‘There looks to be something red over there to 5’ to be parsed as 'S senses red sense- 
content x’. Indeed, the sense-datum theorist appears free to excise the semantic 
middlemen of appearance statements and directly parse existence statements in terms of 
senses-talk. But if we begin by questioning the appearance theorist’s more straight 
forward claim to looks-talk we shall in any case find reason to question the sense-datum 
theorist’s claim.
86 Ibid, p. 101, original emphasis.
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We have seen (§3.4) that Sellars takes the sense-datum theorist to have confused 
two distinct theses: ‘(1) The idea that there are certain “inner episodes”, e.g. the 
sensation of a red triangle or of a C# sound, which occur to human beings and brutes 
without any prior process of learning or concept formation, and without which it 
would—in some sense—be impossible to see, for example, that the facing surface of a 
physical object is red and triangular, or hear, that a certain physical sound is C#; (2) 
The idea that there are certain “inner episodes” which are the noninferential knowings 
that, for example, a certain item is red and triangular, or, in the case of sounds, C#, 
which inner episodes are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as providing 
the evidence for all other empirical propositions’. He continues:
If this diagnosis is correct, a reasonable next step would be to examine these 
two ideas and determine how that which survives criticism in each is 
properly to be combined with the other. Clearly we would have to come to 
grips with the idea of inner episodes, for this is common to both.88
Now, the route via which Sellars himself ‘comes to grips with the idea of inner 
episodes'— both thoughts and appearances—I am taking as offering a possible way to 
undermine the Agrippan problematic. As a corollary of characterising how Sellars 
analyses looks-talk and so arguing against the logical atomism of the foundationalist, 
then, we will begin to come to grips with the epistemological direction, so to speak, in 
which Sellars will later take us.
Sellars begins his examination of looks-talk by making ‘the simple but 
fundamental point that the sense of “red” in which things look red is, on the face of it, 
the same as that in which things are red’. He continues: ‘When one glimpses an object 
and decides that it looks red (to me, now, from here) and wonders whether it really is 
red, one is surely wondering whether the colour—red—which it looks to have is the one 
it really does have’.90 That is, Sellars’s thought is that ‘being red is logically prior, is a 
logically simpler notion, than looking red', where ‘ being red' is a property of physical 
objects.9I His argument has two parts. The second is to argue that ‘x is red iff x would 
look red to standard observers in standard conditions’ ‘without this being a definition of 
“x is red” in terms of “x looks red’” . That is, the second part is to explain away the
87 Sellars, EPM, §10, pp. 32—33, original emphasis.
88 Ibid, §10, p. 33, original emphasis.
89 Ibid, §12, p. 35, original emphasis. I have taken the liberty of altering Sellars’s use of ‘green’ to ‘red’ 
where appropriate throughout the following references of this chapter.
90 Ibid, §12, p. 35, original emphasis.
91 Ibid, §12, p. 36, original emphasis.
92 Ibid, §13, p. 36.
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contingent a prioricity of that biconditional, i.e., illustrate why it is non-vacuous, 
without defining ‘x is red’ in terms of ‘x looks red’. The first part, what Sellars calls the 
‘logically prior’ step, concerns locating the proper epistemic level, so to speak, of looks- 
talk.93
Sellars points out that appearance statements like ‘This is red’ have two uses: (i), 
they can be used to state facts, i.e., act as the conclusions of inferences; and (ii), they 
can be used to make reports, i.e., for our purposes as non-inferential statements directly 
concerning mind-independent objects. This latter use is not as yet to be understood in 
the foundationalist sense of non-inferential knowledge, simply as an observation 
concerning such statements: they often appear to be causally elicited, without any 
process of inference being therefore involved in that elicitation. Nonetheless, clearly it 
is this second use which is of interest to any epistemologist concerned with non- 
inferential knowledge. Only such a statement in its reporting use could be an expression 
of a basic belief. Moreover, statements such as ‘This looks red to me now’ do seem to 
have such a reporting role—‘Indeed, it would seem essentially a report’ .94
However, simply in regards to their logical compositionality it can be seen that 
the statements ‘This is red’ and ‘This looks red to me now’ differ: the latter is logically 
more complex than the former. For the statement ‘This is red’ makes, or need make, no 
mention of the subject of experience or epistemic subject. ‘This is red’ will not be true 
in virtue of the fact that something is red to someone now, only because that thing is 
red. On the other hand, ‘This looks red’, even in such a truncated form, will only be true 
in virtue of the fact that something looks red to someone now—for something to look 
red is for it to look red to someone. That is, properly expressed appearance statements 
should always make reference to a subject of experience or epistemic subject: ‘This 
looks red’ is really to be expanded into something like ‘This looks red to me now’.
Noting this point Sellars calls attention to the fact ‘that the experience of having 
something look red to one at a certain time is, insofar as it is an experience, obviously 
very much like that of seeing something to be red, insofar as the latter is an 
experience’ .95 He continues:
But the latter, of course, is not just an experience. And this is the heart of the 
matter. For to say that a certain experience is a seeing that something is the 
case, is to do more than describe the experience. It is to characterize it as, so
93 Ibid, §13, p. 36.
94 Ibid, §15, p. 39.
95 Ibid, §16, p. 39.
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to speak, making an assertion or claim, and—which is the point I wish to 
stress—to endorse that claim.96
So note that simply in terms of the logical grammar of sees-talk Sellars is here ascribing 
propositional contents to appearances, although he is careful to express that such cannot 
be all that there is to an appearance: ‘It is clear that the experience of seeing that 
something is red is not merely the occurrence of the propositional claim ‘this is red’— 
not even if we add, as we must, that this claim is, so to speak, evoked or wrung from the 
perceiver by the object perceived’ .97 We might be surprised to find Sellars ascribing 
propositional contents to appearances: have we not just taken the sense-datum theorist 
to task for in effect the same idea? But to be clear: Sellars is not employing the thought 
that appearances are in part conceptual to argue for their foundational role in regards to 
the structure of empirical knowledge. Leaving this idea to the side for the moment, then, 
what does Sellars have to say concerning what we might call the ‘something more’ to an 
appearance over and above its propositional content? He remarks that this ‘is clearly 
what philosophers have in mind when they speak of “visual impressions” or “immediate
QO
visual experiences.’” That is, what we have called the ‘something more’ to an 
appearance corresponds with its qualitative character.
The introduction of the thought that experiences have propositional contents 
allows Sellars to more fully differentiate the statement ‘This is red’—in general, 
statements which solely involve is-talk—from statements that involve looks- and sees- 
talk. A statement such as s’s T see that x is red’ is to be understood as his not only 
ascribing the propositional content to his experience that ‘X is red’, but as 5 further 
endorsing that content. As Sellars comments: ‘To characterize S’s experience as a 
seeing is, in a suitably broad sense... to apply the semantical concept of truth to that 
experience’ .99 On the other hand, in the case of s’s statement ‘Xlooks red to me at f  s 
attributes to himself an experience with the propositional content ‘Xis red’, but does not 
endorse that content. He does not take himself to have had a veridical experience. 
Sellars writes:
Thus, when I say “X looks red to me now” I am reporting the fact that my 
experience is, so to speak, intrinsically, as an experience, indistinguishable 
from a veridical one of seeing that x is red. Involved in the report is the 
ascription to my experience of the claim ‘x is red’; and the fact that I make 
this report rather than the simple report “X is red” indicates that certain
96 Ibid, §16, p. 39, original emphasis.
97 Ibid, §16bis, p. 40, original emphasis.
98 Ibid, §\6bis, p. 40.
99 Ibid, §16bis, p. 40, original emphasis.
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considerations have operated to raise, so to speak in a higher court, the 
question ‘to endorse or not to endorse.’ I may have reason to think that x 
may not after all be red.100
So notice that the matter of endorsement only comes up when that question—‘to 
endorse or not to endorse’—comes up: thus the report ‘I see that x is red’ only occurs if 
I am prompted to make it for some reason, otherwise I will report on my experience 
with ‘Xis red’.
At this point in Sellars’s analysis of looks-talk he has achieved two things, 
although we have not explicitly highlighted them as yet. Firstly, he has defended the 
thought that the statement ‘X  looks red to 5 at f  has a reporting use, and so is not to be 
understood as the conclusion of an inference, as the foundationalist would demand. An 
appearance statement reports on ‘the fact that my experience is, so to speak, 
intrinsically, as an experience, indistinguishable from a veridical one of seeing that x is 
red’. But it is a second-level report, so to speak, one only engendered if the question of 
endorsement has come up. That is, in defending the idea that the statement ‘X looks red 
to 5 at f  has a reporting use, such that it is not to be understood as the conclusion of an 
inference, Sellars has supported the idea that it is the non-comparative use of the 
locution ‘looks red’ at work in appearance statements, although he has done so by 
arguing that it instead concerns the propositional element of an appearance. For if it was 
the comparative use it would be the conclusion of an inference. Unlike the appearance 
theorist his analysis of looks-talk does not confuse this thought. Moreover, he has 
explained away the non-iterative nature of looks-talk: someone can do no more than 
deny endorsement to the propositional content of some experience (someone cannot 
deny it twice). Thus he has concluded the first step of his argument, i.e., locating the 
proper epistemic level of looks-talk.
But what about the contingent a priori truth of the biconditional, i.e., the second 
step of his argument? Firstly, Sellars points out that if is-talk is logically prior to looks- 
talk as his analysis would suggest then we are confronted by the fact ‘that the concept of 
looking red, the ability to recognize that something looks red, presupposes the concept 
of being red, and that that latter concept involves the ability to tell what colours objects 
have by looking at them—which, in turn, involves knowing in what circumstances to 
place an object if one wishes to ascertain its color by looking at it’.101 It follows that if 
having the concept ‘being red’—being able to use the locution ‘is red’—involves 
‘knowing in what circumstances to place an object if one wishes to ascertain its color by
100 Ibid, §16bis, p. 41, original emphasis.
101 Ibid, §18, p. 43, original emphasis.
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looking at it’ then the biconditional ‘X is red iff x would look red to standard observers 
in standard conditions’ is non-vacuous because the right-hand side tells us in what 
conditions x will look the colour that it is—‘“standard conditions” means conditions in 
which things look what they are’. Which is to instead explain its right-hand side 
clause ‘looks red’, which is to be understood as invoking the non-comparative use of 
that locution, in terms of ‘to standard observers in standard conditions’, i.e., to proffer 
the reverse explanation of its being non-vacuous to that of the appearance theorist 
(§3.2).
So note that we are now fundamentally ‘out of step’ with semantic or logical
I A T
atomism. Sellars writes:
as long as looking red is taken to be the notion to which being red is 
reducible, it could be claimed with considerable plausibility that 
fundamental concepts pertaining to observable fact have that logical 
independence of one another which is characteristic of the empiricist 
tradition. Indeed, at first sight the situation is quite disquieting, for if the 
ability to recognize that x looks red presupposes the concept of being red, 
and if this in turn involves knowing in what circumstances to view an object 
to ascertain its color, then, since one can scarcely determine what the 
circumstances are without noticing that certain objects have certain 
perceptible characteristics—including colors—it would seem that one 
couldn’t form the concept of being red, and, by parity of reasoning, of the 
other colors, unless he already had them all. 104
That is, if someone must know what standard conditions are to be able to recognise that 
x is red, then it must be the case that he can recognise certain observable characteristics 
of things like x, how they differ over a variety of conditions, how they differ when he is 
in a variety of conditions, etc. To think that this could occur without his being able to 
recognise other colours than red—which surely come under ‘observable characteristics 
of things like x’—seems odd.
Sellars’s contention here, that colour concepts come as a package, essentially, is 
explicitly suggestive of a coherence theory of concepts. Moreover, Sellars adopts a 
rather aggressive coherence theory of concepts. He writes:
Now, it just won’t do to reply that to have the concept of red, to know what 
it is for something to be red, it is sufficient to respond when one is in point 
o f fact in standard conditions, to green objects with the vocable “This is 
red.” Not only must the conditions be of a sort that it appropriate for 
determining the color of an object by looking, the subject must know that
102 Ibid, §18, p. 43.
103 Ibid, §18, p. 44.
104 Ibid, §19, p. 44, original emphasis.
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conditions of this sort are appropriate. And while this does not imply that 
one must have concepts before one has them, it does imply that one can 
have the concept of red only by having a whole battery of concepts of which 
it is one element. It implies that while the process of acquiring the concept 
of red may—indeed, does—involve a long history of acquiring piecemeal 
habits of response to various objects in various circumstances, there is an 
important sense in which one has no concept pertaining to the observable 
properties of physical objects in space and time unless one has them 
all....105
Sellars therefore requires that someone who has the concept ‘being red’ is one who can 
use it knowingly. We shall return to this requirement below, however in the next section 
it will be useful to follow up on a response which the sense-datum theorist qua semantic 
or logical atomist may make to Sellars’s analysis of looks-talk, and what that entails, 
i.e., a coherence theory of concepts.
$4.2. Three Explanations
I have suggested that the sense-datum theorist—if he is careful, perhaps—need not 
invoke looks-talk, instead analysing ‘X is red at f  as 'S senses red sense-content x at f . 
As Sellars puts it: ‘what is to prevent the sense-datum theorist from taking the line that 
the properties of physical objects are directly analyzable into the qualities and 
phenomenal relations of sense contents?’'00 That is, the sense-datum theorist points out 
that Sellars analysis of looks-talk, whilst indicative of the fact that empirical concepts at 
a secondary level, so to speak, are to be understood holistically, this in no way disbars 
him from analysing is-talk in terms of senses-talk. Now, let us ignore the implicit 
suggestion of phenomenalism in this thought. Really, the sense-datum theorist is here 
changing his tack: he is arguing for the ontological conclusion that there must be such 
things as sense-contents as the best explanation for the problems of perception, i.e., 
illusions, hallucinations, and the like, and this explanation can be further motivated i f  is- 
talk can be analysed in terms of sense-talk. Indeed, Sellars will not dispute the fact that 
there is something to this line of thought, but only if it is differentiated entirely from the 
epistemological aspects of those theories.
What we want is an explanation of Sellars’s analysis of looks-talk in regards to 
the qualitative aspect of an appearance: what is one having an experience o f when one 
has an experience properly reported on by the statement 'X  looks red to me at /’? Must 
there not be something that is red even if 5 is not willing to endorse the propositional
105 Ibid, §19, pp. 44-45, original emphasis.
106 Ibid, §20, p. 46, original emphasis.
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content of his experience, i.e., that x qua physical object is red? The difficulty is that the 
redness that something looks to have is surely the redness that physical objects do have’, 
to say 5 is experiencing something that looks red is surely, then, to say that he is 
experiencing a physical object that looks red, even if it is not red or there is no physical 
object there at all.
Sellars suggests that there is a simple, everyday explanation for looks-talk which 
makes no reference to some nefarious ontological intermediary between mind and 
mind-independent. ‘Thus’, he writes, ‘it is perfectly proper to answer the question “Why 
does this object look red?” by saying “Because it is an orange object looked at in such 
and such circumstances.’” 107 (And we could imagine, in the case of hallucination, the 
question ‘Why am I seeing a Pink elephant?’ answered by ‘You’re not seeing a pink 
elephant, it only looks like you are because you’re on drugs’.) Notice that such 
explanations make no mention of ontological intermediaries between mind and mind- 
independent. ‘But’, as Sellars remarks, ‘because these explanations are good, it by no 
means follows that explanations of other kinds might not be equally good, and, perhaps, 
more searching’ . 108
He suggests that there are ‘two ways in which additional, but equally legitimate 
explanations might be forthcoming for such a fact as x looks red9. 109 The first of these is 
the one Sellars pursues:
Might it not be the case that just as there are two kinds of good explanation 
of the fact that this balloon has expanded, (a) in terms of the Boyle-Charles 
laws which relate the empirical concepts of volume, pressure, and 
temperature pertaining to gasses, and (b) in terms of the kinetic theory of 
gasses; so there are two ways of explaining the fact that this object looks red 
to S: (a) in terms of empirical generalizations relating the colors of objects, 
the circumstances in which they are seen, and the colors they look to have, 
and (b) in terms of a theory of perception in which ‘immediate experiences’ 
play a role analogous to that of the molecules of the kinetic theory.
So note that either of Sellars’s ‘(a)” s are to be equated with the less searching 
explanation mentioned already, whereas his ‘(b)” s go ontological, so to speak, and 
attempt to explain away the facts of the case by reference to some unobservable, 
introduced or postulated, theoretical entity.
The key idea here is the thought that ‘immediate experiences’, or what I have 
called ‘appearances’, are ^observable. Certainly for the sense-datum theorist this
107 Ibid, §21, p. 48.
108 Ibid, §21, p. 48.
109 Ibid, §22, p. 48, original emphasis.
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cannot be the case—immediate experiences must be observable or they could not play 
the epistemological role required of them. We are supposed to base our empirical 
knowledge on our awareness of sense-contents, therefore it cannot be that they are 
theoretical entities, introduced after we have empirical knowledge to explain prior 
instances of it. Notice that we might think we are here following a redundancy: surely 
Sellars must defend his claim that the first explanation he posited can be a good 
explanation—how it enables us to explain the reporting role of is-, looks-, and sees- 
talk—and so enables us to explain instances of empirical knowledge, before turning to 
the claim that appearances can be made sense of as introduced or postulated theoretical 
entities? And that is indeed the case, but for my investigation the import of introducing 
this second kind of explanation of looks-talk which he envisages here will come out in 
the fact that for Sellars that prior step, i.e., even being able to offer that first explanation, 
involves a similar dialectical manoeuvre in the case of thoughts. That is, we must grasp 
the fundamental idea here: Sellars takes it that appearances are to be introduced as 
theoretical entities, i.e., that the concept of that which corresponds to the qualitative 
aspect of an appearance is an addition to our original, holistic conceptual resources, 
much like that of a ‘positron’ or ‘quark’. This is essentially the same manoeuvre he will 
make with concepts pertaining to thought (see §6.1). Moreover, we can now finally 
reject the sense-datum theorist.
For the second way in which Sellars thinks a more searching explanation of 
looks-talk can be given is the sense-datum theorist’s manner of doing it. Say that the 
sense-datum theorist accepts Sellars coherence theory of concepts at that secondary 
level, but nonetheless takes it that is-talk, and consequently looks- and sees-talk can all 
be parsed in terms of statements along the lines of 'S senses red sense-content x at f . 
That is, the primary level is still to be conceived of as semantically or logically 
atomistic. If this is to be the case the question the sense-datum theorist must answer is 
how an epistemic subject can come by the sense-datum framework? Where does he get 
it from? And Sellars’s analysis of looks-talk doesn’t uncover it.
The sense-datum theorist understands a sense-content as something found via 
the careful investigation of an experience, and the most obvious way in which this is to 
be done is by noting disparities between veridical and ostensibly veridical 
experiences—disparities between experiences properly described in terms of sees-talk 
and experiences properly described in terms of looks-talk, respectively. But it is a 
simple point, and one technically broached above in regards to the less searching 
explanation, that neither sees- nor looks-statements make reference to something like
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sense-contents; they directly concern the propositional content of an experience, and in 
the latter case imply that if that propositional content were true then that experience 
would be a case of an epistemic subject seeing something—a physical object being red, 
say—to be the case. The point being that neither sees- nor looks-talk directly pertain to 
what we have called the qualitative aspect of an appearance, i.e., the putative sense- 
contents constitutive of an appearance; there is simply no evidence to be found in our 
everyday conceptual resources to defend the sense-datum theorist’s claim that it is by 
the careful inspection of our experiences that we come by the sense-datum framework. 
This just reinforces the thought that it is from within those conceptual resources that an 
explanation of the possibility of empirical knowledge must be sought. However, as 
implied above, that does not suggest that we come by such conceptual resources all at 
once.
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Chapter Five: Coherentism and the Agrippan Problematic
Introduction
Having suggested that we should opt for a holistic semantics, in this chapter I turn to the 
simplest epistemic position incorporating such a theory, i.e., the one I have called 
‘coherentism’. Recall that the coherentist challenges neither of the assumptions 
underlying the premise of the epistemic regress argument, simply modifying that 
premise itself. He suggests that in actual fact inferential justification is non-linear or 
holistic in character, such that the regress of conditional justification which loops 
around upon itself, i.e., (b), should not be discounted in regards to the charge of circular 
reasoning—the fact that a belief appears to paradoxically justify itself.
After further defining his position, in the first section I argue that the 
coherentist’s appeal to non-linear or holistic justification importantly disregards two of 
the necessary elements of a reason to believe some proposition, arid that this would 
seem to entail that his position is not even formally sufficient to escape the epistemic 
regress argument.
In the next and final section (§5.2) I argue to that conclusion via the other 
applications of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic. Whilst 
I suggest that we can suitably idealise the coherentist’s position to escape the evidential 
regress argument, it is essentially a formal analogue of the appearance theory, except at 
a holistic level. Therefore, like the appearance theory it falls prey to Bonjour’s 
argument, and so is to be rejected. That is, I argue that coherentism is essentially a 
foundationalism, except at a holistic level. I end by commenting on the fact that the 
coherentist simply assumes a coherence theory of concepts, telling no story concerning 
how we come by our concepts.
§5.1. Coherentism and the Epistemic Regress Argument
In a sense I have shown my hand already in regards to coherentism: in §2.3 I suggested 
that in regards to an attempt to carry through the traditional epistemological project no 
epistemically salient account of the notion of coherence can be given without the 
importation of a foundationalist element and thus the breakdown of any claim to holistic 
inferential justification. Moreover, as I have endeavoured to illustrate over the two
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preceding chapters, foundational ism itself is to be rejected. Obviously, then, that 
previous claim needs to be defended.
I have mentioned on various occasions (§2.2, §2.3) that coherentism challenges 
neither the first nor second assumptions underlying the premise of the epistemic regress 
argument. That premise is that all justification must be inferential, and the assumptions 
which underlie it are: firstly, that the only way in which a belief can justify another 
belief is inferentially; and secondly, a reason to believe some proposition must always 
be something epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns. 
Foundationalism challenges that second assumption, however it has been suggested that 
it is an untenable position. We might assume, then, that a reason to believe some 
proposition is always something epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it 
concerns. (As we might, perhaps, wish—§2.2.) Coherentism, on the other hand, 
modifies that premise.
The coherentist accepts the second assumption and effectively accepts the first 
assumption, however he argues that the Agrippan sceptic, who doesn’t really have any 
control of these assumptions in any case (as we saw in §2.2), falsely assumes that all 
inferential justification must be linear—indeed, that it is linear at all. As Bonjour 
writes:
The contrary suggestion is that [inferential] justification, when properly 
understood, is ultimately nonlinear or holistic in character, with all the 
beliefs in the system standing in relations of mutual support, but none being 
epistemically prior to others. In this way, it is alleged, any true circularity is 
avoided. Such a view amounts to making the system itself the primary unit 
of justification, with its component beliefs being justified only derivatively, 
by virtue of their membership in an appropriate sort of system.110
The coherentist’s central claim can therefore roughly be summed up as follows: given a 
suitable account of what the notion of coherence amounts to, then ‘if a's belief-set is 
more coherent with the belief that p as a member than without it or with any alternative, 
a is (or would be) justified in believing that p \ x 11 Thus, the coherence of a belief system 
devolves justification upon its constituent beliefs.
But what is meant by the claim that inferential justification is ‘nonlinear or 
holistic in character’? And how does it avoid ‘any true circularity’? This thought clearly 
needs some explanation. Towards that end the coherentist begins by making a 
distinction between ‘local’ and ‘global’ contexts of justification. Bonjour again:
110 Bonjour, ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’, p. 123, original emphasis. 
1,1 Dancy, ICE, p. 116.
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The epistemic justification on a particular occasion will usually be merely
the justification of a single empirical belief, or small set of such beliefs,
within the context of a cognitive system whose overall justification is (more
or less) taken for granted; we may call this the local level of justification.
But it is also possible, at least in principle, to raise the issue of the overall
justification of the entire system of empirical beliefs; we may call this the
112global level of justification.
So whilst it is possible ‘to raise the issue of the overall justification of the entire system 
of empirical beliefs’ the coherentist notes that, outside of the Agrippan problematic, or 
epistemology more generally perhaps, this rarely—if ever—occurs. In a local context of 
justification inferential justification appears linear. This is because, the coherentist 
argues, ‘premise-beliefs which are dialectically acceptable in that particular [local] 
context [of justification] and which can function rather like the foundationalisf s basic 
beliefs’ are normally reached. 113 Such ‘dialectically acceptable premise-beliefs’ are not 
epistemically acceptable, so to speak, premise-beliefs, but they give us the impression 
that inferential justification is linear, in that they masquerade as actual tenninating 
points to chains of inferential justification. With this point in mind the coherentist 
charges the Agrippan sceptic with the apparently radical mistake of falsely importing 
the character of inferential justification in a local context of justification into the 
discussion of the character of inferential justification in the global context of 
justification.
But perhaps the coherentist is not really arguing with the Agrippan sceptic in 
making this claim as instead with the foundationalist over the phenomenology of what 
he takes to be local justification. For we might say that it is in fact the foundationalist 
who has really made the radical mistake of falsely importing the character of inferential 
justification in a local context of justification into the discussion of the character of 
inferential justification in the global context of justification, given that he accepts the 
first assumption, i.e., that the only way in which a belief can justify another belief is 
inferentially. The coherentist argues that ‘the epistemic dialogue [in a local context of 
justification] would if ideally continued eventually circle back upon itself, giving the 
appearance of a linear regress and in effect challenging the entire system of empirical 
beliefs’ . 114 That is, it would not terminate with basic beliefs even if ‘ideally’ continued. 
(Note, then, the simple discounting of the infinite regress of conditional inferential 
justification.) Therefore it is the foundationalist who appears to confuse ‘the appearance
112 Bonjour, SEK, p. 91, original emphasis.
113 Ibid, p. 91.
114 Ibid, p. 91.
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of a linear regress’ of inferential justification for an actual regress of inferential 
justification, a confusion which the coherentist takes as exhibiting a failure to 
understand the inferential interrelation between beliefs in the global, and not in a local, 
context of justification.
Now, we need not concern ourselves with why this is, although we might assume 
it is because of the foundationalist’s logical atomism which would be further indicative 
of the fact that it is the coherentist’s alliance with a coherence theory of concepts that 
enables his appeal to the non-linear or holistic character of inferential justification in the 
global context of justification. But in any case, as Bonjour writes:
According to the envisaged coherence theory, the relation between the 
various particular beliefs [constitutive of the belief system as a whole] is 
correctly to be conceived, not as one of linear dependence, but rather as one 
of mutual or reciprocal support. There is no ultimate relation of epistemic 
priority among the members of such a system and consequently no basis for 
a true regress. Rather the component beliefs of such a coherent system will 
ideally be so related that each can be justified in terms of the others, with 
the direction of argument on a particular occasion of local justification 
depending on which belief (or set of beliefs) has actually been challenged in 
that particular situation. And hence, a coherence theory will claim, the 
apparent circle of justification is not in fact vicious because it is not 
genuinely a circle: the justification of a particular belief finally depends, not 
on other particular beliefs as the linear conception of justification would 
have it, but instead on the overall system and its coherence.115
So the distinction between a local and the global contexts of justification—that 
distinction which the coherentist takes someone somewhere to have fallaciously 
ignored—comes out in the suggestion that the ‘direction of argument on a particular 
occasion of local justification’ depends upon ‘which belief (or set of beliefs) has 
actually been challenged in that particular situation’. The direction of argument, i.e., 
that which gives the appearance of linearity in a local context of justification, could just 
as easily have gone the other way in regards to the global context of justification if 
another belief (or set of beliefs) in that apparent regress of inferential justification 
which—in fact—loops around upon itself had had their justification questioned. That 
being the case, any true circularity thought to accrue to the global context of 
justification is supposedly avoided.
To say that the direction of argument ‘could just as easily have gone the other 
way\ as I did in the last paragraph, is to suggest that the coherentist is taking the first 
element of a reason to believe some proposition as differentiated in §1.1, i.e., the
115 Ibid, pp. 91—92, original emphasis.
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evidence in favour of some proposition, as admitting of more than the one-way 
deductive inference intimated there. For it is surely the deductive inference I employ 
from my understanding of the theses to the conclusion that, i f  they are true, or likely to 
be true, then the proposition that ‘Martians exist’ is true, or likely to be true, which 
appears to entail the direction of argument. The coherentist’s thought seems to be that I 
could reason back, in a sense, from my belief that ‘Martians exist’ to the conclusion that 
those theses are true, or likely to be true, if  the proposition that ‘Martians exist’ is itself 
true, or likely to be true. This is obviously intuitively suggestive of the fact that my 
belief in the proposition that ‘Martians exist’ can play the role of an item of evidence in 
favour of the propositions encapsulated in those theses, as long as, of course, I have 
secondary evidence and an epistemic principle to fill out the rest of a reason to believe 
those theses. Yet bringing up those other elements I have suggested to be constitutive of 
a reason to believe some proposition appears to muddy the waters.
For as I have implied they do not seem to be able to set the direction of argument 
at all: the secondary evidence in favour of a beliefs being justified, for the orthodox 
coherentist, must be that that belief coheres with the rest of an epistemic subject s’s 
belief system, i.e., that it has the epistemic property of cohering with the rest of s’s 
belief system; and the epistemic principle employed in a reason to believe that 
proposition must be expressed by the conditional statement ‘If a belief coheres with the 
rest of s’s belief system, then that belief is likely to be true’ (where obviously what it 
means for a belief to cohere with the rest of s’ s belief system is as yet an open question). 
Thus it can only be the evidence in favour of some proposition which dictates the 
direction of argument. Which is to suggest: these latter two elements of a reason to 
believe appear to escape the ambit of the coherentist’s appeal to coherence. Surely, then, 
the coherentist must tell us something about them and how they fit in to his appeal?
The question I mean to push in bringing up these other elements concerns the 
epistemic sufficiency of the appeal to coherence if it only appears to encompass 
evidence in favour of some proposition, and not a reason to believe that proposition as a 
whole. That is, does that appeal enable the coherentist to escape even the epistemic 
regress argument, in all its apparent formality? For whilst the appeal to coherence may 
be able to escape the charge of circularity raised against that option (b) of the Agrippan 
trilemma at the level of the evidence in favour of some proposition by appeal to 
coherence, it is not clear that that appeal succeeds at the level of secondary evidence, 
nor at the level of an epistemic principle. But to have provided an even formally
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sufficient answer to the Agrippan problematic that appeal must be applicable to all those 
levels, as we effectively saw with the sense-datum theorist.
The denial of the second assumption underlying the premise of the epistemic 
regress argument ultimately led the committed foundationalist to posit an item—a 
sense-content—-s’s immediate experience or direct apprehension of which (something I 
argued that itself had to be understood as a cognitive item if such a position was to be 
epistemically intelligible) simply did not— could not, perhaps—require justification, at 
least if the foundationalist was to undermine the Agrippan problematic. That claim, i.e., 
that s 's immediate experience or direct apprehension of a sense-content—as a sense- 
datum—which whilst cognitive did not itself require justification, was, I argued, 
epistemically groundless, such that the sense-datum theorist was faced with the dual 
result that: (i), there was no reason why we should not treat s 's immediate experience or 
direct apprehension of a sense-content as just another belief; and (ii), since we should 
treat it as a belief we still faced the options laid out in the Agrippan trilemma. (As, of 
course, the foundationalist accepts the first assumption underlying the premise of the 
epistemic regress argument.) The point being in regards to the coherentist’s appeal to 
coherence that the foundationalist’s response to the epistemic regress argument enabled 
him to respond—unsuccessfully, but no matter—to each of the other three applications 
of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan problematic. That is what 
made it a formally sufficient response to that argument.
To say that a reason to believe some proposition need not always be 
epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns, as the foundationalist 
does in response to the epistemic regress argument in denying the second assumption 
underlying its premise, is to already say that all the elements of a reason to believe are 
themselves not always epistemically distinct from that which they concern—it 
encompasses all those elements in originally pertaining to the level of their complex in a 
reason to believe some proposition. The coherentist, on the other hand, simply seems to 
be ignoring the issues of secondary evidence and epistemic principles in making his 
appeal to coherence. We should assume, therefore, that his position is to be questioned 
from the off. And I will suggest that this is because of the fact that the coherentist fails 
to outright reject either of the assumptions underlying the premise of the epistemic 
regress argument, but most importantly the first such assumption, which entails that his 
position falls headlong into foundationalism. The implicit suggestion being that any 
position which does not outright reject that first assumption can only respond to the 
Agrippan problematic in the manner of foundationalism.
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$5.2. Coherentism as Foundationalism
When the coherentist appeals to coherence what is he appealing to? Bonjour writes:
What, then, is coherence? Intuitively, coherence is a matter of how well a 
body of beliefs “hangs together”: how well its component beliefs fit 
together, agree or dovetail with each other, so as to produce an organized, 
tightly structured system of beliefs, rather than either a helter-skelter 
collection or a set of conflicting subsystems. It is reasonably clear that this 
“hanging together” depends on the various sorts of inferential, evidential, 
and explanatory relations which obtain among the various members of a 
system of beliefs, and especially on the more holistic and systematic of 
these.116
Or more comprehensively:
coherence requires a high degree of inferential connectedness in the system 
of beliefs, involving relations of necessitation, both strictly logical and 
otherwise, together with probabilistic connections of various kinds. One 
important aspect of this is what might be called probabilistic consistency, 
i.e. the minimizing of relations between beliefs in the system in virtue of 
which some are highly unlikely to be true in relation to others.... 
[Moreover, the] coherence of a system of belief is surely enhanced to the 
extent that some parts of the system are explained by others, thus reducing 
the degree to which the beliefs of the system portray unexplained
117anomalies.
Now, we must note that what is being called upon to do the work of enabling the 
direction of argument to go both ways within this rough characterisation of the notion of 
coherence are ‘the more holistic and systematic’ ‘inferential, evidential, and explanatory 
relations’ which the coherentist posits between beliefs, i.e., those which entail that 
‘some parts of the system are explained by others’. For ‘relations of necessitation, both 
strictly logical and otherwise’ and, indeed, ‘probabilistic connections of various kinds’, 
do not seem sufficient to escape the charge of circularity levelled against option (b) of 
the Agrippan trilemma, i.e., enable the necessary local/global distinction to be drawn.
That is, at least in the first case of logical necessitation, merely ensuring that s’s 
belief system is logically consistent is not enough to ensure that the direction of 
argument can go both ways. To say that s’s belief system is logically consistent is to say 
that it contains no contradictories, e.g., belief both in the propositions that p and that 
not-p. But note that logical relations are not inferential relations—they do not dictate
116 Ibid, p. 93.
117 Ibid, p. 124
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which way an inference between belief in the propositions p  and q should go. As 
Williams writes:
For example, it would be a mistake to think of Modus Ponens as the rule 
that, if we believe that P and also believe that P entails Q, we should believe 
Q. Perhaps Q is so implausible that we should rethink our premises. 
Deductive logic, though it puts constraints on belief systems, does not tell us 
what to believe. . . . 118
Therefore, there is no reason to think that, given as always that s can understand the 
propositions involved, a logically consistent regress of conditional inferential 
justification which loops around upon itself, i.e., (b), and so falls to the charge of 
circularity, could not be logically consistent, in the sense that it contained no 
contradictories. It may nonetheless be paradoxical, however that is a different matter.
Moreover, this further goes for probabilistic consistency, a point which also 
brings us to the nub of the problem with coherentism. For firstly, there is no reason to 
expect that a logically consistent regress of conditional inferential justification which 
loops around upon itself, i.e., (b), and so falls to the charge of circularity, could not also 
be probabilistically consistent. That is, there is no reason to think that such a regress of 
conditional inferential justification need hold beliefs which imply the probable falsity of 
any of the other beliefs in that regress. And, moreover, need dictate which way the 
direction of argument must go as a factor independent of s's understanding of the 
propositions involved. It is at this point, then, that the coherentist must appeal to his 
inferential, evidential, and explanatory relations as enabling non-linear or holistic 
inference. For otherwise he cannot escape the evidential regress argument: a 
probabilistically consistent regress of conditional inferential justification which loops 
around upon itself cannot escape the evidential regress argument. For whilst it may be 
probabilistically consistent it would nonetheless never allow us to see any of its 
constituent beliefs as actually probable, as opposed to their being conditionally 
probable—we would simply follow the probabilities around indefinitely. But if 
inference between beliefs can be considered non-linearly, such that the direction of 
argument is not all one way, then we can see those constituent beliefs as mutually 
reinforcing themselves—we can calculate probabilities in more than one direction, i.e., 
actual probabilities. It is possible, then, for the coherentist to respond to the evidential 
regress argument.
118 M. Williams, UD, p. 281.
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Indeed, we may assume for the sake of argument that the propositional content 
of every belief constituent of a belief system is absolutely certain, such that belief in 
them is infallible, as well as, in a sense, the belief system as a whole. That is, we may 
assume that the notion of coherence somehow dictates that only infallible beliefs can be 
constitutive of a coherent belief system. For we have seen nothing to suggest that the 
orthodox coherentist does not have to deal with the evidential regress argument, and it is 
only some such move which would enable him to escape it without his having to posit 
some belief without the system which was itself infallible such that the probabilities of 
the beliefs within the system could themselves be considered actual rather than 
conditional.
So secondly, as matters stand surely the conclusion which must be drawn is that 
the coherentist is in the same situation as the appearance theorist would be if he could in 
fact claim that experiential beliefs were infallible, i.e., he would still in any case be 
undone by the requirement that for 5 to accept any such belief as basic he must know 
that it has that epistemic property, as well as that that epistemic property is indicative of 
the truth of any belief which exhibits it. For whilst we can simply assume that the notion 
of coherence encompasses the infallibility of the constituent beliefs of a belief system, 5 
must be able to infer that a belief that p is infallible because it coheres with the rest of 
his beliefs, i.e., that that belief has the epistemic property of cohering with the rest of his 
beliefs and so the corresponding property of infallibility. This is suggestive of the fact 
that the coherentist’s position, idealised as I have made it such that it can escape the 
evidential regress argument, is an exact formal analogue of the idealised appearance 
theorist’s position, but at the level of belief systems instead of particular beliefs, and, 
moreover, subject to the same objections.
As Bonjour writes:
According to a coherence theory of empirical justification... the... 
justification of an empirical belief derives entirely from its coherence with 
the believer’s overall system of empirical beliefs and not at all from any sort 
of factor outside that system. What we must now ask is whether and how the 
fact that a belief coheres in this way is cognitively accessible to the believer 
himself, so that it can give him a reason for accepting the belief.119
That is, how can 5 have a reason to accept the belief that p  as justified? This would 
appear to require that 5 have a grasp, so to speak, of the totality of his belief system in 
order that he can at least estimate, perhaps, whether the putative addition of that belief
119 Bonjour, SEK, p. 101, original emphasis.
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to that system would entail an increase or decrease in the latter’s coherence. ‘Such a 
grasp’, Bonjour suggests, ‘would presumably take the form of a set of metabeliefs (or
• 190one comprehensive metabelief) specifying the contents of [s’s]... system of beliefs’. 
The problem, however, is that the coherentist cannot claim ‘that these metabeliefs too 
are justified by virtue of their coherence with the rest of [s’s]... system of beliefs’. As 
Bonjour writes:
How can my metabelief B2 that I have a certain other belief Bi be justified 
for me by appeal to the fact that B2 coheres with my total system of beliefs if 
my very grasp of that system depends on the justification of B2 and other 
similar beliefs? How, that is, can my reason for accepting B2 be its 
coherence with my total system of beliefs when I have no justification apart 
from an appeal to B2 and similar beliefs for thinking that I even have that 
system of beliefs? 122
In other words, if coherence is the ultimate standard of empirical justification for the 
coherentist, then it cannot be the case that s’s grasp of the coherence of his belief system 
is itself justified by an appeal to coherence, for it is exactly what he must already 
have—and justifiably—if any appeal to coherence is to even be made. That being so, 
how can s’s grasp of the coherence of his belief system be anything but unjustified since 
in its case no appeal to coherence can be made?
We have now reached the point at which the appeal to coherence breaks down, 
i.e., the point at which the other two elements of a reason to believe some proposition 
over and above evidence in its favour have to be dealt with by the coherentist. And 
simply put, if he is to endeavour to hold on to the possibility of empirical justification 
he cannot do so without importing certain foundationalist machinery into his theory. 
Those elements really do escape the ambit of the coherentist’s appeal to coherence. 
Indeed, Bonjour seeks to deal with the problem of the justification of s’s grasp of the 
coherence of his belief system by employing the notion of a ‘Doxastic Presumption’: 
‘The idea is to mitigate the foregoing objection [re the unjustified nature of s’s grasp of 
the coherence of his belief system] by treating the metabelief [or metabeliefs] in 
question as an unjustified hypothesis in relation to which issues of justification are 
conditionally assessed, yielding results of the general form: if  my representation of my 
system of beliefs is correct, then such-and-such a particular belief is justified in the
120 Bonjour, ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’, p. 126.
121 Bonjour, SEK, p. 102.
122 Ibid, p. 102.
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sense of being likely to be true’ . 123 The underlying thought behind the ‘Doxastic 
Presumption’ being that any challenge to s ’s grasp of the coherence of his belief system 
presupposes that he in fact has some such system, whether or not it is reflected by that 
grasp of his, and thus that that grasp is in some sense justified. But we should not accept 
such a presumption; conditional justification, as has been stated previously, is simply 
not non-conditional or actual justification. As Williams writes:
Of course, the word ‘presumption’ is carefully chosen. If our supposed 
knowledge of our won belief-system is allowed to be questionable, it will 
need to be backed up by some justifying inference. This can hardly be 
coherentist: such an inference would require us to estimate the coherence of 
our beliefs about our beliefs. We would then have to presume these beliefs 
to be more or less accurate, or else produce a meta-meta-argument about the 
coherence of our beliefs about our beliefs about our beliefs... and so on 
without end. Invoking a ‘presumption’ is meant to prevent any such regress 
getting started. In effect, it confers foundational status on the relevant kind 
of self-knowledge. 124
That is, the coherentist, like the foundationalist before him, is cornered into claiming 
that there are some beliefs which simply do not require justification from whence our 
empirical knowledge springs, except again for no principled reason.
So the difference between the foundationalist and the coherentist seems merely 
to be the theory of concepts which they cleave to. But the move to a coherence theory of 
concepts does not seem to have paid any dividends in any case, the coherentist just as 
mired in the Agrippan problematic as the foundationalist. However, it must be noted 
that the coherentist, at least as I have presented his position, simply assumes such a 
theory; he tells no story concerning how s comes by his concepts. Indeed, he tells no 
story concerning how s comes by the belief that he has beliefs, he simply presumes that 
5 has beliefs, and so that he believes that he has beliefs. And whilst that implied 
question is a rather strange question—how can 5 come to believe that he has beliefs?— 
in that it is suggestive of the fact that s can have beliefs without knowing that he has 
beliefs, I take it that in regards to something like the Doxastic Presumption it might be 
less objectionable if such a story could be told.
122 Bonjour, SEK, p. 101, and Bonjour, ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’, pp. 126— 
127, original emphasis.
124 M. Williams, PK, p. 137, original emphasis.
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Chapter Six: Sellars and the Agrippan Problematic
Introduction
In this final chapter we shall turn to Sellars’s positive contribution to the debate around 
the Agrippan problematic.
In the first section I present a short, descriptive exposition of Sellars’s attempt to 
explain how we can understand thoughts as theoretically introduced entities. I 
effectively assume that something along these lines is possible. The import of this idea 
is that the very ability of s to think is bound up with his ability to use language, and not 
the other way round.
In the next three sections (§§6.2—6.4) I turn to Sellars’s proposed structure of 
empirical knowledge as set out in Part VIII of EPM. I begin §6.2 by characterising 
Sellars’s negative specification of his own position, as over against foundationalism and 
coherentism. This already makes it clear that he will challenge the first assumption 
underlying the premise of the epistemic regress argument. I then turn to the two criteria 
he thinks an instance of non-inferentially justified knowledge must satisfy, i.e., the 
criteria of ultimacy (that something is non-inferential) and authority (that something is 
justified), and what I call his ‘first-run position’, a proposed structure of knowledge 
built around the notion of a report, which he will go onto complicate and extend in an 
attempt to satisfy those two criteria.
In §6.3 I turn to the two problems Sellars thinks his first-run position faces in 
attempting to satisfy the two criteria of ultimacy and authority. The first of these 
problems involves an appeal to a novel kind of linguistic rule, which Sellars fails to 
adequately specify. The second involves the introduction of one part of the non- 
traditional understanding of what it is for a belief to be justified that has been mentioned 
on various occasions above (see, e.g., the introduction and §2.2). This section ends with 
the characterisation of a specific kind of regress of justification that applies to Sellars’s 
position, the most fundamental form of which is to be associated with the epistemic 
regress argument.
In §6.4 I turn to the epistemic regress argument as it arises vis-a-vis Sellars’s 
proposed structure of knowledge. I give a structural characterisation of his position, 
which is akin to foundationalism, except that it demands that instances of both
125 I will drop the reference to ‘empirical’ knowledge for the rest of this chapter. That is, from here on, 
‘knowledge’, ‘belief, etc., is really shorthand for ‘empirical knowledge’, ‘empirical belief, etc.
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observational or particular and general knowledge occupy his foundation, in that, whilst 
they are not inferentially connected to each other, their (non-inferential) justification 
nonetheless presupposes the justification of other items within that foundation, in a 
sense to be specified (see also §6.2). However, whilst I take it that Sellars’s proposed 
structure of knowledge, as set out in Part VIII of EPM, may escape the epistemic 
regress argument, it certainly fails to escape Bonjour’s argument.
In §6.5 I extricate Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge from Bonjour’s 
argument by characterising the novel kind of linguistic rule we find him appealing to in 
§6.3. This further enables me to specify the second part of the non-traditional 
understanding of what it is for a belief to be justified. However, again Sellars’s 
proposed structure of knowledge faces a regress.
In §6.6, making use of one final idea from Sellars concerning the very 
possibility of epistemic agency, I illustrate how his proposed structure of knowledge, 
suitably amended, can escape the regress we met at the end of §6.5. Indeed, I illustrate 
how that structure can answer the claim at the heart of the Agrippan sceptic’s 
argumentative methodology, i.e., that any claim to knowledge can always be challenged 
(see §2.2), by invoking the two parts of the non-traditional understanding of what it is 
for a belief to be justified specifically in regards to, respectively, s’s beliefs that T think’ 
and T understand /’ (or: ‘If I think, then I understand /’). I then make use of the final 
idea from Sellars to show how observational knowledge can be considered non- 
inferentially justified in virtue of these beliefs being justified.
Notice that I have not brought up either the evidential regress argument or the 
problem of the criterion. I will explicitly deal with these two applications of the general 
argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic in regards to Sellars’s proposed 
structure of knowledge in the conclusion.
§6.1. The Theoretical Introduction of Thoughts
As we have seen (§4.2), Sellars suggests that there are two kinds or levels of 
explanation that could be given for why s might report that ‘This looks red’ of T see 
that x is red’, given his analysis of looks- and sees-talk as reporting on the propositional 
contents of experiences. Moreover, I have suggested that (again §4.2), in regards to the 
Agrippan problematic, we only need concern ourselves with the less searching 
explanation which points out that ‘it is perfectly proper to answer the question “Why 
does this object look red?” by saying “Because it is an orange object looked at in such
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and such circumstances.’” It is from within the conceptual resources we have available 
for giving that explanation that we are to explain the possibility of empirical 
knowledge. Nonetheless, Sellars thinks we have to go someway to even be able to 
provide that explanation for looks- and sees-talk. The question is: what must be added 
to is-talk, i.e., the holistic conceptual resources required for making strict observation 
reports, that enables looks- and sees-talk to be possible?
Notice that even the less searching explanation makes reference to Sellars’s 
contention that experiences make or contain claims or assertions, i.e., that experiences 
have propositional contents. That which he highlights as the most important aspect of 
sees-talk is that it involves the endorsement of the claim that an experience contains. 
That is, the most important epistemological aspect of sees-talk, at least in regards to the 
Agrippan problematic, is that it makes necessary reference to a subject o f experience 
qua epistemic subject. Only an epistemic subject can endorse or not endorse a claim 
contained by an experience. Unlike a strict observation report, i.e., a report which 
involves is-talk, a looks- or sees-statement in some sense shows the epistemic subject at 
work in their elicitation: the question of whether to endorse or not to endorse has come 
up. For Sellars, however, this ensures that we cannot make such statements unless we 
have the resources of mentalistic discourse, something which he takes to require a story 
concerning how we come by the concepts constitutive of that discourse. That is the first 
stage of what we might call his ‘Myth of Jones’.
Sellars attempts to defend what he calls a ‘revised classical analysis of our 
common-sense conception of thoughts’. This conception is different in kind to an 
account that has thoughts as overt ‘verbal or linguistic episodes’ together with what 
Sellars everywhere calls ‘verbal imagery’, those covert episodes in which we speak to 
ourselves, privately. He complains that surely there are not enough such episodes, of 
either kind, ‘to account for all the cases in which it would be argued that a person is 
thinking’? Moreover, it is different in kind from what is called ‘behaviourism’ in 
which all thinking is subsumed under observable—both actually and possibly—
1 ? Qepisodes of ‘intelligent behaviour’. As Sellars writes:
This, however, runs into the difficulty that whenever we try to explain what 
we mean by calling a piece of nonhabitual behaviour intelligent, we seem to 
find it necessary to do so in terms of thinking. The uncomfortable feeling
126 Sellars, EPM, §47, p. 90.
127 Ibid, §46, p. 88, original emphasis.
128 Ibid, §46, pp. 88—89.
129 Ibid, §46, p. 89.
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will not be downed that the dispositional account of thoughts in terms of
I O A
intelligent behaviour is covertly circular.
Finally, it is based upon, although importantly dissimilar in certain epistemological 
respects, from the classical tradition’s claim ‘that there is a family of episodes, neither 
overt verbal behaviour nor verbal imagery, which are thoughts, and that both overt 
verbal behaviour and verbal imagery owe their meaningfulness to the fact that they 
stand to these thoughts in the unique relation of “expressing” them’. The classical 
tradition normally adds to this claim that such episodes are introspectable—‘Indeed, it 
was normally believed that they could not occur without being known to occur’ . 132 But 
Sellars denies that thoughts are to be considered infallibly knowable and, indeed, 
introspectable in anything like that classical sense. He takes the classical tradition to 
have perpetuated, even originated, that confusion which besets the sense-datum theorist, 
i.e., the confusing of thoughts with appearances. Instead, he proposes that ‘If we purge 
the classical tradition of [that]... confusion..., it becomes the idea that to each of us 
belongs a stream of episodes, not themselves immediate experiences, to which we have
i  o  'y
privileged, but by no means either invariable or infallible access’.
Having negatively identified his conception of thoughts via its differentiation 
from these others, Sellars then sets about defining and defending it. He does this by 
telling a story about some mythological ancestors of ours, and one in particular—his 
famous ‘Jones’ . 134 That story begins from a point at which those mythological ancestors 
have what Sellars calls a ‘Rylean language’, ‘a language of which the fundamental 
descriptive vocabulary speaks of public properties of public objects located in Space 
and enduring through Time’. This language also has the ‘logical operations of 
conjunction, disjunction, negation, and quantification, but especially of the subjunctive 
conditional’. The question Sellars then pushes is one concerning what would have to 
be added to this language to enable talk o f thoughts, objects not as yet known to our 
mythical ancestors.
At this juncture Sellars adds to this ‘Rylean language’ the resources of 
semantical discourse, i.e., the ability of these mythical ancestors of ours to make
130 Ibid, §46, p. 89, original emphasis.
131 Ibid, §47, p. 89, original emphasis.
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metalinguistic statements about their language—what words mean, what statements 
refer to, etc. Sellars writes:
Let it be granted, then, that these mythical ancestors of ours are able to 
characterize each other’s verbal behaviour in semantical terms; that, in other 
words, they not only can talk about each other’s predictions as causes and 
effects, and as indicators (with greater or lesser reliability) of other verbal 
and nonverbal states of affairs, but can also say of these verbal productions 
that they mean thus and so, that they say that such and such, that they are 
true, false, etc. 137
Now, since the overriding characteristic of thoughts is ‘their intentionality, reference, or 
aboutness’, Sellars takes it that the addition of semantical discourse to the resources of 
the Rylean language puts its mythical speakers in, or close to, a position to begin to talk 
about thoughts. This is because of the structural similarities between semantical talk 
concerning overt verbal behaviour and mentalistic talk of thoughts—talk which 
concerns what concepts apply to, what the propositional contents o f beliefs are about, 
etc.
Yet Sellars does not want to just identify semantical talk with mentalistic talk, 
otherwise we would be back with the first conception of thoughts rejected above. Nor 
does he want to return to the classical tradition’s conception of thoughts in which 
semantical discourse ends up being derivative o f mentalistic discourse, in which ‘overt 
verbal performances’ are ‘to be analyzed in terms of talk about the intentionality of the 
mental episodes which are “expressed” by’ such ‘overt performances’ . 139 If the latter 
were the case we would be back to the epistemic primacy of the mental. The way out of 
this dilemma, for Sellars, is to turn to that second, behaviouristic conception of 
thoughts.
But first, however, he enriches the Rylean language with the resources of 
theoretical discourse. Not only do our mythical ancestors have semantical talk, but they 
can also ‘elaborate, without methodological sophistication, crude, sketchy, and vague 
theories to explain why things which are similar in their observable properties differ in 
their causal properties, and things which are similar in their causal properties differ in 
their observable properties’ . 140 That is, they can construct theoretical models to explain 
why some observable states of affairs behave as they do, models whose imobservable 
postulates are correlated with other observable states of affairs not in the domain to be
137 Ibid, §49, p. 92, original emphasis.
138 Ibid, §50, p. 93, original emphasis.
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explained in that the model describes ‘a domain of familiar objects behaving in familiar 
ways such that we can see how the phenomena to be explained [re those first observable 
states of affairs] would arise if they consisted of this sort of thing’, i.e., things 
analogous to those latter observable states of affairs. 141 All such models, however, are 
accompanied by a ‘commentary which qualifies or limits—but not precisely or in all 
respects—the analogy between the familiar objects and the entities which are being 
introduced by the theory’ . 142 The relationship between the language of observation and 
the language of theory is thus one way but constrained. The postulated entities are to 
explain why some observable states of affairs behave as they do by reference to the 
behaviour of some other observable states of affairs (their model), but the postulated 
entities, based in important respects upon the latter observable states of affairs do not 
just exhibit their behaviour again, but at the unobserved level. The ‘commentary’ sets 
important limits on the analogy.
It is at this point that Jones makes his presence felt by offering a theory o f 
thoughts. Sellars takes that second conception of thoughts assayed above, that one 
which subsumes thinking under actually or possibly observable episodes of intelligent 
behaviour, to be committed to a needless methodological restriction. That restriction is 
the ‘thought that Behaviourism is committed to the idea that the concepts of a 
behaviouristic psychology must be... analyzable’ ‘into concepts pertaining to overt 
behaviour’—‘that properly introduced behaviouristic concepts must be built by explicit 
definition—in the broadest sense—from a basic vocabulary pertaining to overt 
behaviour’ . 143 But, contra ‘philosophical’ behaviourism, Jones does not take his theory 
to be so restricted. He commits himself only to ‘the behaviouristic requirement that all 
concepts [pertaining to thoughts] should be introduced in terms of a basic vocabulary 
pertaining to overt behaviour’, but takes this to be ‘compatible with the idea that some 
behaviouristic concepts are to be introduced as theoretical concepts’, i.e., as concepts of 
unobservable entities and their qualities and relations conceived in reference to 
observable states of affairs—observable behaviour—but allowed a measure o f 
independence from the latter in how they are supposed to behave (the effect of the 
commentary, then) . 144 Such a behaviourism as Jones’s, Sellars calls ‘methodological’ 
behaviourism.
141 Ibid, §51, p. 96.
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The Rylean language of our mythical ancestors, prior to Jones’s intervention, 
can now be characterised ‘as not only a behaviouristic language, but a behaviouristic 
language which is restricted to the non-theoretical vocabulary of a behaviouristic 
psychology’ . 145 Sellars writes:
Suppose, now, that in the attempt to account for the fact that his fellow men 
behave intelligently not only when their conduct is threaded on a string of 
overt verbal episodes—that is to say, as we would put it, when they “think 
out loud”—but also when no detectable verbal output is present, Jones 
develops a theory according to which overt utterances are but the 
culmination of a process which begins with certain inner episodes. And let 
us suppose that his model for these episodes which initiate the events which 
culminate in overt verbal behaviour is that o f overt verbal behaviour itself 
In other words, using the language o f the model, the theory is to the effect 
that overt verbal behaviour is the culmination o f a process which begins 
with “inner speech ” ]46
But note that ‘inner speech’—Jones calls instances of such ‘thoughts’—is not the verbal 
imagery of that first conception of thoughts we have already met. Thoughts, by Jones’s 
theory, are ‘“unobserved,” “nonempirical” “inner” episodes’ modelled on episodes of 
observable verbal behaviour, and to which the categories of semantical discourse are, to 
an extent qualified by Jones’s commentary to his model, applicable. 147 That is, they are 
episodes which are about things as statements refer to things, whose constituents— 
concepts—are applicable as words are meaningful, but not necessarily along exactly the 
same lines as the overt statements or words which constitute his model.
Indeed, in the other direction Jones is also careful not to completely sever the tie 
between overt verbal behaviour and thoughts. In fact, the concept “ thinking that-p\ 
where this means ‘having the thought occur to one that-;?’, has as its primary sense 
saying ‘p ’ and a derivative sense in which its stands for a short-term proximate 
propensity to say ‘p ” . Thus the fundamental concept pertaining to thought is actually 
one which pertains to an episode of overt verbal behaviour, not to be understood as an 
expression of a thought (a ‘linguistic action’), as in the classical tradition’s conception 
of thoughts, but as instead a ‘candidly thinking-out-loud-that-p\]49 Such a candid 
thinking-out-loud-that-p is not a performance in which a deliberate use of words is 
made to achieve some purpose or other, but one which is spontaneous (non- 
deliberative). As Sellars writes: ‘Thus, at the primary level, instead of analyzing the
Ibid, §56, p. 102, original emphasis.
146 Ibid, §56, pp. 102— 103, original emphasis.
147 Ibid, §58, p. 104.
148 Sellars, ‘The Structure of Knowledge’, II, §12, p. 319, original emphasis.
149 Ibid, II, §12, p. 319, original emphasis.
100
intentionality or aboutness of verbal behavior in terms of its expressing or being used to 
express classically conceived thoughts or beliefs, we should recognize that this verbal 
behavior is already thinking in its own right, and its intentionality or aboutness is 
simply the appropriateness of classifying it in terms which relate to the linguistic 
behavior of the group to which it belongs’ . 150 Indeed, he remarks: ‘Thus, it should be 
noted that Jones’ theory, as I have sketched it, is perfectly compatible with the idea that 
the ability to have thoughts is acquired in the process of acquiring overt speech and that 
only after overt speech is well established, can “inner speech” occur without its overt 
culmination’ . 151
The final flourish of Jones’s theory is then to enable our mythical ancestors, 
with his theory of thoughts now added to the resources of their Rylean language, to 
acquire the ability to report on both the thoughts of others as well as their own. In other 
words, to take thoughts out o f the theoretical realm and into the non-theoretical one of 
everyday discourse. This is in an effort to allay the—correct and proper—fear that there 
is something ever-so paradoxical about saying ‘that concepts pertaining to thinking are 
theoretical concepts’. " As Sellars writes:
once our fictitious ancestor, Jones, has developed the theory that overt 
verbal behaviour is the expression of thoughts, and taught his compatriots to 
make use of the theory in interpreting each other’s behaviour, it is but a 
short step to the use of this language in self-description. Thus, when Tom, 
watching Dick, has behavioral evidence which warrants the use of the 
sentence (in the language of the theory) “Dick is thinking ‘p’” (or ‘Dick is 
thinking that p’), Dick, using the same behavioral evidence, can say, in the 
language of the theory, T am thinking “p”’ (or T am thinking that p’). And 
it now turns out—need it have?—that Dick can be trained to give 
reasonably reliable self-descriptions, using the language of the theory, 
without having to observe his overt behavior. Jones brings this about, 
roughly, by applauding utterances by Dick of “I am thinking that p” when 
the behavioral evidence strongly supports the theoretical statement “Dick is 
thinking that p”; and by frowning on utterances of “I am thinking that p,” 
when the evidence does not support this theoretical statement. Our ancestors 
begin to speak of the privileged access each of us has to his own thoughts.
What began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a 
reporting role. 153
Thus, the manner in which Sellars attempts to effect the transition between thoughts qua
theoretical entities and thoughts qua, well, thoughts is by providing a reporting role for
150 Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Language as Thought and as Communication’, p 80, in Wilfrid Sellars, In the Space 
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first-, second-, and third-person attributions of such. We have already seen that, for 
Sellars, reports are not to be considered the conclusions o f inferences. His idea is that if 
we can report on something then it must exist. Perhaps the easiest way to see how such 
reporting is possible in the case of thoughts is simply by noting that, in the first 
instance, Jones’s theory of thoughts makes them obsetwable, in that candid verbal 
behaviour is to be considered, not the expression of thought, but thought itself Sellars 
comments: ‘As I see it, this story helps us understand that concepts pertaining to such 
inner episodes as thoughts are primarily and essentially intersubjective, as 
intersubjective as the concept of a positron, and that the reporting role of these 
concepts—the fact that each of us has privileged access to his thoughts—constitutes a 
dimension of the use of these concepts which is built on and presupposes this 
intersubjective status’ . 154 By Jones’s theory, behavioural evidence is built into the very 
concepts of mentalistic discourse.
We are now ready to turn to the issue of that less searching explanation of looks- 
(and sees-) talk as reporting on the propositional contents of experiences. For those 
propositional contents will belong in the newly acquired framework of thoughts that 
Jones’s theory has enabled. That is, where before thoughts were introduced all the 
concepts our mythical ancestors had in regards to experiences ‘were those of overt 
verbal reports, made, for example, in the context of looking at an object in standard 
conditions’, reports which made no reference to a subject of experience qua epistemic 
subject, and so experiences themselves, with the introduction of thoughts this 
framework can be enlarged to encompass such subjects and thus experiences. 155 So 
whereas if someone said that ‘Dick reported that the table is green’, that person would 
be committing himself only to the truth of what Dick reported, i.e., the table being 
green, if he had instead said, which he now can with the introduction of thoughts, ‘Dick 
saw that the table is green’, that person would be both ascribing to Dick the experience 
of the table being green—the propositional content ‘the table is green’— as well as 
endorsing that content, i.e., the table being green. 156 Moreover, if someone said that 
‘Dick reported that the table is green, but Dick’s report was not made in standard 
conditions’, that person would not be committing themselves to the truth of what Dick 
reported; if he had instead said, again which he now can with the introduction of 
thoughts, ‘The table looks green to Dick’, that person would be ascribing to Dick the
154 Ibid, §59, p. 107, original emphasis.
155 Ibid, §60, p. 108, original emphasis.
156 Ibid, §60, p. 108, original emphasis.
102
experience of the table being green but not endorsing the propositional content of that 
experience.157
Jones’s introduction of the framework of thoughts allows our mythical ancestors 
to locate a possible locus of mismatch between what is now revealed as the mind and 
the mind-independent. That is, before the introduction of thoughts our mythical 
ancestors may have wondered what went wrong between something’s being the case 
and their reporting on looking that something’s being the case (the act of looking, not 
the experience of, note) such that they made false reports, since all their reports 
pertained only to the object looked at. And whilst they could cope with this by adding 
the rider to reports ‘but this (or that) report wasn’t made in standard conditions’ where 
appropriate, this would still have left a certain incompatibility in their conceptual 
framework between the fact that objects don’t change their colours and the fact that they 
can make false reports concerning such objects, and ultimately make false reports 
concerning objects which aren’t even there. The introduction of thoughts, and 
specifically perceptions and (apparent or actual) w/s-pereeptions, even if only 
considered in terms of experiences having propositional contents, allows our mythical 
ancestors to understand that there is something there when such false reports are made, 
even when there is no object there being looked at. Thus is allowed the concept of an 
experience, a subject of experience, and, we might say, an epistemic subject.
$6.2, The Two Criteria of Non-Inferential Knowledge and Reports
The essential place to start an overview of Sellars’s epistemology is with his (infamous) 
discussion of whether ‘Empirical Knowledge has a Foundation’ in Part VIII of EPM. 
He begins Part VIII of EPM with the following passage:
One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, 
indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact 
can not only be noninferentially known to be the case, but presuppose no 
other knowledge of particular matter of fact, or of general truths; and (b) 
such that the noninferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure 
constitutes the ultimate court of appeal for all factual claims—particular of 
general—about the world. It is important to note that I characterized the 
knowledge of fact belonging to this stratum as not only noninferential, but 
as pre-supposing no knowledge of other matter of fact, whether particular or 
general. It might be thought that this is a redundancy, that knowledge (not 
belief or conviction, but knowledge) which logically presupposes
157 Or not all of it: just the part which concerns the table.
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knowledge of other facts must be inferential. This, however, as I hope to
1 SRshow, is itself an episode in the Myth.
The first thing to note in regards to unpacking this passage is that, for our purposes, if 
Sellars labels something as a form ‘taken by the Myth of the Given’, or again an 
‘episode in the Myth’, he objects to it. I do not need to state exactly what the Myth of 
the Given is. That would be an extremely difficult—and thankless—task, and certain of 
its lineaments have already been covered in the foregoing. (Obviously its title refers to 
something like Lewis’s appeal to the given [see §3.3], but Sellars’s use of the Myth 
goes far beyond a critique of Lewis’s position.) With that in mind, we can understand 
Sellars to be objecting to two distinct positions in this passage.
The first is clearly foundationalism, in any of its guises. A ‘structure of 
knowledge’ that appeals to the possibility of an instance of knowledge that ‘can not 
only be noninferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge of 
particular matter of fact, or of general truths’, is a structure of knowledge that appeals to 
the idea that a reason to believe some proposition need not be epistemically distinct 
from a belief in the proposition it concerns. Note how Sellars qualifies this appeal. In 
doing so he leaves it open that an instance of knowledge might be non-inferentially 
known to be the case and yet presuppose other knowledge of particular matter of fact, or 
of general truths. The claim ‘that the noninferential knowledge of facts belonging to this 
structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims—particular and 
general—about the world’ is then the necessary corollary of the foundationalist’s 
appeal. For again, clearly, if there are instances of knowledge, then some of those 
instances will be inferentially justified (§2.1). That being the case, any appeal to non­
inferential justification entails that there will be two strata of knowledge: non-inferential 
and inferential, and the latter will rest on the former.
The second position which Sellars objects to in the passage is one that assumes 
‘that knowledge (not belief or conviction, but knowledge) which logically presupposes 
knowledge of other facts must be inferential’, i.e., coherentism. But if Sellars objects to 
both foundationalism and coherentism, then by elimination it can only be the case that 
the ‘redundancy’ he refers to is the position he in fact endorses. And that redundancy 
must be an appeal to the idea that a belief can justify another belief in a way other than 
via inferential connection between the two, i.e., he must challenge the first assumption 
underlying the premise of the epistemic regress argument. But we can also say 
something further here: if Sellars is going to challenge that assumption, then it must also
158 Ibid, §32, pp. 68—69, original emphasis.
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be the case that he argues for something like the foundationalist’s proposed structure of 
knowledge. Again, any kind of appeal to non-inferential justification will ensure that its 
resultant—a putative structure of knowledge—will necessarily involve two strata of 
knowledge.
So Sellars will challenge the first assumption underlying the premise of the 
epistemic regress argument. To draw out how he will challenge that assumption, we 
need to work towards the specific juncture at which that argument arises vis-ä-vis 
Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge. And to do this we need to zero in on his 
habit of talking about non-inferential justification in terms of the notions of ultimacy 
and authority.
He sets out what he sees to be the problem of non-inferential justification in the 
following way:
Now, the idea of... a privileged stratum of knowledge is a familiar one, 
though not without its difficulties. Knowledge pertaining to this level is 
noninferential, yet it is, after all, knowledge. It is ultimate, yet it has 
authority.159
Sellars’s invocation of the notions of ultimacy and authority suggests a division of 
labour. That an instance of knowledge is ultimate implies that it is not inferred from any 
other instances of knowledge. This is why it stops a regress of justification; indeed, this 
is obviously why it is «cw-inferential. That an instance of knowledge has authority, on 
the other hand, implies that the termination of that regress is justified, in that the 
instance of knowledge with which the regress terminates is justified. These are, then, 
the two criteria Sellars thinks that an instance of knowledge must satisfy if it is to be 
considered non-inferentially justified. And note that this subtle diremption, on Sellars’s 
part, of what goes in to making an instance of knowledge non-inferentially justified is 
further indicative of the fact that he will pursue a line of investigation different to that of 
the foundationalist. For, whilst it must be the case that an instance of knowledge is 
ultimate if it is to be considered non-inferential, treating of these two criteria separately 
implies that it will be justified in a manner other than its merely being ultimate.
A little further on in Part VIII of EPM, Sellars recapitulates what he takes to be 
the problem of non-inferential justification, and in so doing suggests a starting point for 
the line of reasoning he will pursue:
159 Ibid, §32, p. 69, original emphasis.
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if some statements... are to express noninferential knowledge, they must 
have a credibility which is not a matter of being supported by other 
statements. Now there does seem to be a class of statements which fill at 
least part of this bill, namely such statements as would be said to report 
observations, thus, ‘This is red.’ These statements, candidly made, [would 
seem to] have authority. Yet they are not expressions of inference. How, 
then, is this authority to be understood?160
We have met the thought that some statements have non-inferential uses before, i.e., 
that some statements are reports (§4.1). But what is the connection between a report 
being non-inferentially made and its being both ultimate and authoritative, i.e., non- 
inferentially justified? And we should note a problem straight away with this line of 
reasoning. When we met the thought that some statements are reports it was also 
suggested that, because of this, they were not to be considered fact-stating. This was 
important: if reports are fact-stating, then Sellars cannot support the claim that it is the 
non-comparative use of the locution ‘looks red’ at work in appearance statements 
(again, §4.1). But then, if reports are not fact-stating, then they cannot be considered as 
putative instances of non-inferential knowledge: surely an instance of knowledge is 
fact-stating? On the face of it, then, Sellars would appear to be barking up the wrong 
tree in beginning his line of reasoning with reports. Nonetheless, let us persevere with 
his line of reasoning.
Now, Sellars qualifies the notion of a report that he will employ in an important 
manner: ‘if the expression “following a rule” is taken seriously, and is not weakened 
beyond all recognition into the bare notion of exhibiting a uniformity—in which case 
the lightning, thunder sequence would “follow a rule”—then it is the knowledge or 
belief that the circumstances are of a certain kind, and not the mere fact that they are of 
this kind, which contributes to bringing about the action’.161 The epistemic regress 
argument, as we have noted (§2.2), does not call into question s’s understanding of the 
propositions he believes, merely whether those beliefs can be justified and so amount to 
instances of knowledge. Indeed, none of the ancillary arguments adumbrated above 
have gone so far as to question whether 5 can understand the propositions he believes. 
However, in the one instance that we have considered a definite semantics, so to speak, 
viz. that picture of meaning and understanding which lay behind the logical atomism of 
the foundationalist, allusion was made to the notion of rule-following (§4.1).
Roughly speaking, the notion of rule-following is the idea that s’s understanding 
of a proposition is bound up with his ability to follow the rules for the use of its
160 Ibid, §32, p. 70, original emphasis.
161 Ibid, §33. pp. 72—73.
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constituent concepts. To take that notion ‘seriously’, as Sellars urges, would appear to 
entail making room for two distinct possibilities: (a), that there is a standard of 
correctness which a putative instance of the following of a rule can be judged as correct 
or incorrect against, and (b), that 5 is actually free to abide by that standard of 
correctness or not. If provision for either of these possibilities is jettisoned, then that is 
not to take the notion of rule-following seriously.
Therefore, if, despite Sellars’s analysis of looks-talk, we assume that a report is 
an action, then it cannot be that 5 understands a report only because it really is caused
by that which its propositional content concerns. This is not to take the notion of 
rule-following seriously—it locates the meaning of the report’s content outside the 
ambit of epistemic subjectivity, as something causal as opposed to intentional. To take 
that notion seriously, it can only be the case that 5 understands that the propositional 
content of a report qua action will be or is likely to be caused by that which it concerns 
that can act as a standard of correctness by which it can be judged as correct or 
incorrect, and in doing so make it possible to locate the meaning of that content inside 
the ambit of epistemic subjectivity. And notice that, if he understands that the 
propositional content of a report qua action will be or is likely to be caused by that 
which it concerns, then, given that for s to believe a proposition is for s to take it as true, 
in understanding that content he should believe it. But if a rule of action or ‘ought to do’ 
rule is to have such normative force, so to speak, then it can only be that s also knows or 
believes that rule itself.
Obviously all of this only matters if we assume a definite semantics which 
employs the notion of rule-following. However, whilst it is conceivable that Sellars 
proposed structure of knowledge could be reached independently of it, this assumption 
certainly provides a conducive context for its conception, so let us also assume such a 
definite semantics or, at least, as we shall not go into any robust characterisation of such 
a definite semantics, that any definite semantics will employ the notion of rule­
following.
That being the case, we must note from the off an important epistemic corollary 
of the assumption that any definite semantics will employ the notion of rule-following. 
If it can only be that 5 knows or believes a rule of action if it is to have any normative 
force, then in the latter case it can really only be if he justifiably believes that rule that 
he can understand that it has such normative force—mere belief is to weak. And the 
obverse of this point is that 5 could surely justify an empirical belief of his by showing 
or exhibiting that he understands its propositional content. It would appear then, that on
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the assumption that any definite semantics will employ the notion of rule-following, s’s 
understanding of the propositions he believes could be called into question in virtue of 
considerations like the epistemic regress argument. Indeed, the fact that the epistemic 
regress argument does not call s’s understanding of the empirical propositions he 
believes into question is a hint towards its eventual dissolution.
Nonetheless, as has already been noted, given his analysis of looks-talk Sellars 
obviously does not take a report to be an action. Indeed, he embarks upon the positive 
specification of his position as follows:
We might begin by trying something like the following: An overt of covert 
token of “This is green” in the presence of a green item is a [report]... and 
expresses observational knowledge if and only if it is a manifestation of a 
tendency to produce overt or covert tokens of “This is green”—given a 
certain set—if and only if a green object is being looked at in standard 
conditions. Clearly on this interpretation the occurrence of such tokens of 
“This is green” would be “following a rule” only in the sense that they are 
instances of a uniformity, a uniformity differing from the lightning-thunder 
case in that it is an acquired causal characteristic of the language user. 
Clearly the above suggestion, which corresponds to the “thermometer view” 
criticized by Professor Price, and which we have already rejected, won’t do 
as it stands. Let us see, however, if it can’t be revised to fit the criteria I 
have been using for “expressing observational knowledge.” 162
Let us call this Sellars’s ‘first-run’ position. He is clearly concerned with how an ‘overt 
or covert token of “This is green’” can, firstly, be taken to be a report, and, secondly, 
how that report can express ‘observational knowledge’—knowledge of a particular 
matter of fact, in this case that a particular (physical) object is green. The idea Sellars 
formulates here is a causal one. To paraphrase: a token of ‘This is green’ which occurs 
in the presence of a green object will be both a report and also express observational 
knowledge iff: (a), it is causally elicited from 5, who has a general propensity to 
differentially produce tokens of ‘This is green’—from a limited set of minimal, ‘colour’ 
tokens, e.g., ‘This is red’, ‘This is blue’, etc.—in response to green objects; and (b), in 
this instance it has been elicited by a green object in standard conditions of perception. 
The satisfaction of (a) is meant to ensure that a putative tokening of ‘This is green’ is a 
tokening of ‘This is green’, such that it is a report and so could express observational 
knowledge, whilst the satisfaction of (b) is meant to ensure that that tokening of ‘This is 
green’ qua report does express observational knowledge.
Of course, as we have seen, Sellars’s first-run position is objectionable by his 
own account: if a report is causally elicited, and that is all that is required for its
162 Ibid, §35, pp. 73—74.
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propositional content to be meaningful, then its meaning is located outside the ambit of 
epistemic subjectivity. (We might also criticise it for purely epistemic reasons, so to 
speak: it is clearly a very simple variant of foundationalism.) Nonetheless, this is the 
picture Sellars will attempt to revise ‘to fit the criteria I have been using for “expressing 
observational knowledge”’, i.e., the criteria of ultimacy and authority.
§6.3. Sellars’s Two Hurdles
In regards to the goal of revising his first-run position to fit his two criteria, Sellars 
writes:
The first hurdle to be jumped concerns the authority which, as I have 
emphasized, a sentence token must have in order that it may be used to 
express knowledge. Clearly, on this account the only thing that can remotely 
be supposed to constitute such authority is the fact that one can infer the 
presence of a green object from the fact that someone makes this report. 
[Moreover]..., the correctness of a report does not have to be construed as 
the rightness of an action. A report can be correct as being an instance of a 
general mode of behaviour which, in a given linguistic community, it is 
reasonable to sanction and support.
The second hurdle is, however, the decisive one. For we have seen that to
be the expression of knowledge, a report must not only have authority, this
authority must in some sense be recognized by the person whose report it is.
And this is a steep hurdle indeed. For if the authority of the report “This is
green” lies in the fact that the existence of green items appropriately related
to the perceiver can be inferred from the occurrence of such reports, it
follows that only someone who is able to draw this inference, and therefore
who has not only the concept green, but also the concept of uttering “This is
green”—indeed, the concept of certain conditions of perception, those
which could correctly be called ‘standard conditions’—could be in a
position to token “This is green” in recognition of its authority. In other
words, for a [report of]... “This is green” to “express observational
knowledge,” not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a
green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens
of “This is green” are symptoms of the presence of green objects in
1conditions which are standard for visual perception.
Now, the first thing to notice in regards to Sellars’s two hurdles is the following point: 
nowhere in those hurdles does Sellars jettison the two conditions the satisfaction of 
which he postulates in his first-run position as being both necessary and sufficient for a 
token of ‘This is green’ to amount to an instance of observational knowledge. That is, 
his criticism of that position must only concern the sufficiency of those conditions. 
Therefore, when he talks of ‘this report’ or ‘a report’ in those hurdles it must be
163 Ibid, §35, pp. 74— 75, original emphasis.
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understood, firstly, as a sentence token causally elicited from s, who has a general 
propensity to differentially produce tokens of ‘This is green’ in response to green 
objects, such that it is a report, and, secondly, that in this instance it has actually been 
elicited by a green object in standard conditions of perception. With this in mind we 
will approach each of those hurdles in turn.
(a) Sellars ’s first hurdle. Here Sellars introduces an idea that swiftly takes him beyond 
his first-run position and, indeed, lays to rest any fears we might have that he is treating 
reports as fact-stating. Nonetheless, the two distinct—but related—points he is making 
in this hurdle in regards to the authority of ‘a sentence token’ doubly provide, going 
forward, an issue for Sellars’s to tackle in regards to his proposed structure of 
knowledge, an issue he will not have tackled satisfactorily by the end of Part VIII of 
EPM.
In the first instance, then, we need to unpack Sellars’s claim that ‘the only thing 
that can remotely be supposed to constitute such authority is the fact one can infer the 
presence of a green object from the fact that someone makes this report’. And the first 
thing to note in unpacking this claim is that, i f  it is the fact that one can infer the 
presence of a green object from a report of ‘This is green’ which constitutes the 
authority of a sentence token, then it is not the report whose authority is so constituted. 
It will be the conclusion of the inference qua sentence token whose authority is 
constituted by the fact that one can infer the presence of a green object from the fact that 
someone makes the report ‘This is green’. That is, the conclusion of the inference will 
be authoritative because, presumably, that inference is successful.
Now, if it is not a report of ‘This is green’ whose authority is constituted by the 
fact that one can infer the presence of a green object from the fact that one makes that 
report, then that report cannot be an instance of observational knowledge. Therefore, as 
Sellars’s analysis of looks-talk requires, it cannot be that that report is fact-stating, thus 
alleviating our fears that Sellars is barking up the wrong tree in beginning his line of 
reasoning with reports. In parallel, note that the conclusion of the inference appears to 
replicate the propositional content of the report: the content of the report already says 
that there is a green object present. That is, the conclusion of the inference will also 
have the propositional content ‘This is green’. This is indicative of the fact that there are 
no other premises involved in the inference to that conclusion over and above the 
report. And this helps explain why Sellars takes it that the authority of a sentence token 
can be constituted by the fact that one can infer the presence of a green object from the
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fact that someone makes the report ‘This is green’. For if that report is not an instance 
of observational knowledge, then the conclusion of the inference, whilst being inferred 
from another cognitive state (the report), will not be inferred from any other instances of 
knowledge, observational or otherwise. 164 The conclusion of the inference will therefore 
satisfy the criterion of ultimacy. If a sentence token is to amount to an instance of non- 
inferential knowledge, then ultimacy and authority must come together.
Nonetheless, this does not explain how Sellars takes it that the authority of a 
sentence token can be constituted by the fact that one can infer the presence of a green 
object from the fact that someone makes the report ‘This is green’, i.e., how he thinks 
that inference works. And the problem is not whether that inference will be successful, 
and so its conclusion authoritative, for we are assuming that, in this instance, the report 
is causally elicited from s by a green object in standard conditions of perception—the 
inference must be successful. The problem is how 5 can understand that he should make 
that inference, i.e., how 5 can understand that it will be or is likely to be successful, 
given only the report. And we must be clear concerning what is at stake here: not only is 
it the case that such an inference ensures that its authoritative conclusion will also be 
ultimate, it is in fact the only conceivable manner in which an instance of observational 
knowledge could be both ultimate and authoritative, i.e., non-inferentially justified. For, 
firstly, clearly if reference to an epistemic principle was required for s to understand that 
he should make that inference, then its conclusion could not be ultimate because that 
principle would have to be justified, and, secondly, a report could never be an instance 
of non-inferentially justified observational knowledge.
To see why this latter is the case we must ask the following question: if 5 cannot 
understand that he should make an inference to the presence of a green object given 
only a report of ‘This is green’, then how can he know that something is green, and 
specifically if such knowledge is premised upon the satisfaction of both the criteria of 
ultimacy and authority? Since we are trying to explain the possibility of observational 
knowledge, the only other option would be if the report itself was both ultimate and 
authoritative. Of course this undermines Sellars’s analysis of looks-talk, in that we are 
taking the report to be fact-stating, but the question now is rather: can that report in fact 
be both ultimate and authoritative? And clearly it cannot, in such a situation the
164 This, then, is the point at which Sellars would seem to build in a possible response to Gettier-type 
counter examples to the tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief. Even though it is non- 
inferentially justified, there is nonetheless a premise that the conclusion of the inference to the presence of 
a green object is inferred from, i.e., the report. The point being that, if the report it is inferred from is 
false, then, of course, the conclusion of the inference cannot be an instance of knowledge, whether it is 
non-inferentially justified or not (in a sense to be specified).
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satisfaction of either the criterion of ultimacy or the criterion of authority precludes the 
satisfaction of the other. The point being that, to be ultimate, a report cannot be inferred 
from any other instances of empirical knowledge, observational or otherwise, yet to be 
authoritative, it must be recognisable as such, and, in terms of a report, these 
requirements necessarily clash.
A report of ‘This is green’ would presumably be ultimate because it was in fact 
causally elicited from 5 by a green object in standard conditions of perception, but it 
could not be authoritative in virtue of this fact, because it could not be recognised as 
being authoritative in virtue of this fact alone. To recognise it as being authoritative in 
virtue of the fact that the report was causally elicited from 5 by a green object in 
standard conditions of perception would require that s independently knew that it was 
elicited by that green object and that the conditions of perception were standard, i.e., if s 
had other instances of observational knowledge pertaining to the objective context at 
hand. Therefore the recognition of the report’s authority could only be accomplished 
inferentially, thus giving the lie to its ultimacy: 5 would have to infer from those other 
instances of observational knowledge to the authority of the report, i.e., in this case the 
truth of its propositional content, but then it would in fact be inferentially justified by 
other instances of observational knowledge.
And yet, if the report was considered recognisably authoritative in virtue of 
something else, e.g., that it was in fact a report of s’s, who has a general propensity to 
differentially produce tokens of ‘This is green’ in response to green objects, then it 
could not be considered ultimate in virtue of this fact, because it could not be 
considered an instance of observational knowledge in virtue of this fact. To be an 
instance of observational knowledge, of course, it is not enough that a report just is a 
report, its propositional content must also be true—that report must in fact be causally 
elicited from s by a green object in standard conditions of perception.
Finally, a report could not be considered ultimate because it was in fact causally 
elicited from 5 by a green object in standard conditions of perception, as it must have 
been to be considered ultimate, even if  it was considered recognisably authoritative, not 
in virtue of that fact, but because of the fact that it was a report of 5’s, who has a general 
propensity to differentially produce tokens of ‘This is green’ in response to green 
objects. To be recognised as authoritative in virtue of the fact that it was a report of s ’s, 
who has a general propensity to differentially produce tokens of ‘This is green’ in 
response to green objects, would require that 5 independently knew that it was a report, 
i.e., if s had other instances of observational knowledge pertaining to the subjective
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context at hand. Therefore the recognition of the report’s authority could again only be 
accomplished inferentially, thus again giving the lie to its ultimacy: 5 would have to 
infer from that instance of observational knowledge to the authority of the report, i.e., in 
this case because it has a certain epistemic property, namely the property of being a 
report, but then again it would in fact be inferentially justified by another instance of 
observational knowledge.
The fundamental moral of these considerations is that, by elimination, the only 
conceivable manner in which an instance of observational knowledge could be both 
ultimate and authoritative, i.e., non-inferentially justified, is if it is the case that it is the 
conclusion of an inference to the presence of a green object given only a report of ‘This 
is green’. Therefore, it is of great importance that Sellars explains how s can understand 
that he should make that inference.
In the second instance, then, Sellars remarks that ‘the correctness of a report 
does not have to be construed as the rightness of an action’. Instead it ‘can be correct as 
being an instance of a general mode of behaviour which, in a given linguistic 
community, it is reasonable to sanction and support’. Clearly this remark also requires 
some unpacking. What Sellars is obliquely gesturing at here is the idea that a report is 
something more than causally elicited, but something less than an action. That is, 
Sellars is attempting to navigate between the two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, 
if Sellars says that a report just is causally elicited, i.e., not subject to a standard of 
correctness, then its meaning is located outside the ambit of epistemic subjectivity—that 
was Sellars’s criticism of his first-run position. In such a case he would not be taking 
the notion of rule-following seriously. On the other hand, if Sellars says that a report is 
an action, i.e., subject to a rule of action, which dictates that 5 must also know or believe 
that rule of action if it is to have any normative force, and has referred to it in making 
the report, then the least that this implies is that the report itself would be the result of 
an inference, i.e., fact-stating, and this would entail that there could never be an instance 
of non-inferentially justified observational knowledge, in the simple sense that the rule 
which it was in some way inferred from would have to be justifiably believed by s . 165
Sellars’s way out of this dilemma is to suggest that, even though a report of 
‘This is green’ cannot be held to a standard of correctness qua rule of action, its 
meaning can nonetheless be located within the ambit of epistemic subjectivity because 
it can be held to an intersubjective standard of correctness. That is, the suggestion
16:5 It also implies, amongst other things, that the elicitation of the report is severed from that which its 
propositional content concerns, i.e., that it is intentionally as opposed to causally elicited, which is 
possibly unintelligible (see §2.3).
113
appears to be that, instead of 5 having to internalise the standard of correctness 
applicable to the propositional content of a report of ‘This is green’, such that that 
standard is something else in s’s epistemic economy which must also be taken into 
account when he is considering whether that report is meaningful or not, it can be 
external to that economy, yet internal to the cognitive economies of others within his 
linguistic community, and the report still meaningful for 5.
Nonetheless, whilst all this may ensure that a report of ‘This is green’ is 
meaningful for 5 ,  such that the inference to the presence of a green object is so much as 
possible, it simply does not explain how 5 can understand that he should make that 
inference given only the report. Therefore, at the end of Sellars’s first hurdle the 
outstanding issue for Sellars to deal with in regards to his proposed structure of 
empirical knowledge is to not only expand upon what is really a hare appeal to the idea 
of an intersubjective standard of correctness, i.e., to at least indicate what kind of 
‘ought’ can be ascribed to the correctness of a report, but also explain how the ‘general 
mode of behaviour’ licensed by that standard enables 5 to understand that he should 
infer the presence of a green object given only a report of ‘This is green’.
(b) Sellars’s second hurdle. Our consideration of Sellars’s second hurdle will 
necessarily be briefer than our consideration of his first; we are fast approaching the 
juncture at which the epistemic regress argument arises vis-a-vis Sellars’s proposed 
structure of knowledge. His second hurdle takes up the issue of how 5 can recognise that 
the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green object, given only a report of 
‘This is green’, is authoritative.
If the only conceivable manner in which an instance of observational knowledge 
could be both ultimate and authoritative, i.e., non-inferentially justified, is if it is the 
case that it is the conclusion of an inference to the presence of a green object given only 
a report of ‘This is green’, then, as Sellars points out, ‘it follows that only someone who 
is able to draw this inference, and therefore who has not only the concept green, but also 
the concept of uttering “This is green”—indeed, the concept of certain conditions of 
perception, those which could correctly be called ‘standard conditions’—could be in a 
position to token “This is green” in recognition of its authority’. This comment also 
requires some unpacking.
The basic idea here is one which we have met before: for something to be 
authoritative, it must be recognisable as such. Now, we have also seen that, if the 
conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green object is to be possibly recognised
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as authoritative, then that recognition cannot come via the fact that its propositional 
content is true, or that it has a certain epistemic property, else its ultimacy will be 
undermined. This is another moral of our considerations to the effect that a report 
cannot be an instance of observational knowledge. However, there is an element to the 
conclusion of the inference which a report does not share, i.e., that it is the conclusion 
of an inference. Can this aid in the recognition of its authority without impugning its 
ultimacy?
Yes. This is because, just as the conclusion of the inference will be true or false 
depending upon whether the report it is inferred from is true or false, i.e., if it is or is not 
causally elicited by a green object in standard conditions of perception, so will the 
making o f the inference from that report be correct or incorrect in virtue of whether the 
report it is an inference from is true or false; the truth or falsity of the conclusion of the 
inference will co-vary with the correctness or incorrectness of the making of the 
inference. In other words, whilst it is not properly a part of the conclusion of the 
inference, the making of the inference can nonetheless be indicative of the former’s 
authority. Moreover, given that a conclusion has been reached, then it must be the case 
that an inference has been made. Therefore, since a report is not fact-stating, there will 
be no need for s to have independent (subjective) observational knowledge that the 
inference has actually been made: if he is asked, or asks himself, how he knows that 
something is green, then that which the question is being asked in regards to must be the 
conclusion of the inference. That is, the recognition of the making of the inference as 
indicative of the authority of its conclusion does not involve 5 having to independently 
know by observation that it has obtained.
However, 5 must be able to defend his making of the inference, for, given that 
the correctness or incorrectness of the making of the inference co-varies with the truth 
or falsity of its conclusion, in defending his making of the inference he recognises the 
authority of its conclusion. Therefore, whilst it cannot be that he refers to such general 
knowledge in making the inference to the presence of a green object—again, that must 
occur given only the report of ‘This is green’, else the conclusion of the inference is not 
ultimate—s will nonetheless have to know that he should make that inference because 
he knows that such reports ‘are symptoms of the presence of green objects in conditions 
which are standard for visual perception’. And we must be absolutely clear what is 
being proposed here: in defending his making of the inference, 5 is not inferentially 
recognising the authority of its conclusion. He is instead moving onto a distinct 
justificatory track which is not, in an epistemically significant sense it is hoped,
115
inferentially connected to the conclusion of the inference. Only in such a way could 5 be 
in a position to token—infer—‘This is green’ in recognition of its authority, and without 
impugning its ultimacy. As Sellars writes in summa of his second hurdle: ‘the point is 
specifically that observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, 
presupposes that one know general facts of the form X  is a reliable symptom o /F .166
Notice what Sellars is proposing here: he is proposing that a belief can be 
justified not—or not only, perhaps—in virtue of the fact that its propositional content is 
true, or in virtue of the fact that it has some epistemic property, but in virtue of the 
epistemic conduct of its believer, 5. This is the non-traditional understanding of what it 
is for a belief to be justified I have mentioned on various occasions above (again, see 
the introduction and §2.2), and the preceding is a rough approximation of one side of 
that non-traditional understanding.
Nonetheless, we are reaching the juncture at which the epistemic regress 
argument arises vis-a-vis Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge. For as Sellars is 
quick to point out, if ‘observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is 
green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form X  is a reliable symptom of 
F , then there is ‘an obvious regress in the view that we are examining’. He continues: 
‘Does it not tell us that observational knowledge as time t presupposes knowledge of the 
form X  is a reliable symptom o f Y, which presupposes prior observational knowledge, 
which presupposes other knowledge of the form X  is a reliable symptom o f Y, which 
proposes still other, and prior, observational knowledge, and so on?’ But if there is a 
regress here it has multiple aspects, and only one of those aspects is to be associated 
with the epistemic regress argument.
The problem in general is the following: if the conclusion of the inference to the 
presence of a green object given only a report of ‘This is green’ really is both ultimate 
and authoritative, i.e., non-inferentially justified, then it can only be the case that the 
knowledge of a general truth that s is required to have to be in a position to token ‘This 
is green’ in recognition of its authority, and without impugning its ultimacy, must also 
be both ultimate and authoritative, i.e., must also be non-inferentially justified. That is, s 
must also know the general truth that ‘X  is a reliable symptom o f F  or, roughly 
speaking, that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green 
objects’ in virtue of the fact that it is both ultimate and authoritative, i.e., non- 
inferentially justified. Given this requirement, we can understand the aspects of the 
regress Sellars articulates to resolve themselves around the distinct demands that Fs
166 Ibid, §36, p. 75, original emphasis.
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belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green 
objects’ be both ultimate and authoritative.
$6.4. Sellars and the Epistemic Regress Argument
Something cannot be ultimate unless it is authoritative, however it may be authoritative 
although it is not ultimate. This is indicative, however, of the epistemic primacy of its 
ultimacy. That is, something’s ultimacy is the source of its authority—it will be 
authoritative, so long as it can be recognised as such, in virtue of its being ultimate. For 
the question, of course, is how anything could be authoritative to begin with, and whilst 
something must be able to have authority in virtue of something else having authority, 
that just defers the question of how anything could have authority. What makes 
something ultimate, on the other hand, is not only that it is not inferred from any other 
instances of knowledge, observational or otherwise, but also that its propositional 
content is true in virtue of the fact to which it refers actually obtaining, and it has been 
in some sense causally elicited by that fact. (This is really the third moral to be drawn 
from our considerations to the effect that a report cannot be an instance of observational 
knowledge.) And that is why something’s ultimacy is the source of its authority—it is 
true in virtue of its being ultimate. Therefore, if an instance of empirical knowledge is 
possibly ultimate it is possibly authoritative. (Of course, if the recognition of its 
authority must be inferential and so necessarily undermines its authority, then it cannot 
be that it was ultimate to begin with.) Thus, one question we can ask in regards to s’s 
belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green 
objects’ is whether it is possibly ultimate?
If we assume that s’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable 
symptoms of the presence of green objects’ cannot be ultimate, then this has the 
following implication. As we have seen, the conclusion of the inference to the presence 
of a green object can only be authoritative if it can be recognised as such. Now, if s’s 
belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green 
objects’ cannot be ultimate, then it cannot be authoritative, and, if it cannot be 
authoritative, then s cannot recognise the conclusion of the inference as authoritative. 
But, if s cannot recognise the conclusion of the inference as authoritative, then it cannot 
be authoritative, whether or not it is possibly ultimate. That is, if s’s belief that ‘Reports 
of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ cannot be 
ultimate, then neither that nor the conclusion of the inference can be authoritative.
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The resultant of these considerations is the following diachronic regress of 
conditional justification, which is both the first aspect of the regress Sellars articulates, 
as well as the manner in which the epistemic regress argument arises vis-a-vis Sellars’s 
proposed structure of knowledge. Firstly, if s’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are 
reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ cannot be ultimate, then, given that 
we are assuming that the possibility of unconditional justification is predicated upon the 
possibility of non-inferential knowledge, that we are assuming that the possibility of 
non-inferential knowledge is predicated upon the satisfaction of both the criteria of 
ultimacy and authority, and that the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a 
green object cannot be authoritative if s’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are 
reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ cannot be ultimate, then 
unconditional justification is impossible because neither can be both ultimate and 
authoritative.
Secondly, given that the propositional contents of both s’s belief that ‘Reports of 
‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ and the 
conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green object are reciprocally referential, 
so to speak, then he also understands that it can only be the case that they justify each 
other. That is, if 5 understands that reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of 
the presence of green objects, then he understands that some things can be green, and, if 
he understands that some things are green, then he understands that he should believe 
that reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects. 
And whilst this is not in fact a strict referential reciprocity, in that to understand that 
reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects 5 must 
actually understand both that some things are green and also that, more often than not, 
he is a reliable reporter of green things, semantic precedence would appear to be taken 
by the former because presumably 5 could not understand that he is a reliable reporter of 
green things unless he already understands that some things are green.
So, thirdly, to be justified in believing the conclusion of the inference to the 
presence of a green object s must already know the general truth that reports of ‘This is 
green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects in standard conditions of 
perception, but to be justified in believing that general truth he must have still prior 
observational knowledge that some things are green, etc.
But why should we associate this diachronic regress of conditional justification 
with the epistemic regress argument? This is because it is the most basic regress which 
can accrue to Sellars’s proposed structure of empirical knowledge—any other regresses
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which accrue to that structure presuppose that an answer has been found to this regress. 
That is, issues concerning the recognition of something’s authority do not occur unless 
it can actually be possibly authoritative, and it can only be possibly authoritative if it 
can be possibly ultimate, or if it is possibly authoritative in virtue of something else 
being possibly authoritative because it is possibly ultimate.
Now, every answer to the epistemic regress argument comes with a structural 
dimension, and Sellars’s answer is no different. We have already seen that any kind of 
appeal to non-inferential justification will necessarily involve two strata of knowledge. 
We have also seen that, in demanding that an instance of non-inferential knowledge 
satisfy both the criteria of ultimacy and authority, Sellars is committed to ‘a privileged 
stratum of knowledge’ which is constituted by both observational knowledge and 
knowledge of general truths. As Sellars writes:
all that the view 1 am defending requires is that no tokening by S now of 
“This is green” is to count as “expressing observational knowledge” unless 
it is also correct to say of S that he now knows the appropriate fact of the 
form X  is a reliable symptom o f T.... And while the correctness of this 
statement about Jones requires that Jones could now cite prior particular 
facts as evidence for the idea that these utterances are reliable indicators, it 
requires only that it is correct to say that Jones now knows, thus remembers, 
that these particular facts did obtain. It does not require that it be correct to 
say that at the time these facts did obtain he then knew them to obtain. And 
the regress disappears.167
A variety of things are being said in this passage. Let us focus to begin with on Sellars’s 
claim that ‘all that the view I am defending requires is that no tokening by S now of 
“This is green” is to count as “expressing observational knowledge” unless it is also 
correct to say of S that he now knows the appropriate fact of the form X  is a reliable 
symptom o f T , which is most pertinent to our present structural considerations. The 
point, of course, is that, if both the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green 
object and s’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the 
presence of green objects’ are non-inferentially justified, then they are not inferentially 
connected to each other, whilst each nonetheless presupposes the authority of the other. 
This claim of Sellars’s simply makes this explicit, and in doing so allows us to draw 
some further conclusions.
In making that claim Sellars is making an appeal to the notion of simultaneity o f 
belief In doing so he attacks the notion of inference at the heart of the epistemic regress 
argument. The notion of inference is a diachronic notion, but that of simultaneity of
167 Ibid, §37, pp. 76— 77, original emphasis.
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belief synchronic. If 5 can believe both the conclusion of the inference to the presence of 
a green object and the proposition that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms 
of the presence of green objects’ simultaneously, as a consequence of their both being 
possibly ultimate, and because they are both possibly ultimate they are possibly 
authoritative, then, the thought goes, whilst the recognition of the authority of either 
presupposes the authority of the other, so long as the recognition of the authority of 
either does not presuppose the recognition o f the authority of the other, which would be 
circular, thus impugning their ultimacy, they are in fact justified merely by their 
presence in 5’s epistemic economy. If this is possible, then it is just not the case that the 
only way in which a belief can justify another belief is inferentially.
And yet, remaining with structural considerations, already we might intuit a 
problem for Sellars’s proposed structure of empirical knowledge. This stems from the 
eliminatory conclusion of Sellars’s two hurdles that the only way in which the 
conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green object can be considered both 
ultimate and authoritative is iff s can defend the inference to that conclusion, and so 
recognise its authority, for which it is required the he knows the general truth that 
reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects. But 
whilst this may safeguard the ultimacy of the conclusion of the inference, in that in 
defending his making of the inference 5 is moving onto a distinct justificatory track, it 
would nonetheless appear to presuppose the recognition of the authority of his belief 
that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’. 
That is, for the conclusion of the inference to be recognised as authoritative, it is not 
enough that in defending his making of the inference 5 just asserts that ‘Reports of ‘This 
is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’, we must further ask 
how s’s belief in that proposition is justified for him, i.e., how he can recognise that 
belief as authoritative, and this would appear to entail that the recognition of the 
authority of the conclusion of the inference presupposes the recognition of the authority 
of s’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of 
green objects’.
But this requirement is not necessarily a problem. Note that, so long as the 
recognition of the authority of s’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable 
symptoms of the presence of green objects’, in this specific context, i.e., the defence of 
s ’s making of the inference to the presence of a green object, does not presuppose the 
authority of the conclusion of the inference, then we can say that the recognition of the 
authority of the conclusion of the inference does not presuppose the recognition of the
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authority of the former. The point being that, in a different context, i.e., one without any 
reference to the conclusion of the inference, it must still be possible to recognise s’s 
belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green 
objects’ as authoritative. This is because, if the recognition of the authority of s’s belief 
that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ 
does not presuppose the authority of the conclusion of the inference, then it cannot be 
that reference to that conclusion is required for the former to be recognised as 
authoritative.
That being the case, then all the recognition of the authority of the conclusion of 
the inference really presupposes is the authority of s ’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is 
green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’—it does not presuppose 
the recognition of the latter’s authority. In recognising the latter as authoritative in the 
defence of his making of the inference s is only going through the motions, so to speak. 
And this is a structural requirement: in general, the recognition of the authority of s ’s 
non-inferential observational knowledge cannot presuppose the authority of his non- 
inferential knowledge of general truths in the same way that the recognition of the 
authority of the latter presupposes the authority of the former.
Over and above structural considerations, however, Sellars’s appeal to the 
notion of simultaneity of belief has implications for the possible ultimacy of s’s belief 
that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’. 
And here the point is that, in virtue of that appeal, whatever s has inferred the 
propositional content of that belief from—and given that it is a general content, it is 
flatly objectionable to say that it has not been inferred from something—it will not have 
been inferred from any prior instances of knowledge, observational or otherwise. This 
is because, as we have seen, whilst he cannot understand the propositional content 
‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ 
unless he understands that some things are green, he cannot know that something is 
green unless he can recognise the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green 
object as authoritative, for which it is required that 5 also know the general truth that 
reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects.
So, given that we are assuming that 5 does have a general propensity to 
differentially produce tokens of ‘This is green’ in response to green objects, we can say 
that s’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of 
green objects’ will be possibly ultimate: it will not be inferred from any other instances 
of knowledge, observational or otherwise, and its propositional content will be true in
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virtue of the fact to which it refers actually obtaining, because in some sense it has been 
causally elicited by that fact. We shall take it, then, that in virtue of his appeal to the 
notion of simultaneity of belief, and whatever underlies that appeal, Sellars has an 
answer to the epistemic regress argument.
Note, however, that Sellars does not say that the regress he articulates 
‘disappears’ straight after making the appeal to simultaneity of belief. For he needs to 
illustrate how the required recognition of the authority of s’s belief that ‘Reports of 
‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ does not 
presuppose the authority of the conclusion of the inference. Indeed, if the recognition of 
the authority of s’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the 
presence of green objects’ presupposes the authority of the conclusion of the inference 
to the presence of a green object, then that conclusion cannot be authoritative because it 
cannot be recognised as authoritative without impugning its ultimacy.
The resultant would be the same diachronic regress of conditional justification 
we have already met, yet this time engendered by the fact that the conclusion of the 
inference to the presence of a green object cannot be authoritative, because it cannot be 
recognised as authoritative without impugning its ultimacy, as opposed to the 
impossibility of s ’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the 
presence of green objects’ being possibly ultimate. Indeed, given that it would concern, 
effectively, the recognition of the conclusion of the inference’s ultimacy, since that it is 
the source of its authority, i.e., the recognition of the fact that a putative instance of 
observational knowledge exemplifies a certain epistemic property, namely the property 
of being ultimate, in virtue of which it is acceptable as justified, we should understand 
this aspect of the regress Sellars articulates as the manner in which Bonjour’s argument 
arises vis-ä-vis the former’s proposed structure of empirical knowledge.
But Sellars is alive to this problem, which is why he does not say that the regress 
he articulates disappears after making the appeal to simultaneity of belief. Instead he 
says that that regress disappears only after making the further claim that ‘while the 
correctness of this statement about Jones’—i.e., the statement ‘that no tokening by S 
now of “This is green” is to count as “expressing observational knowledge” unless it is 
also correct to say of S that he now knows the appropriate fact of the form X  is a 
reliable symptom o f T —‘requires that Jones could now cite prior particular facts as 
evidence for the idea that these utterances are reliable indicators, it requires only that it 
is correct to say that Jones now knows, thus remembers, that these particular facts did 
obtain’.
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The idea here is that the recognition of the authority of s’s belief that ‘Reports of 
‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ is to be 
accomplished by 5 citing as evidence for its authority the prior cognitive states he 
inferred that belief from, the particular matters of fact referred to by the propositional 
contents of which he now knows, thus remembers, to have obtained, i.e., which he has 
now recognised as authoritative. So, the thought continues, since 5 did not have to know 
that those prior cognitive states were instances of observational knowledge when he 
inferred the general truth that reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the 
presence of green objects from them, then this should not impugn the ultimacy of his 
belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green 
objects’, and, in parallel, since the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green 
object is not one of those states, then this should not presuppose its authority and thus 
impugn its ultimacy.
What Sellars is attempting here is to characterise how 5 can defend his inference 
to the general fact that reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence 
of green objects. And clearly something like this is required, in that, again, the 
recognition of the authority of 5 ’s  belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable 
symptoms of the presence of green objects’ cannot come via the fact that its 
propositional content is true, or that it has a certain epistemic property. Nonetheless, 
that attempted defence fails. Sellars is saying that, in virtue o f the fact that s has now 
recognised the authority of the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green 
object, because he has now recognised the authority of his belief that ‘Reports of ‘This 
is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’, because he has now 
recognised the authority of the prior cognitive states he inferred that belief from, then he 
has now recognised those prior cognitive states as authoritative, which is flatly circular, 
thus undermining the ultimacy of both the conclusion of the inference and s’s belief that 
‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’.
What has gone wrong? The problem is, for 5 to recognise his belief that ‘Reports 
of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ as 
authoritative via a defence of the inference by which he comes to believe that 
proposition is for s to recognise it as authoritative via the fact that its propositional 
content is true. That is why it presupposes the authority of the conclusion of the 
inference to the presence of a green object: he must have observational knowledge 
pertaining to the objective context at hand, i.e., in this case that something can in fact be 
green, if he is to recognise the particular matters of fact referred to by the propositional
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contents of the prior cognitive states as having obtained, i.e., if he is to have recognised 
those states as authoritative. Thus the circle.
The conclusion we should draw is that, if, as Sellars’s two hurdles dictate, the 
only way in which the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green object can 
be considered both ultimate and authoritative is iff 5 can defend the inference to that 
conclusion, then it cannot be the case, in parallel, that his belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is 
green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ can be recognised as 
authoritative in the same manner. In other words, as we have already seen, the 
recognition of the authority of s’s non-inferential observational knowledge cannot 
presuppose the authority of his non-inferential knowledge of general truths in the same 
way that the recognition of the authority of the latter presupposes the authority of the 
former. What is missing here is the other side of the non-traditional understanding of 
what it is for a belief to be justified. But we will not find its characterisation in Part VIII 
of EPM. Indeed, as set out there Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge is fatally 
flawed. But note that he has left us with a possible line of investigation. Let us recoup 
and return to the question of how 5 understands that he should make the inference to the 
presence of a green object given only a report of ‘This is green’. In other words, what 
kind of ‘ought’ does Sellars ascribe to the correctness of a report, and how does the 
general mode of behaviour licensed by the intersubjective standard of correctness 
applicable to reports of ‘This is green’ enable 5 to understand that he should make that 
inference?
§6.5. Another Kind o f ‘Ought’
A report is to be understood along the lines of a candid thinking-out-loud, i.e., for 
Sellars, the most basic of mentalistic concepts. It is not a deliberative linguistic action 
but nonetheless a linguistic act. As Sellars writes:
Now to say that [a]... thinking-out-loud that something is the case is 
epistemically justified or reasonable or has authority is clearly not to say 
that Jones has correctly inferred from certain premises, which he has good 
reason to believe, that there is a red apple in front of him[, for example]. For 
we are dealing with a paradigm case of non-inferential belief. The authority 
o f the thinking accrues to it in quite a different way. It can be traced to the 
fact that Jones has learned how to use the relevant words in perceptual 
situations,168
l6S Sellars, ‘The Structure of Knowledge’, II, §37, p. 324, original emphasis.
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And whilst Sellars is rather infelicitous here, in that he does not in fact take reports qua 
candid thinkings-out-loud to be instances of observational knowledge, the idea we must 
trace is the final one, relativised to the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a 
green object: authority accrues to the conclusion of the inference in virtue of the fact 
that the report it is inferred from is causally elicited from 5 by a green object in standard 
conditions of perception, and because s ‘has learned how to use the relevant words in 
perceptual situations'—this is why he has a general propensity to differentially produce 
tokens of ‘This is green’ in response to green objects. That is, we must explain the 
impact of the fact that 5 has learned how to use the relevant words in perceptual 
situations upon the possible ultimacy of the conclusion of the inference.
Simply put, reports, being made in perceptual situations, are subject to rules of 
behaviour or what Sellars calls ‘ought to be’ rules, i.e., intersubjective standards of 
correctness which, because they are intersubjective, cannot apply to actions. 169 They can 
only ensure that something is correct or incorrect in virtue of how things should be, 
given the perceptual situation. S should report that ‘This is green’ in regards to a green 
object in standard conditions of perception, but he doesn’t understand that he should 
report that ‘This is green’ in making that report, it is others within his linguistic 
community who understand that he should make that report, because they know that it 
has in fact been causally elicited from him by a green object in such conditions. Indeed, 
it is others within his linguistic community who have inculcated 5 to make that report in 
response to green objects in standard conditions of perception. And this is the key to our 
understanding how 5 can understand that he should make the inference to the presence 
of a green object given only a report of ‘This is green’: in fact he can’t, at least not yet.
To be more perspicuous: a rule of behaviour works in an exclusionary manner, 
so to speak. S is following a rule of behaviour if he differentially responds to all and 
only green objects in standard conditions of perception with reports of ‘This is green’. 
But this has nothing to do with whether 5 understands that he should respond to all and 
only green objects in such conditions with reports of ‘This is green’; it is brute 
behavioural conditioning, so to speak. And it is because of such brute behavioural 
conditioning that 5 makes the inference to the presence of a green object given only a 
report of ‘This is green’. In virtue of that conditioning, if everything has gone correctly, 
i.e., the report has in fact been causally elicited from s by a green object in standard 
conditions of perception, and 5 has learned how to use the relevant words in perceptual
169 Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes, (Atascadero: Ridgeview 
Publishing Company, 1992), pp. 75—77.
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situations (s’s reports of ‘This is green’ are actually subject to a rule of behaviour), then 
all that 5 can infer from a report of ‘This is green’ is the presence of a green object, 
because all that is present in his epistemic economy is the report. There is nothing else 
for him to infer. But, of course, the behaviour of 5 qua inference is intelligible because 
others within his linguistic community understand that the report it was based upon was 
actually causally elicited from 5 by a green object in standard conditions of perception, 
such that it is understood by at least someone that s should have made that inference if 
he had in fact had the choice.
We can now understand what Sellars is really attempting in situating his 
proposed structure of empirical knowledge within the context of the assumption that 
any definite semantics will employ the notion of rule-following. It is the 
characterisation, suitably idealised, of how s can become aware of his own epistemic 
subjectivity, i.e., of how 5 can move from behaviour to action—from consciousness to 
self-consciousness, perhaps. In recognising the authority of the conclusion of the 
inference to the presence of a green object 5 comes to understand that he should have 
made that inference, even though he had no choice. That is, 5 comes to recognise what 
would be the rule of action for a report of ‘This is green’ i f  that report were an action. 
And this has very important implications. If, as it transpires, the inference to the 
presence of a green object is not something 5 understands that he should make, then it 
cannot be that what he should infer from the prior cognitive states is the fact that reports 
of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects. Indeed, it 
cannot be that what is inferable from those prior cognitive states is that fact.
We have seen that, for s to understand that reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable 
symptoms of the presence of green objects, he must understand both that some things 
are green and also that, more often than not, he is a reliable reporter of green things. It 
was also suggested that the former would appear to have semantic precedence over the 
latter, in that presumably 5 could not understand that he is a reliable reporter of green 
things unless he already understands that some things are green. But, in fact, 5 cannot 
understand that some things are green unless he can recognise the conclusions of 
inferences to the presence of green objects as authoritative. Such understanding is what 
goes with the fact that 5 does not understand that he should infer the presence of a green 
object given only a report of ‘This is green’, i.e., that he just believes that conclusion.
And yet, although s does not understand that he should believe that something is 
green given only a report of ‘This is green’, we should allow that, in coming to believe 
that proposition, he can nonetheless do things with it. Indeed, we should allow that he
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can do everything with that proposition that a fully reflective epistemic subject can, 
except those things which require that he has recognised that he should believe it. In 
other words, what s can infer from the prior cognitive states is instead the conditional 
general truth that some things might be green, and, i f  some things are green, then he will 
be a reliable reporter of green things. 170 Therefore, the propositional content of the 
belief via which 5 is to recognise the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a 
green object as authoritative cannot be ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms 
of the presence of green objects’, but must instead be T am a reliable reporter of green 
things’. And now we face a decisive break with Sellars’s proposed structure of 
knowledge as set out in Part VIII of EPM, and specifically in regards to the manner in 
which s’s belief that T am a reliable reporter of green things’ is to be recognised as 
authoritative: the propositional content of that belief is an assumption to be proved, as 
opposed to the conclusion of an inference to be defended.
To be clear, s ’s belief that ‘I am a reliable reporter of green things’ cannot be 
recognised as authoritative in virtue of the fact that it has been inferred from prior 
cognitive states, the particular matters of fact referred to by the propositional contents of 
which he now knows, thus remembers, to have obtained, i.e., which he has now 
recognised as authoritative. This is because the propositional content of his belief that T 
am a reliable reporter of green things’ makes no reference to such states, in that it makes 
no reference to such facts actually obtaining, otherwise it cannot be intelligible for s. 
Moreover, and more importantly, the recognition of the authority of that belief cannot 
presuppose the authority of the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green 
object, and not in the sense that this would, of course, undermine the actual ultimacy of 
both. If 5 cannot infer that he is a reliable reporter of green things from the prior 
cognitive states, then the addition of one more such state to his epistemic economy will 
not tip the balance, even if it is the case that, having inferred the fact that he may be a 
reliable reporter of green things, he now infers the presence of a green object. He still 
cannot understand that things are green, even if he now believes that something is 
green. The virtue of this fact, even if it is in the end only a negative virtue, so to speak, 
is that it allows the extrication of Sellars’s proposed structure of empirical knowledge 
from the predations of Bonjour’s argument. It cannot be that the ultimacy of the 
conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green object will be impugned because
170 Recall that the subjunctive conditional is one o f the things Sellars’s allows our mythological, ‘Rylean’ 
ancestors in his characterisation o f the theoretical introduction of thoughts.
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the recognition of the authority of s’s belief that ‘I am a reliable reporter of green 
things’ presupposes its authority.
Nonetheless, how can s recognise that he is a reliable reporter of green things? 
If it is not in virtue of some things actually being green, as would be the case if it 
presupposed the authority of the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green 
object, then it must be in virtue of something about 5 himself. However, if s’s belief that 
‘I am a reliable reporter of green things’ is to be ultimate, then it cannot be recognised 
as authoritative in virtue of some other fact about himself. The only other possibility is 
that it could be recognised as authoritative without having to go beyond its propositional 
content, i.e., it could be recognised as authoritative via the rearticulation o f its content.
To understand the suggestion here we must recall that, if 5 is a reliable reporter 
of green things, then some things must actually be green. That latter is the suppressed, 
enthymematic portion of the propositional content of s’s belief that T am a reliable 
reporter of green things’. Now, certainly s could in part prove his assumption that he is 
a reliable reporter of green things by exhibiting the fact that he can recognise green 
things, i.e., by pointing them out now. This would be illustrative of the fact that, i f  s 
knows that things are green, then he knows how to apply the concept ‘green’. And this 
would involve the rearticulation of the propositional content of s ’s belief that T am a 
reliable reporter of green things’. S would have called upon—rearticulated—the 
suppressed, enthymematic portion of the propositional content of that belief to show that 
he could recognise green things if there are such things. And yet, again, he cannot 
recognise that he is reliable reporter of green things in virtue of this ability, because he 
cannot tell that those things he has actually pointed out to be green are green unless he 
already knows that he is a reliable reporter of green things. But this is nonetheless a 
pregnant suggestion. Moreover, we should note that, in a context in which he has 
already inferred the presence of a green object the exhibition of this ability is redundant; 
we shall come back to this important point.
The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that s ’s belief that T am 
a reliable reporter of green things’ cannot be authoritative because it cannot be 
recognised as authoritative without impugning its ultimacy. Nonetheless, if this means 
that Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge faces a regress, it is not an aspect of the 
regress Sellars articulates. This is because, even if s’s belief that T am a reliable reporter 
of green things’ cannot be recognised as authoritative without impugning its ultimacy, 
this does not necessarily impugn the ultimacy of the conclusion of the inference to the 
presence of a green object, since the former could never be recognised as authoritative
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in virtue of the latter’s authority. The point being that it might still be possible to 
recognise that belief as authoritative, even though it is not ultimate, in virtue of some 
other instance of general knowledge which is both ultimate and authoritative. There is a 
regress which threatens, then, however it is not a diachronic regress of unconditional 
justification, but just a regress of unconditional justification, diachronic only in the 
reduced sense that inference is a diachronic notion.
§6.6. Sellars and the Agrippan Problematic: A Solution
Still, a regress does threaten. However, in later reviewing his proposed structure of 
empirical knowledge from Part VIII of EPM, Sellars himself offers a pregnant 
suggestion as to how this regress might be avoided. He suggests that s’s belief that T am 
a reliable reporter of green things’ may be recognised as authoritative in virtue of the 
fact that, ‘since agency, to be effective, involves having reliable cognitive maps of 
ourselves and our environment, the concept of effective agency involves that of our’ 
being reliable reporters of green things.171 In other words, Sellars suggests that s’s belief 
that T am a reliable reporter of green things’ is recognisably authoritative in virtue of 
the fact that ‘unless [it is]... likely to be true, the concept of effective agency has no 
application’.172 To that end, Sellars argues that that belief that is recognisably 
authoritative in virtue of s ’s further belief that, to paraphrase Sellars, ‘My IPM 
judgements are likely to be true’,173 where TPM’ is to be understood to refer to all of s’s 
‘introspective, perceptual, and memory judgements’,174 which must be authoritative. 
That is, Sellars’s argument is that, if s ’s IPM judgements are not likely to be true, then 
he cannot be an epistemic subject.
But this argument fails. The question, of course, is: how can s recognise that his 
belief that ‘My IPM judgements are likely to be true’ is authoritative? Sellars is offering 
a this-or-nothing justification of its acceptance as authoritative: whilst s cannot 
recognise it as authoritative, it must nonetheless be authoritative, else he is not, in fact, 
an epistemic subject. And whilst such a this-or-nothing justification is objectionable in 
itself, it in any case raises a further problem for Sellars, in that it actually calls into 
question the very fact that he is using to shield that this-or-nothing justification, i.e., that 
5 is an epistemic subject.
171 Wilfrid Sellars, ‘More on Givenness and Explanatory Coherence’, §82, p. 180, in George S. Pappas 
(ed.), Justification and Knowledge, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 169— 182.
172 Ibid, §83, p. 180.
177 Paraphrase of ibid, §83, p. 180.
174 Ibid, §62, p. 178.
129
To be more perspicuous, for 5 to be an epistemic subject, then it must be that he 
thinks. Indeed, it must be that he can know that he thinks. Now, 5’s belief that T think’ 
will be the conclusion of an inference to that fact given only a report of T think’—this is 
what Sellars’s theoretical introduction of thoughts dictates. But for this to make sense, it 
must be the case that such an inference leaves no logical room for doubt. That is, a 
necessary requirement on such an outlandish characterisation of how s comes to believe 
that he thinks is that it explain away what is perhaps the cardinal epistemic fact to be 
associated with 5 thinking, i.e., that he cannot doubt that he thinks. However, as we 
have seen, in making the inference to the fact that he thinks, 5 does not understand that 
he should make that inference, so it may be possible that he could come to doubt that he 
thinks, and that is a problem—something will have gone awry with Sellars’s theoretical 
introduction of thoughts if it cannot safeguard that fact.
But really there is no problem here. For whilst Sellars’s theoretical introduction 
of thoughts does allow that 5 can doubt that he thinks—s is only reliable, after all, so the 
inference to the fact that he thinks could go wrong—it does not allow that he can do 
anything further with that doubt. To see why this is the case we must note again that, 
given that 5 does not understand that he should think, and so also, if it were possible, 
that he shouldn’t think, any dealings with a doubt of his that he thinks, i.e., his taking it 
as false that he thinks, will again have to take the conditional form: Tf I do not think, 
then...’. But that is logically impossible, because the propositional content of his doubt 
cannot be transposed to the antecedent of the conditional without alteration, entailing 
that it must really be understood as Tf I think that I do not think, then...’, i.e., if 5 
believes—again, takes as true—that he doubts that he thinks. That being the case, the 
propositional attitudes involved in the very articulation of that antecedent must cancel 
each other out—s cannot both believe that he doubts that he thinks and doubt that he 
thinks, so no consequent can be broached. The point being that 5 is effectively trying to 
take two diametrically opposed propositional attitudes to the same propositional content 
at the same time, with the end result being an attitudinal nullility, so to speak.
Therefore, it is only if 5 believes that T think’ that he can do anything further 
with that proposition. Thus, given that he has done something further with that 
proposition, it can only be that 5 believes that T think’. Nonetheless, whilst that belief 
will obviously be possibly ultimate and so possibly authoritative, because in believing 
that he thinks 5 makes it true (the particular matter of fact to which its propositional 
content refers obtains in his very act of believing it), there is the further question of how 
5 can recognise that belief as authoritative.
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Sellars’s argument then, fully unpacked, is really that s’s belief that ‘I think’ can 
only be recognised as authoritative in virtue of his belief that ‘My IPM judgements are 
likely to be true’, which is why the latter must itself be authoritative, because, if  s cannot 
know that he thinks, then he cannot be an epistemic subject. But the problem, of course, 
is that, as in the case of s ’s belief that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms 
of the presence of green objects’, the propositional content of s’s belief that ‘My IPM 
judgement are likely to be true’ makes reference, even if only implicitly, to the fact that 
5 thinks, since his belief that he thinks will be one of those introspective judgements, 
and this is exactly what 5 doesn’t understand as yet because he has not at this juncture 
recognised that his belief that T think’ is authoritative. Therefore, the recognition of the 
authority of s ’s belief that ‘My IPM judgements are likely to be true’ presupposes the 
authority of s’s belief that T think’, so the latter cannot be authoritative because it 
cannot be recognised as authoritative without impugning its ultimacy.
To recognise the authority of his belief that T think’, s requires a belief the 
propositional content of which does not presuppose that he already understands that he 
can think, but which can nonetheless be used to recognise the authority of his belief in 
that fact. The obvious suggestion is the proposition T am a reliable maker of IPM 
judgements’, which, expanded, would read ‘If the things referred to by my IPM 
judgement actually obtain, then I will be a reliable maker of IPM judgements’. But in 
fact this is indicative of a second problem with Sellars’s argument: the proposition T am 
a reliable maker of IPM judgements’ is just not general enough, and so, in this manner, 
also presupposes that s already understands that he thinks. The point being that, if ‘the 
concept of effective agency has no application’ in virtue of the fact that IPM judgements 
are not likely to be true, then, if we are to make epistemic use of this fact, it can only be 
the case that 5 already understands that the concept of ‘effective agency’ has 
application, i.e., that 5 understands that he thinks.
We need to ask, therefore, what enables the concept of ‘effective agency’ to 
have application, and the answer can only be that 5 understands the language, /, in which 
his belief that T think’ is couched. For it is not only paradigmatic of Sellars’s appeal to 
rules of behaviour that, for 5 to understand that he should have inferred something, he 
will require a whole battery of concepts to enable him to come to understand that he 
should have inferred that thing, i.e., for him to come to recognise the conclusion of that 
inference as authoritative, but also paradigmatic of his theoretical introduction of 
thoughts that they are modelled on overt, intersubjective linguistic acts (see §6.1). That
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is, the proposition we are looking for is ‘I understand /’, which, expanded, reads ‘If I 
think, then I understand /’.
We have reached the heart of our argument. The Agrippan sceptic’s challenge is 
a bare challenge: ‘How do you know?’ As we have already noted, at some points this 
challenge appears unintelligible (see §2.2). One of the points where its intelligibility 
came into question was in regards to s’s belief that T think’. However, if s’s ability to 
understand that he thinks requires that he understand a whole battery of other things, 
even in the limited sense of being able to do things with them, then in fact that question 
cannot be unintelligible when asked in regards to his belief that T think’. In such a case 
it is asking: ‘How do you understand that you think?’ This is what the recognition of the 
authority of s ’s belief that T think’ must amount to, i.e., it must be a defence of the 
inference to that conclusion via a defence of the fact that he understands that he thinks. 
The only answer, then, to the Agrippan sceptic’s question is by s asserting that T 
understand /’—he understands that he thinks because he understands the language in 
which that proposition is couched. And the essential thing to notice is that, after such a 
defence of his inference to the belief that T think’, the Agrippan sceptic cannot now ask 
5 how he knows that he understands /. At such a juncture that question really is 
unintelligible, for that question will itself be couched in /. And this is what the 
recognition of something’s authority actually amounts to: it is an inability to question its 
dictates because it is authoritative.
Now, as we have seen, the recognition of the authority of s’s non-inferential 
observational knowledge cannot presuppose the authority of his non-inferential 
knowledge of general truths in the same way that the recognition of the latter’s authority 
presupposes the authority of the former. But how can s recognise the authority of his 
belief that T understand /’ in a context in which no reference is made to the fact that he 
believes that he thinks? In this case only can such a belief be recognised as authoritative 
without having to go beyond its propositional content, i.e., it can be recognised as 
authoritative via the rearticulation of its content, and in the following manner. Again, 
the expanded form of the propositional content of s’s belief is ‘If I think, then I 
understand /’. In defending his inference to the fact that he thinks, 5 assumes the 
consequent of this conditional propositional content; in defending his belief in that 
content itself he assumes the antecedent. That is, 5 assumes that he thinks, and in doing 
so he exhibits the fact that he understands /, because in assuming that he thinks he 
actually thinks, making the propositional content T think’ true by correctly using the 
concepts constitutive of that content. But, of course, since his understanding that he
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thinks requires that 5 understand a whole battery of other things, even in the limited 
sense of being able to do things with them, the Agrippan sceptic can then ask how he 
understands that he thinks. Finally, therefore, having exhibited that he understands / by 
assuming that he thinks, 5 can then infer, still without having gone beyond the 
propositional content of his belief, that he understands /. And once again, the Agrippan 
sceptic cannot ask how 5 knows that he understands /, for that question will itself be 
couched in /. So again, if its is unintelligible to ask how he knows it, then the thing 
which 5 knows must be authoritative.
Up until now we have avoided the question of whether s ’s belief that ‘I 
understand /’ can be possibly ultimate. In a negative sense, since it can be recognised as 
authoritative, and something’s ultimacy is the source of its authority, then it must be 
ultimate for it to be recognisable as such. In a positive sense, we can surely understand 
it as possibly ultimate in a similar manner to which we argued for s’s (rejected) belief 
that ‘Reports of ‘This is green’ are reliable symptoms of the presence of green objects’ 
possible ultimacy. Let us take stock, then, of the juncture we have reached. We have 
effectively argued that, since s can believe both that T think’ and that T understand /’ 
simultaneously, and because they are both possibly ultimate they are possibly 
authoritative, then, whilst either beliefs authority presupposes the authority of the 
other, since the recognition of either beliefs authority does not presuppose the 
recognition of the authority of the other, they are both ultimate, and so justified by their 
mere presence in 5’s epistemic economy. At least in this limit case, it is just not true that 
the only way a belief can justify another belief is inferentially. But we can say more 
than this.
We are now in a situation where we can make epistemic use of the fact that the 
concept of ‘effective agency’ has no application in virtue of the fact that IPM 
judgements are not likely to be true. For in regards to the conclusion of the inference to 
the presence of a green object we can now understand it to be recognisable as 
authoritative in virtue of s reasoning along something like the following lines. After 
defending his making of that inference by asserting that T am a reliable reporter of 
green things’, and so taking himself onto a new justificatory track, s can reason to the 
authority of that belief by then asserting that ‘If I am a reliable reporter of green things, 
then the concept of ‘effective agency’ must have application’. Therefore, given that we 
are assuming that it is in fact true that, if 5 is a reliable reporter of green things, then he 
is able to apply the concept of ‘effective agency’, we can allow that 5 can infer the 
consequent of that conditional propositional content, i.e., that the concept of ‘effective
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agency’ does have application. So, in defence of that further conclusion 5 will have to 
show that the concept of ‘effective agency’ has application, and, of course, he does this 
by asserting that ‘I think’, i.e., by showing that the concept of ‘effective agency’ has 
application. Finally, therefore, he defends his assertion that he thinks by asserting that ‘I 
understand /’. And again the Agrippan sceptic cannot trouble him.
Moreover, we can achieve a similar result strictly in regards to 5’s belief that ‘I 
am a reliable report of green things’ alone. In this case, the inference is simply elided, 
and the line of reasoning begins with that belief itself, except in its expanded form, i.e., 
the belief that ‘If things can be green, then I am a reliable reporter of green things’, and 
it proceeds by 5 assuming the antecedent, i.e., by 5 exhibiting the fact that he can 
actually recognise green things by pointing them out, illustrating that he knows how to 
apply the concept ‘green’ if things can be green, and so allowing him to infer the 
consequent, at which point the line of reasoning continues to the end-point already 
specified.
The structure of empirical knowledge which emerges from these considerations 
is much as was previously specified, with one rather large exception: it will consist of a 
privileged stratum of knowledge constituted by both observational knowledge and 
knowledge of one general truth, viz. s' s belief that T understand /’. That latter is the only 
general truth which resides in that privileged stratum. All of s 's other knowledge of 
general truths, and specifically those required for him to recognise instances of 
observational knowledge as authoritative, will be authoritative in virtue of s’s belief that 
T understand /’ being authoritative, so they camiot be ultimate.
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Conclusion
The requirements of space dictate that, in lieu of a properly synoptic conclusion, I will 
instead conclude by drawing out how Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge, 
amended in the manners which I have proposed, satisfies the morals of the three 
applications of the Agrippan sceptic’s general argumentative methodology over and 
above the epistemic regress argument, i.e., the evidential regress argument, Bonjour’s 
argument, and the problem of the criterion (although not in that order), and certain 
further conclusions we can draw from this. I will then highlight a clear problem for 
Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge, but, importantly, not one engendered by the 
general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic. The point being that, even 
if we are to reject Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge in light of this problem, the 
manner in which it attempts to respond to the general argumentative methodology of the 
Agrippan sceptic would seem in any case to be successful, and could perhaps be 
replicated.
In coming to recognise both his belief that T think’ and his belief that T 
understand /’ as authoritative and so justified, in virtue of the fact that he cannot ask 
himself how he knows those things without falling into unintelligibility, I have 
suggested that 5 comes to understand that he both thinks and understands /. This can be 
understood to be signified by a certain dialectical movement, from 5 asking himself how 
he knows those things to why he knows those things. That is, given that, if it is 
unintelligible for 5 to ask how he knows that he both thinks and understands /, then it 
must be the case that he does know those things, this does not tell 5 why he knows those 
things, in the sense of why his thinking ensures that he understands /, and why his 
understanding / ensures that he thinks; nonetheless, the question of why he knows those 
things assumes that he does know those things.
As we have seen, what is truly unintelligible is for 5 to ask himself how he 
knows that he understands /, as that question is itself couched in /. S' s belief that T 
understands /’—or, extended, his belief that Tf I think, then I understand /’—is to be 
understood as the criterion by which 5 comes to recognise that he knows things. The 
moral of that application of the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan 
sceptic which I called ‘the problem of the criterion’ was that at some point an 
assumption simply had to be made in regards to the explanation of empirical knowledge 
(§2.4). 5”s belief that T understand /’ is clearly that assumption, at least in regards to 
Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge. But though it is an assumption, I have
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illustrated how, made in certain contexts, i.e., in regards to the defence of the inference 
to s’s belief that ‘I think’ or via the rearticulation of its extended form, it is an 
unquestionable assumption—indeed, a (non-inferentially) justified belief
Notice that s’s belief that ‘I understand V is unquestionable in either context. 
This is indicative of the fact that he can come to recognise that he knows that he 
understands l either way. That is, it is not necessary for s to both defend his inference to 
his belief that T think’ as well as rearticulate the extended form of his belief that T 
understand /’ for him to be justified in believing the latter. This clarifies how the 
authority of each of those beliefs presupposes the authority of the other: the 
presupposition is a semantic and so epistemic presupposition—without either belief 5 
cannot recognise that he understands the propositional content of the other, but if he has 
both beliefs then he can recognise their authority in either context.
Notice that I said that 5 could recognise the authority of both his belief that T 
think’ as well as his belief that T understand /’ in either context. This is, of course, for 5 
to move back from his recognition of the authority of the latter to the recognition of the 
authority of the former because the latter is authoritative. And here is where the 
question of why he knows that he understands / comes in. The explanation for why 5 
understands / is because he has exhibited his understanding of / in believing that T 
think’. Since his believing the proposition T think’ is his thinking the proposition T 
think’, he makes that proposition true in believing it, and in so doing shows that he 
understands what it for something to be true.
The moral of that application of the general argumentative methodology of the 
Agrippan sceptic which I called ‘the evidential regress argument’ was that we must be 
able to illustrate that our empirical concepts actually hook onto the mind-independent in 
some way (§3.2). Moreover, that argument mandates that, to illustrate that our empirical 
concepts actually hook onto the mind-independent, certainty must occur at least 
somewhere in our structure of knowledge. And it is here, with the recognition of the 
authority of s’s belief that T think’, in which Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge 
provides for such certainty. For again, in his believing that T think’ s makes that 
proposition true, such that its ‘chances of being false are nil’. Furthermore, s’s belief 
that T think’ is not isolated in its certainty: we have seen how the recognition of the 
authority of any particular matter of fact or general truth is to be funnelled through that 
belief, via the illustration of the fact that the concept of effective agency has application, 
i.e., that s thinks. Thus its certainty can be understood to suffuse the entirety of s’s 
empirical knowledge.
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Which brings us to the moral of that application of the general argumentative 
methodology of the Agrippan sceptic which I called ‘Bonjour’s argument’. That moral 
was that we cannot separate the two supposed domains of empirical knowledge—the 
mind-independent and the mind-dependent—as with a knife, i.e., that introspective and 
memory knowledge, say, is just as empirical as, e.g., knowledge of mind-independent 
objects (§3.3). And this is exactly what we find in Sellars’s proposed structure of 
knowledge. For in an epistemic sense s’s knowledge of mind-independent objects is 
dependent on his introspective knowledge that he thinks for the recognition of its 
authority, and yet in a semantic sense unless 5 is actually in touch with those mind- 
independent objects, and in a reliable manner, he could never come to believe that T 
think’ in any case—the concept of effective agency would have no application.
The story of this thesis has been one in which the epistemologist’s reaction to 
the Agrippan problematic is connected to his theory of concept-acquisition and 
accompanying semantics (§2.2).175 The premise of the epistemic regress argument, i.e., 
the most fundamental application of the general argumentative methodology of the 
Agrippan sceptic, is that all justification is inferential. I argued that there were two 
assumptions underlying this premise, which were, firstly, that the only way a belief can 
justify another belief is inferentially, and, secondly, that a reason to believe some 
proposition is always epistemically distinct from belief in the proposition it concerns 
(§2.1). We have moved from questioning the second assumption underling the premise 
of the epistemic regress argument with the foundationalist, to questioning neither of 
those assumptions with the coherentist, to questioning the first of those assumptions 
with Sellars. We have also moved from an atomistic semantics with the foundationalist, 
to a holistic semantics with the coherentist, to a holistic semantics with an 
accompanying tale concerning how we acquire our concepts, and specifically our 
mentalistic concepts, with Sellars.
We have also seen how we can understand the ostensibly paradoxical statement 
at the heart of the Agrippan problematic, i.e., that we require empirical knowledge to 
explain empirical knowledge, and yet we cannot assume any empirical knowledge in 
order to explain empirical knowledge, to be just that—ostensibly paradoxical (see the 
introduction and §2.2). We must assume empirical knowledge in order to explain its 
possibility—s 's belief that T understand /’ is exactly such an assumption. However, 
even though it is assumed it is actually an instance o f empirical knowledge, and can be 
shown to be such before such an explanation begins. That is, the explanation of
175 Not his definite semantics, it might now be said, but more like his theory o f concepts.
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empirical knowledge—the question of why s knows what he knows—presupposes that 5 
already knows certain things, or it could not get started.
Yet there is a clear problem with Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge, and 
this is not that it has no obvious bearing on Cartesian scepticism, although that is also 
true. It is the problem of how the rules of behaviour Sellars’s appeals to in order to 
ensure that the conclusion of the inference to the presence of a green object given only a 
report of ‘This is green’ can be meaningful for 5, even though he does not know why— 
in virtue of what—it is meaningful for him, can exist. For if there is not a regress of 
justification involved in the appeal to such rules, surely there is a regress of meaning. 
That is, how do those others in his linguistic community whom have internalised the 
rules of action for a report of ‘This is green’, such that they can secondarily apply them 
to the behavioural modification of s when confronted by green objects in standard 
conditions of perception, come by those rules? If a diachronic regress of language users, 
each in turn behaviourally conditioning the one whom comes after, is to be avoided, it 
can only be that, at some point, Sellars must deal with the fact that linguistic rules 
would appear to arise from a world devoid o f intentionality.
However, to conclude, if this is a problem for Sellars, in a certain sense it is just 
as much a problem for the Agrippan sceptic. For, perhaps unlike the Cartesian sceptic’s, 
the general argumentative methodology of the Agrippan sceptic would seem to be 
dependent on the possibility of meaning, in that he is doing nothing if his bare challenge 
‘How do you know?’ is just not intelligible—we cannot talk about anything, let alone 
knowledge, if meaning is impossible. Indeed, I suspect this is the key to the Agrippan 
problematic. That is, however it is with Sellars’s proposed structure of knowledge, and 
here we are really concerned with the definite semantics that underlies it, the manner in 
which to approach the hoped for dissolution of the Agrippan problematic is via the 
question of how his bare challenge ‘How do you know?’ can be so much as intelligible.
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